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Abstract 
Perceived failures in top-down climate governance and many emerging bottom-up 
activities have prompted scholars to pay more attention to the promise and limits of 
polycentric governance, in which activities are spread across many levels, actors, and 
scales (E. Ostrom, 2010c; E. Ostrom, 2014b). In adopting the Paris Agreement, policy 
makers also appear to be moving in the direction of greater polycentricity. But many 
aspects of polycentric governance remain theoretically and empirically underexplored, 
especially with a view to policy evaluation, a vital but often neglected governance 
activity. This thesis addresses these gaps by: (1) considering the potential (theoretical) 
role of policy evaluation in polycentric governance and (2) empirically exploring the 
case of the European Union, an active adopter and evaluator of climate policy whose 
climate governance has been described as polycentric. The thesis argues that polycentric 
governance theory is based on three foundational ideas, namely that that actors can and 
do self-organize, that context matters in governance, and that governance centres, while 
independent, interact in order to fully realize the benefits of polycentric governance. 
These foundational ideas provide a means to explore climate policy evaluation, and to 
connect with related debates in the evaluation literatures. Fresh empirical data from a 
new database of 618 climate policy evaluations (1997-2014) suggest that formal (state) 
actors produced many more evaluations that informal (societal) ones—pointing to 
limited self-organization and a key role for public actors in evaluation—but that 
informal evaluations also emerged in empirically detectable and relevant quantities. By 
using a new coding scheme to analyse a sub-set of the evaluations this thesis reveals that 
the limited attention to various contextual factors and the fact that climate policy 
evaluation tends to happen in and focus on individual governance centres restricts the 
potential travel of evaluative insights from one governance centre to another. In toto, the 
empirical characteristics equip climate policy evaluation only partially to facilitate 
polycentric climate governance in the EU.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Climate change and polycentric governance 
In an era of rising global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (see Jackson et al., 
2017) and palpably insufficient policy responses, there is growing concern about 
whether existing governance systems are capable of dealing with the immense challenge 
of climate change. The widely perceived failure of the Kyoto-based approach to address 
climate change by top-down negotiations has precipitated many newer, more bottom-up 
approaches to climate governance (see Jordan et al., 2015), typified by the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement in late 2015 (Oberthür, 2016). By that time, scholars had already 
spent a decade or so exploring governance alternatives to the Kyoto approach (e.g., 
Lilliestam et al., 2012; E. Ostrom, 2010b; Stewart, Oppenheimer, & Rudyk, 2013; 
Victor, House, & Joy, 2005). These include for example private and transnational 
initiatives (Abbott, 2011; Bulkeley et al., 2014), as well as regional or local public 
policy responses. Taken together, and especially in the area of climate change 
governance, these activities have increasingly been described as polycentric; that is, 
spread across many governance levels, actors, and scales (Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; 
Jordan et al., 2015; E. Ostrom, 2014b). 
According to Elinor Ostrom (2010b, p. 552),  
polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing authorities at 
differing scales rather than a monocentric unit […]. Each unit within a 
polycentric system exercises considerable independence to make norms 
and rules within a specific domain […]. 
Note that polycentric governance assumes no central coordinating authority, and yet, her 
definition still speaks of a ‘system.’ This way of thinking about governance first entered 
academic discussions in the 1960s, when US-based scholars started debating the 
2 
advantages and disadvantages of different forms of organizing public goods provision, 
such as policing (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). They searched for ways to 
coordinate governance activities in the absence of top-down hierarchies or markets (E. 
Ostrom, 2010a). 
But why do some scholars favour polycentric governance, especially in the case of 
climate change? One argument is that, in contrast to more centralized (or monocentric) 
governance, polycentric systems have inherently greater flexibility to muster governance 
responses commensurate with the nature of the problems they seek to address and that 
they are more resilient to failures in individual parts of the system (E. Ostrom, 2010b). 
Drawing on such notions, researchers argue that 
The utility of polycentricity in the context of the climate regime is 
premised upon a theoretical conviction that collective action is more 
likely than otherwise to take place in a form of small scale networks as 
they better facilitate face-to-face interactions promoting trust and 
reciprocity among the actors involved […]. (Lee, Su Jung, & Lee, 2014, 
p. 33) 
Another argument is that polycentric arrangements allow for greater experimentation, 
which may generate new solutions to unresolved issues—a supposedly key attribute for 
climate change, whose mitigation still remains an immense challenge (Jordan et al., 
2018). 
These arguments on the merits on polycentric governance proved especially 
attractive to climate governance scholars because the Kyoto-based approach had stalled 
and many emerging efforts to address climate change had in fact already taken a 
polycentric form (Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; Jordan et al., 2015; Abbott, 2011; Cole, 
2011; 2015; E. Ostrom, 2010c; 2014b; Victor et al., 2005), but were not necessarily 
designed as such. But even though discussions on polycentric governance have been 
gaining traction in scholarly and policy-making communities, many of the core 
assumptions and building blocks of polycentric governance have not yet been fully 
explored—neither theoretically nor empirically. This thesis therefore asks precisely 
3 
which factors enable polycentric governance systems to function? In particular, this 
thesis focuses on evaluation as one such potential factor, whose growing presence has 
been acknowledged in climate governance debates (e.g. Hildén, Jordan, & Rayner, 
2014; Huitema et al., 2011), but which has not yet been sufficiently explored from a 
polycentric perspective. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: the next section provides a 
more detailed overview of polycentric governance. The third section turns to policy 
evaluation in polycentric governance systems and how to analyse its important but 
under-specified role. The chapter’s last section includes an exposition of the research 
aims and objectives, and discusses the empirical focus of this thesis, namely climate 
policy-making in the European Union (EU), which boasts considerably polycentricity 
and is also an active evaluator of climate policy, and closes with an overview of this 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Polycentric governance: an overview 
Unpacking the role of evaluation in governance from a polycentric perspective 
first requires clarifying the meaning of the latter. To do so, an analytical distinction 
between ‘polycentricity’ and ‘polycentrism’ is a subtle, but potentially helpful way to 
understand its inner workings.2 Linguistically, the term ‘polycentricity’ is a 
nominalization of the adjective ‘polycentric,’ thus according to the Oxford English 
                                                 
2 The existing literature remains unclear on the use of these different terms and many authors simply use 
them interchangeably without justification. For example, Aligica (2014) peppers his second chapter with 
‘polycentricity’, ‘polycentrism’ and ‘polycentricism’ (see p. 47, third paragraph). Such loose use of 
terminology risks adding to the “Tower of Babble” that Elinor Ostrom (2006, p. 4) admonished. A review 
of the three terms with Google Books NGram viewer shows that ‘polycentricity’ and ‘polycentrism’ enjoy 
much wider use than ‘polycentricism’ (see Appendix 1). 
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Dictionary connoting “[t]he fact or quality of being polycentric.” In other words, 
‘polycentricity’ may be best understood as a descriptor to indicate the apparent structure 
of governance activities. By contrast, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
‘polycentrism’ describes “a situation involving several important elements or powerful 
parties; [but also] a system or theory having or proposing many centres or focal points.” 
But what type of approach is polycentric governance, or polycentrism? 
Early on, scholars described polycentrism as a ‘concept’ (V. Ostrom, 1999a) for 
theorizing the efficient functioning of metropolitan governments. However, since then, 
polycentrism has been used in a variety of contexts and for a variety of analytical 
purposes. As Aligica and Sabetti (2014a, p. 9) write, “[p]olycentricity3 is a complex 
multifaceted concept and it is yet to be fully and systematically elaborated as an 
analytical instrument.” The same scholars go on to assert that polycentrism has 
descriptive, heuristic, explanatory, and normative functions (Aligica & Sabetti, 2014a; 
see also Jordan et al., 2018). What thus becomes clear is that polycentrism is more than 
a ‘descriptive picture’ or metaphor for governance processes, a criticism that has often 
been levelled at multi-level governance (e.g., Jordan, 2001). Some have even gone as far 
as identifying and drawing on ‘polycentric governance theory’ (Abbott, 2011), or 
arguing that the Ostrom enterprise is about “[…] advancing a theory of polycentricity” 
(Aligica, 2014, p. 38).  
Elinor Ostrom herself helpfully distinguishes between frameworks, theories, and 
models (E. Ostrom, 2007). In a nutshell, frameworks are most general as they specify 
which elements or variables are relevant in relation to an overall phenomenon (e.g., 
institutions in Ostrom’s work). By contrast, “[…] theories focus on a framework and 
make specific assumptions that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a problem, 
explain its processes and predict outcomes” (E. Ostrom, 2007, p. 25). Last, models 
“make precise assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables […]” (E. 
                                                 
3 Scholars tend to use the terms ‘polycentricity’ and ‘polycentrism’ interchangeably. I will use the term 
polycentrism going forward. However, when citing other scholars, the imprecision in the use of these 
terms will still appear. 
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Ostrom, 2007, p. 26). Polycentrism is too narrow to qualify as a general framework for 
analysis, but it is certainly broader than a model. It thus appears to be a mid-range 
theory, which seeks to describe and explain some but certainly not all parts of 
governance processes, so it may best be understood as an emerging governance theory. 
Over time, corresponding efforts have been underway to refine the initial definition of 
polycentric governance. One recent example includes McGinnis (2016, p. 5) who writes 
that 
A polycentric system of governance consists of (1) multiple centers 
[sic] of decision-making authority with overlapping jurisdictions (2) 
which interact through a process of mutual adjustment during which they 
frequently establish new formal collaborations or informal commitments, 
and (3) their interactions generate a regularized pattern of overarching 
social order which captures efficiencies of scale at all levels of 
aggregation, including providing a secure foundation for democratic self-
governance. (emphasis in original) 
Here, we can see how numerous elements have been added to Ostrom’s definition, 
including the structure of the governance system, processes within it, as well as broader 
normative considerations on democratic governance. Chapter 2 returns to the theoretical 
building blocks of polycentric governance in greater detail. 
Since the 1960s, scholars have been engaging in considerable empirical efforts to 
test various aspects of polycentrism. Substantial work has focused on common-pool 
resource (CPR) governance, centring on activities within individual governance centres 
rather than on the interactions between them (E. Ostrom, 1990). This work has often 
been conducted on relatively small CPR management systems, such as inland fisheries 
or forestry (E. Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom, 2005). Some scholars have tested their 
theoretical expectations with quite broad empirical examples, such as the scientific 
community or the common law system (Tarko, 2017). In more recent work on climate 
change, Elinor Ostrom drew heavily on the normative and descriptive aspects of 
polycentrism without clearly specifying underlying causal relationships that may add to 
or detract from functioning polycentric systems (E. Ostrom, 2010c; 2014b). The 
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polycentric idea has spurred considerable response from scholars to consider activities 
in individual centres of governance, but much theoretical and empirical work remains to 
fully explore the factors that may enable polycentric governance systems to function. 
This is especially true when it comes to applying the insights from CPR systems to 
higher levels of governance (see also Singleton, 2017).  
Vincent Ostrom long argued that the polycentric idea proves relevant well beyond 
relatively small scales of governance. He discusses such aspects with a view to 
federalism in the United States, but also when writing about metropolitan governance 
(V. Ostrom, 1999a). To date, there remains however a dearth of further theoretical and 
empirical work to understand exactly how to apply the insights from more local 
explorations of polycentrism to larger scales of governance. Scholars who study 
governance at different scales argue that, from an analytic perspective, this kind of up-
scaling, also a key element of federal theory, most likely succeeds if problem and 
solution characteristics are similar across scales regarding the nature of the 
problem/resource, and the wider social and cultural environment (Gupta, 2008). The 
extent to which problems and solutions can be scaled (i.e. implemented at another level 
of governance) has been termed ‘transferability,’ and when this is not possible, 
‘transformation’ may be needed in order to adjust to particular contexts (Gupta, 2008). 
In response to such arguments, McGinnis and Ostrom (2008, p. 195) hold that 
experiences from lower governance levels may indeed be relevant for global governance 
questions for the following reasons: 
1. “The analytical structure of some global problems shares similar features 
with the analytical structure of many local CPRs [common pool 
resources]. 
2. Concepts and tools devised for the analysis of local CPRs provide a solid 
foundation for building theories and models appropriate for application 
at a global level. 
3. Many global problems (e.g., deforestation) are themselves the result of 
inadequate solutions at a micro level of a complementary and interactive 
commons problem.” 
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In a similar vein, Keohane and Ostrom (1994, p. 2) argue that 
Not surprisingly, many of the ‘design principles’ underlying successful 
self-organized solutions to CPR [common pool resource] problems 
appear relevant to the design of institutions to resolve problems of 
international cooperation as well as those at a strictly local level. For 
example, both students of local CPRs and of international regimes have 
identified effective monitoring arrangements as crucial for promoting 
widespread compliance with rules […] 
These arguments suggest that there are theoretical reasons why ‘up-scaling’ may work, 
especially with a view to climate change.  
What makes polycentrism interesting and relevant to contemporary (climate) 
governance is the way in which it conceptualizes relationships but also independence 
among multiple governance centres and the actors contained therein. Importantly, in 
contrast to hierarchies and networks, different governance centres can move at different 
speeds without obstructing overall progress. Elinor Ostrom thus suggests that this may 
help to avoid gridlock, which she claimed had long plagued the predominantly top-down 
international approach to climate governance (E. Ostrom, 2010c; 2014b). At heart, the 
idea of a polycentric governance ‘system’ revolves around interacting but independent 
governance centres, which sometimes compete and/or learn from each other, and that 
this competition and learning can under certain circumstances produce substantially 
‘better’ policy outcomes than hierarchical systems (V. Ostrom et al., 1961). As far as 
individual governance centres in polycentric systems are concerned, Elinor Ostrom 
(2005, p. 259) proposes a number of revised design principles to ensure effective 
organization for common pool resource governance within them, namely “clearly 
defined boundaries, proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, collective 
choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
minimal rights to organize [and] nestled enterprises.” While she acknowledges that even 
if these conditions are met results may not always be positive because some actors 
simply do not self-organize or because small governance centres have only limited 
scientific possibilities (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 282), even fewer theoretical insights are 
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available regarding how governance centres interact productively to form a polycentric 
‘governance’ system (and whether indeed we can speak of a system at all). This thesis 
focuses on how evaluation may foster polycentric governance in the case of climate 
change. 
 
1.3 The role of evaluation in polycentric governance systems 
A system of polycentric governance would amount to more than the sum of its 
parts by capitalizing on synergies that arise from its systemic aspects, such as mutual 
learning among the governance centres within the system. In order to effect the shift 
from ‘polycentricity’ to ‘polycentrism,’ or from a polycentric form to a polycentric 
governance system, scholars have advanced the normative claim that formally 
independent governance centres have to interact to a certain degree. In their widely cited 
article, Vincent Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) recognized this by highlighting that 
To the extent that they [governance centres] take each other into account 
in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and 
cooperative undertakings or have resource to central mechanisms to 
resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area 
may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable 
patterns of interacting behavior [sic]. To the extent that this is so, they 
may be said to function as a ‘system.’ (p. 831) 
Simply paying attention to activities and experiences in other governance centres will 
not necessarily generate a polycentric system because after all, governance actors must 
act on this information in one way or another, otherwise it would be futile to speak of a 
‘system.’ 
Only if governance centres interact can we properly speak of a polycentric 
‘system’ or the emergence of polycentrism (see above). So how do they interact and 
what role may evaluation play in this process? In her writing, Elinor Ostrom implicitly 
assumes that knowledge flows between governance centres. For example, she writes that 
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“[a]s more information is provided about these small-scale, but cumulatively additive, 
benefits [of emissions reducing activities], one can expect further efforts to be 
undertaken that cumulatively and significantly reduce GHG emissions” (E. Ostrom, 
2010c, p. 553). But she falls short of exactly specifying from where and from whom this 
information is thought to emerge, aside from general references to higher governance 
levels (E. Ostrom, 2010c), and she does not explicitly address and discuss evaluation. 
Other scholars have gone somewhat further. For example, Abbott (2011, p. 586) writes 
with a view to enabling interactions that 
Information and networking schemes […] are particularly important in 
this regard […] if cities, firms, CSOs [civil society organisations], and 
other actors are to observe their peers on a global scale, benchmark their 
strengths and weaknesses, and learn from their successes and failures, 
schemes that facilitate interaction, disseminate information, and 
encourage learning are essential. (emphasis added) 
But again, precisely from where and how the information emerges remains 
unclear. In the world of public (i.e. state) policy, can ex-post (i.e. retrospective) 
evaluation be a vehicle to generate systematic and evaluative insights on the 
functionality and effects of policy interventions in particular governance centres in a 
polycentric system? While policy-makers may of course use other ways to learn from 
and/or ‘evaluate’ policies, such as their own personal perceptions or ideological 
preferences, evaluation can in principle provide systematic and in-depth analysis of the 
effects of individual (climate) policies. However, evaluation may also be subject to the 
same political pressures that apply in other aspects of policy-making, hence its existence 
and especially its quality should not be assumed (Bovens, Hart, & Kuipers, 2006).  
Are there consequently certain characteristics of policy evaluation that may be 
particularly paramount in order to facilitate polycentric governance? Polycentric 
governance theorists have long argued that monitoring and enforcement often works 
better in the hands of localities rather than in a centralized fashion (E. Ostrom, 2010b; 
2014b; see also Cole, 2011), but they fall short on discussing the specific characteristics 
of evaluations in polycentric systems. Symptomatically, there has to date only been 
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minimal engagement between emerging literatures on polycentric governance and 
policy evaluation.  
A first crucial step in specifying evaluation’s potential role in polycentric 
governance (see Chapter 2) is to complement the discussion of the latter with (an 
operational) definition of evaluation. As Furubo, Rist and Sandahl (2002, p. 2) admit, 
“[i]f asked for a definition of evaluation, the attempted answer might be seen as a never-
ending story” (see also Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Evaluation has generally been 
described as “[…] the process of determining the merit or worth or value of something; 
or the product of that process” (Scriven, 1981, p. 53). Thus, it is undeniably a normative 
endeavour (Fournier, 2005; Vedung, 1997). But not all definitions recognize this. 
Consider, for example, the OECD (2002), which defines evaluation as “[t]he systematic 
and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its 
design, implementation and results” (p. 21; emphasis added). Such claims to objectivity, 
however, contradict those who argue that evaluation is fundamentally value-based. 
Others thus define evaluation more broadly. For instance, the Encyclopedia of 
Evaluation sees it as 
[…] an applied inquiry process for collecting and synthesizing evidence 
that culminates in conclusions about the state of affairs, value, merit, 
worth, significance, or quality of a program, product, person, policy, 
proposal, or plan. Conclusions made in evaluations encompass both an 
empirical aspect (that something is the case) and a normative aspect 
(judgment about the value of something). It is the value feature that 
distinguishes evaluation from other types of inquiry, such as basic 
science research, clinical epidemiology, investigative journalism, or 
public polling. (Fournier, 2005, p. 139-140) 
This definition is relatively broad and encompasses many different potential targets of 
evaluation; furthermore, it makes a clear distinction between basic science research and 
evaluation. 
But what about (public) policy evaluation? Crabbé and Leroy (2008) explain that a 
definition of policy evaluation hinges in part on what we mean by ‘policy’ or the ‘policy 
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process.’ They propose three fundamental views of policy, which envision different 
roles for policy evaluation: those who envision policy as a rational process of problem-
solving see evaluation as a ‘control loop’ or correcting device that indicates how well a 
policy ‘solves’ the problem it seeks to address. However, as the idea of entirely rational 
policy-making has proven increasingly problematic, policy has also been conceptualized 
as a ‘political’ or ‘discursive’ interaction (see also Fischer, 2006). Policy then becomes 
the result of interactions between actors who exercise their power in order to further 
their interests – and evaluation thus a way of understanding these interactions (Crabbé & 
Leroy, 2008). Finally, a policy may be seen as an ‘institutional phenomenon’ where 
institutions structure and stabilize human behaviour; thus the task of evaluation 
broadens even further to include a study of these institutions (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). 
Underlying this argumentation is that policy, and in particular public policy is a course 
of action that is typically undertaken by public or governmental actors – though of 
course, there are numerous broader meanings of policy that will not be considered here 
(Hill & Varone, 2017). While the concept of policy remains fuzzy, this thesis 
conceptualizes it as a course of action by governmental actors in order to solve some 
perceived problem. 
Numerous authors emphasize that evaluation is also a purposeful process, geared 
towards providing insights for policy makers. Accordingly, the prominent scholar Evert 
Vedung (1997, p. 3) defines policy evaluation as a  
careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth, and value of 
administration, output and outcome of government interventions, which 
is intended to play a role in future practical action situations. 
 
Along very similar lines, Crabbé and Leroy (2008, p. 1) write that policy evaluation 
is a scientific analysis of a certain policy area, the policies of which are 
assessed for certain criteria, and on the basis of which recommendations 
are formulated. 
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The latter definition is useful, because it clearly delineates evaluation as a ‘scientific 
analysis’ – in other words not a position or advocacy paper by an interest group or a 
newspaper article – and it also explains that evaluation comes with a purpose. But not all 
definitions of evaluation include a purpose. For example, Fischer (2006) writes that 
“[p]olicy evaluation is […] the activity of applied social science typically referred to as 
‘policy analysis’ or ‘policy science’ (p. 2). Clearly, this definition focuses on the process 
of evaluation, rather than its outcome. 
This thesis broadly follows Vedung’s (1997) definition (see above) given the 
public policy focus of this thesis, but empirically it casts a somewhat wider net as 
suggested by Huitema et al. (2011), who argue that producing recommendations for 
policy-makers is certainly an important, but not a necessary characteristic of policy 
evaluation. Policy evaluation may, as Crabbe and Leroy (2008) point out, be conducted 
for other purposes and by non-state actors for many different target audiences, some 
going well beyond policy-makers (Huitema et al., 2011). The efficacy of evaluation-
based recommendations is further questionable given that the uptake of (evaluation) 
knowledge or ideas in policy is often not straightforward and may take long to manifest 
(Johnson et al., 2009; Radaelli, 1995). Finally, in line with Scriven’s (1981) definition, 
this thesis understands and studies evaluation both as a ‘process’ and as an ‘outcome.’ 
Evaluation is a process because it is in many ways a practice, which often involves the 
interaction of numerous actors who together decide what is of value and what is not (see 
the second definition of policy above). However, in line with Huitema et al.’s (2011) 
approach, frequently the outcome of this process are evaluation reports (hereafter 
‘evaluations’), which in turn become the backbone of the empirical analysis in this 
thesis. 
 
1.4 Analysing policy evaluation 
Policy evaluation has been debated in academia and elsewhere ever since it rose to 
prominence more than five decades ago (Stame, 2003). In these debates, the EU and its 
constituent parts have served as important loci of evaluation activity (Stern, 2009; 
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Summa & Toulemonde, 2002; Toulemonde, 2000). However, most of the corresponding 
evaluation literatures consist of prescriptive ‘how to’ guides for evaluations and they 
tend to be practitioner rather than theory-led. In other words, by extension of Hill’s 
(2017) argument on policy analysis, much of the existing literature focuses on 
‘evaluation for policy’ rather than analysis of evaluation. In a ‘field’ that is already 
heavily infused with normative elements, this development may risk that evaluation 
theorists speed away from the realities that evaluators encounter in their daily work and 
the evaluation they practice. There is some evidence that this may be happening – for 
example, Christie (2003) found that evaluators were at best partially informed by 
normative and prescriptive evaluation theory. Thus, no less than the former President of 
the American Evaluation Association, Debra Rog, argues that “[w]e need more study of 
evaluation practice itself; we need to accumulate knowledge about evaluation” (Rog, 
2012, p. 38). This is especially the case for the role of evaluation in polycentric 
governance. 
In order to understand how policy evaluation in the EU may facilitate polycentric 
governance it is thus wise to take ‘analysis of policy evaluation’ as a starting point. As 
Hill (2017, p. 5) argues, in principle, “[e]valuation marks the borderline between 
analysis of policy and analysis for policy” because it “[…] may be either descriptive or 
prescriptive.” A smaller, but emerging literature focuses on analysis of evaluation 
(Segerholm, 2003; see also Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 228), and there have been 
repeated calls to do more of this, including in the context of social science and political 
science theory (Duscha, Klemisch, & Meyer, 2009; Vo & Christie, 2015). King (2003, 
p. 57-60) identifies six reasons why much less work has been done to test evaluation 
theory so far: 
 Lack of conceptual consensus 
 Practical focus 
 Continuing focus on evaluation models and methods 
 Focus on program theory 
 Lack of research support 
 Relatively young field 
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According to King (2003), the ‘lack of conceptual consensus’ originates from the 
interdisciplinary nature of the evaluation field, whereas the practical focus of many 
evaluators has afforded little room for them to critically analyse their own theory and 
practice. Finally, there tends to be little funding available for studying evaluation, in part 
because this is still a relatively new field. These reasons notwithstanding, there is some 
research on the politics of policy evaluation, as well as the use of evaluation theory and 
methods in different settings (see Chapter 2). For example, Segerholm (2003) urges 
researchers to study evaluation within its wider political and organizational context and 
suggests using the ‘evaluation cycle,’ which comprises evaluation initiation, 
implementation, results, utilization, as well as the evaluation context and evaluation’s 
theoretical orientation as a framework in such studies. This is particularly important 
given that governance arrangements tend to shape policy evaluation by for example 
demanding that evaluation fulfil different roles and policy evaluation may in turn 
become a critical element in governance debates and arrangements (Gore & Wells, 
2009; see also Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017).  
In a similar vein, Radaelli and Dente (1996) argue that the role of policy 
evaluation can only be understood after analysing how policies are made—and show 
how early evaluation theory (‘the age of innocence’) relied on linear and rational 
conceptualizations of policy-making, and thus an instrumental and direct role for 
evaluation knowledge, while later theories began to engage with the incremental, 
evolutionary, and often highly political nature of policy processes, and thus foresee a 
different role for evaluation, such as providing new ideas that percolate slowly into 
policy-making, or a moderator role for evaluators. Attention to ‘systemic’ factors also 
emerged in the evaluation literature, for example in an edited collection by Rist and 
Stame (2011), who argue that individual evaluation studies are increasingly insufficient 
and that it is therefore necessary to understand evaluation from a broader and systemic 
perspective. In sum, there is a drive to understand evaluation activities more broadly. 
This thesis endeavours to contribute to such analysis of evaluation in polycentric 
settings. Lack of analysis of evaluation goes hand-in-hand with similarly low levels of 
interaction between the evaluation and (polycentric) governance literatures (Segerholm, 
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2003). For instance, Hanberger (2012, p. 10) writes that “[t]ere is clearly a dearth of 
knowledge regarding how M&E [monitoring & evaluation] work and function in 
different models of governance.” This also includes evaluation activities in the context 
of the nation state (Segerholm, 2003). But will more knowledge in this domain generate 
benefits because “[i]f more attention is paid to the governance structure in which 
evaluation is embedded, we can arrive at a better understanding of the implications of 
evaluation in public policy and governance […] (Hanberger, 2012, p. 10)? 
Some of this work has already begun because changing governance arrangements 
in multiple contexts have not entirely escaped the attention of evaluation theorists. For 
example, Hertting and Vedung (2012) explain how some elements of existing evaluation 
approaches may be useful to evaluate policies enacted through governance networks, 
while some new elements may be needed to cater to existing governance debates (e.g., 
accountability). However, as Gore and Wells (2009, p. 161) argue, 
[…] while the interest in governance by the evaluation community is to 
be welcomed, it has to date confined itself either to issues of evaluation 
method (e.g., participatory methods), to using evaluation to contribute 
better to policy making (e.g., democratic evaluation), or to designing 
evaluation frameworks (e.g., to take account of new governance 
arrangements). There appears a continued absence of more theoretically 
informed work which sets out, for example, how issues of power, 
resource dependency, ideas, and networks shape policy outcomes. 
Whilst some scholars have studied policy evaluation across the EU’s multilevel 
environment (e.g., Mickwitz, 2013), surprisingly little has been written about 
evaluation’s role in increasingly polycentric governance settings. In fact, even as 
recently as 2015, Jacob et al. argue that there is “[…] little systematic comparative 
research across countries… and this body of research is still at a relatively early stage” 
(p. 2). On the one hand, one may argue that multiple centres of governance need 
standardized evaluation practices and metrics in order to compare their policy outcomes 
(see Duscha et al., 2009; V. Ostrom, 1999b). However, efforts to standardize policy 
evaluation systems may go against the very essence of polycentric governance (see E. 
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Ostrom, 2014b). Taken together, it thus remains an open question whether highly 
uniform evaluation practices can deliver on such diverging policy needs or whether a 
more decentralized form of evaluation would be more useful (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 
2017). 
In recent years, scholars have developed important analytical categories in order to 
analyse policy evaluation. For this thesis, an absolutely central way to look at policy 
evaluation from a polycentric perspective is to distinguish between formal (i.e. state-
driven) and informal (i.e. society-driven) evaluation (Hildén et al., 2014; Schoenefeld & 
Jordan, 2017). Polycentric governance scholars have time and again emphasized that 
states are not the sole sources of governance – or evaluation - (see Chapter 2), and thus 
counsel to look at both state and non-state actors, especially in order to assess the 
capacity of different governance actors to self-organize. Evaluation theorists, too, have 
for several decades written on the nature of different evaluation actors, and especially 
considered them with a view to their independence from the state (see Chapter 2). If we 
can establish that both formal and informal evaluations constitute important factors in 
facilitating polycentric governance, then the relationship between them also matters. Are 
the contributions of formal and informal evaluations to polycentric governance unique 
and complementary or are they similar and perhaps overlapping? Looking at evaluation 
from the polycentric perspective in effect means to identify how far evaluation 
facilitates polycentric climate governance in the EU, but also to be open to the 
possibility that evaluation itself may have polycentric characteristics (Schoenefeld & 
Jordan, 2017). This is because in line with the arguments on state and non-state actors 
above, evaluation is certainly not limited to different public actors, but also includes 
private or third-sector actors. Nevertheless, we have so far only a very limited 
understanding of what their respective contributions via evaluation may be. Therefore, 
the distinction between formal and informal evaluation is a core way to study evaluation 
in this thesis.  
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1.5 Overview of this thesis 
The central aim of this thesis is to understand precisely which factors enable 
polycentric governance systems to function, with a particular focus on the potential and 
actual role of policy evaluation. This aim translates into two specific objectives: 
Objective 1: Identify the key foundational ideas of polycentric governance theory 
and relate these to relevant debates on policy evaluation in order to understand the 
potential role of evaluation in facilitating climate governance.   
Objective 2: Test these theoretical expectations in the case of the European Union 
in order to understand the actual role of evaluation in climate governance. 
Empirically, this thesis focuses on climate change policy-making in the European 
Union, which exhibits considerable polycentricity in its approach to governance. The 
EU does not have a single locus of authority and decision-making, but rather multiple 
routes through which different actors, most importantly Member States and the EU’s 
main institutions (Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice) decide on and conduct (climate) governance (Peterson & 
Shackleton, 2012; T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013). Scholars have pointed to “the EU’s 
inherent polycentricity—i.e. its active encouragement of experimental efforts at multiple 
levels, with active steering of actors at local, regional, and national levels […]” in 
climate change policy-making (T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013, p. 75) as a source of its 
strength (see also M. D. McGinnis, 2016; E. Ostrom, 2010c). This structure did not 
emerge completely by accident – in fact, the “EU’s ‘founding fathers’ deliberately set 
out to prevent power from accumulating in ways that had dragged Europe into two 
world wars” (Jordan, Van Asselt, Berkhout, Huitema, & Rayner, 2012, p.46). But even 
though European institutions were certainly consciously designed and shaped, they have 
also taken on a life of their own, especially because the Commission has always had the 
exclusive right to propose policies (see Peterson & Shackleton, 2012). Climate change 
policy has often been an area that is understood to work particularly well – a system 
where international policy leadership appears to emerge from a ‘leaderless,’ polycentric 
system (T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013). 
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For example, while the EU as a whole has not been able to agree on firm long-
term emissions reduction targets beyond 2030—it only has political targets until 2050 
(see Dupont & Oberthür, 2015), the UK’s Climate Change Act contains a much longer-
term legally binding emissions target by 2050 (Benson & Lorenzoni, 2014), and other 
states have other preferences (Jordan, Huitema, Van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010; 
Oberthür, 2016). Numerous actors in the EU including its Member States, institutions at 
the EU level and sub-national actors have been deploying policies in order to address 
climate change for well over thirty years (Jordan et al., 2010)—so much so that the 
number of individual climate policy instruments from Member States alone had swollen 
to over 1,300 by 2013 (Schoenefeld et al., 2018). But what counts as a (public) climate 
policy? The answer to this question is by no means a trivial matter, because, as Feldman 
and Wilt (1996, p. 63) explain, “[…] there is a practically limitless range of activities 
that may be counted as having an impact on global climate change.” The difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that what constitutes a policy is also contested, as public 
policies are often related to a range of (non)decisions by governmental actors that may 
change over time (see Hill & Varone, 2017). Drawing on Hill (2017), this thesis 
therefore defines climate policies as courses of action undertaken by governmental 
actors in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
This thesis builds on the notion that governance arrangements influence policy 
evaluation and that policy evaluation has the potential to become an important element 
of governance (Gore & Wells, 2009). Climate change policy in the EU is a suitable 
setting to explore such dynamics, because it exhibits much ‘polycentricity’ and because 
the EU is also an active evaluator of environment (European Environment Agency, 
2016; Mickwitz, 2013) and especially climate policy (Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 
2011; Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). This thesis focuses on three key governance centres 
in the EU, namely the EU governance level, as well as Germany and the UK (both 
national level only). The latter two are not only the two top-emitters of greenhouse gases 
in the EU (and thus highly relevant climate change policy actors), but importantly for 
this thesis they are also known for their efforts to address climate change and to evaluate 
their policies (Derlien, 2002; Gray & Jenkins, 2002; Jacob, Speer, & Furubo, 2015; 
Wurzel & Connelly, 2011). As the two largest governance centres in polycentric climate 
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governance in the EU, they are thus highly relevant places to explore the role of policy 
evaluation. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
review of polycentric governance theory with a view to a theoretical role of policy 
evaluation in facilitating climate governance. It distils three foundational ideas of 
polycentric governance and relates these ideas to relevant debates in policy evaluation 
literatures. Note that the extensive debates of (evaluation) knowledge utilization (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2009; Rich, 1991) remain, by and large, outside the scope of this thesis. 
In addition, while the focus of this thesis is ex-post (i.e. retrospective) climate policy 
evaluations, literatures on environment and climate policy evaluation in the EU context 
suggest that ex-ante (prospective evaluation of future policy impacts; often termed 
‘impact assessment’ (Radaelli, 2010; Turnpenny, Russel, Jordan, Bond, & Sheate, 
2016)), ex-nunc (monitoring ongoing policy) and ex-post evaluation (Crabbé & Leroy, 
2008) may at times be used together or not be clearly distinguishable in theory and 
practice. Relatedly, Chapter 3 explains how the data that EU Member States collect on 
climate policies includes aspects of ex-ante, ex-nunc, and ex-post data (Hildén et al., 
2014; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). In doing so, Chapter 3 draws on the theoretical review 
in order to uncover important research gaps on climate policy evaluation at the EU level, 
as well as in Germany and in the UK, which are some of the most productive sites of 
climate policy and corresponding evaluation.  
Chapter 4 describes the research methods employed in this thesis, including the 
novel coding scheme for analysing evaluations and the new database of climate policy 
evaluations from the aforementioned jurisdictions. Importantly, this thesis focuses on 
climate mitigation (i.e. it does not consider adaptation policy). But the scope 
nevertheless includes a broad range of policies with a view to those that states report as 
climate policy to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)—(see Huitema et al., 2011; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). Chapters 5 and 6 
present the coding results, namely on state-based (formal) and society-based (informal) 
climate policy evaluations respectively and their key characteristics with a view to 
facilitating polycentric governance. Chapter 7 presents an empirical comparison of 
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formal and informal evaluations. Chapter 8 contains a detailed, theoretical analysis of 
the empirical findings. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a reflection on how 
evaluation could in theory and how it actually facilitates polycentric climate governance 
in the EU, policy recommendations, and some ideas for future research in this important 
topic area. 
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Chapter 2 Policy Evaluation in Polycentric 
Governance Systems 
2.1 Introduction 
A key starting point for polycentric governance scholars is the idea of 
heterogeneity in governance, which the Oxford English Dictionary loosely defines as 
“composed of diverse elements or constituents.” “The Ostroms pointed toward 
heterogeneity, diversity, context, and situational logic as critical elements in the analysis 
of institutions, governance, and collective action” (Aligica, 2014, p. 5). While 
heterogeneity can take many forms, referring to diversity in capabilities, preferences, 
beliefs, information, but also social, cultural or linguistic aspects (Aligica, 2014, p. 4-5), 
this chapter focuses on the conceptual consequences of such heterogeneity for theorizing 
the role of policy evaluation in the shift from polycentricity to polycentrism (see 
Chapter 1).  
To do so, this chapter provides an overview of polycentric governance theory in 
terms of positivism, normative elements and key variables. It then disentangles three 
foundational ideas or assumptions on which polycentrism builds, namely that context 
matters in governance, that actors can and do self-organize in order to address pressing 
governance challenges and that governance centres, while independent, interact to fully 
generate the hypothesized benefits of polycentric governance. The chapter explains the 
origins of these ideas, specifies their theoretical implications for polycentric governance 
and draws together key existing empirical research. This is done in order to assess how 
the idea of monitoring currently features in work on polycentrism, and how related key 
insights may be developed in order to analyse what role evaluation may play to 
contribute to the shift from polycentricity to polycentrism with a view to the 
foundational insights. To do so, the chapter ultimately combines polycentric governance 
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and policy evaluation literatures in novel ways in order to advance polycentric 
governance and policy evaluation theory. The chapter concludes by further elaborating 
and specifying the key empirical research gaps, which Chapter 1 already flagged, and 
which will be addressed in the chapters that follow. 
 
2.2 Positivism, key variables, and normative theory  
From the outset, and as Chapter 1 recognised, it is critical to appreciate that theory 
on polycentrism contains a subtle blend of both normative and positive elements 
(Aligica, 2014; M. D. McGinnis, 2016). In his early and later re-published work, 
Vincent Ostrom explains that polycentrism does not simply provide an explanation of 
the status quo, but is rather a theory which is capable of making normative prescriptions, 
such as identifying necessary conditions for polycentrism to work (V. Ostrom, 1999a). 
In more recent contributions, the normative element has become even more pronounced, 
as for example McGinnis and Ostrom (2012) specify what “polycentric governance 
requires” (p. 15; emphasis added). In sum, the polycentric approach must be understood 
as both a positive and a normative project. 
Such normative considerations should however not obscure the extraordinary 
amount of empirical work that scholars in and around the Ostrom Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis4 have been undertaking for at least five decades in order to 
gauge the (normative) polycentric approach against empirical realities. Elinor Ostrom’s 
book on Governing the Commons (1990) draws on vast empirical evidence to validate 
and further develop key polycentric ideas. Her ‘design principles’5 for common pool 
                                                 
4 http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/ 
5 Elinor Ostrom’s design principles for successful CPR governance (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 90): 
1. Clearly defined boundaries. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements. 
4. Monitoring. 
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resource governance systems have since found further empirical support around the 
world (E. Ostrom, 2005). Given decades of empirical work and particularly Elinor 
Ostrom’s affinity for ‘grounded research’ and interdisciplinarity (E. Ostrom, 2005), it 
would be inappropriate to relegate polycentrism to the realm of purely normative 
governance theories. By the same token, polycentrism clearly contains normative 
elements, which will likely become stronger as polycentrism gains traction and 
application on numerous issues, including climate governance. In fact, Aligica (2014) 
argues that Elinor and Vincent Ostrom have moved from empirical explorations towards 
more normative elements over time. In fact, 
Certain normative assumptions and preferences are undoubtedly and 
inescapably embedded at a very basic and intuitive level in the 
perspectives advanced by scholars, like the Ostroms, who explore 
collective action and institutional arrangements. (Aligica, 2014, p. 17) 
This thesis thus endeavours to make these normative elements explicit and engage with 
them in the context of studying policy evaluation. 
The presence of normative aspects in polycentrism derives from the Ostroms’ 
general scholarly approach, which seeks to elevate theory over methods (Aligica & 
Sabetti, 2014a, p. 2). This approach reacts to the positivist doctrine starting in the 1960s, 
where scholars endeavoured to build theory starting from empirical insights (E. Ostrom, 
2014a). By contrast, Elinor Ostrom (2014a) advocates that “[…] the development of 
theory precedes the choice of appropriate methods to test a theory” (p. 218). She 
furthermore elaborates that “[…] theory has also come to mean for many political 
scientists a set of logically connected statements without the requirement that 
assumptions used in a theory have themselves already been established as empirical 
laws” (p. 218; emphasis in original). However, reverting back to an earlier point, Elinor 
                                                 
5. Graduated sanctions. 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. 
8. Nested enterprises (for common pool resources that are part of larger systems). 
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Ostrom also had a strong affinity for empirical work. Consequently, she argues that 
while “theory precedes empirical work […], empirical studies help to refine our 
theoretical understanding of the world […].” (E. Ostrom, 2014a, p. 222). Taken 
together, Elinor Ostrom thus advocates a dialectic relationship between theory and data, 
but an approach that allows normative elements because theory comes before empirics. 
This general stance may in part explain the presence of normative elements in 
scholarship on polycentrism. 
There has of course been a strong movement in political science and related fields 
to develop context-independent and generalizable theory. As Benjamin (1982, p. 69) 
argues, 
During periods of relative social-economic and political stability, social 
scientists are lured into a false sense of security regarding the ahistorical 
validity of empirical generalizations. 
Thus, if social conditions are ever changing and unstable, Benjamin (1982, p. 93) 
 holds that 
[t]he continual need to develop, question, and reformulate theory (the 
general structuring principles that allow a temporary but necessary 
ordering of the political and social processes) should now be considered 
the most important element of the logic of inquiry on which to 
concentrate. If one grants this point, then the context, assumptions, 
conceptualization, and reconceptualization of the way the questions are 
formulated takes on crucial significance. 
According to Austen-Smith and Banks (1998, p. 259), a “[p]ositive political 
theory is concerned with understanding political phenomena through the use of 
analytical models which, it is hoped, lend insight into why outcomes look the way they 
do and not some other way.” These models typically include assumptions such as 
rational individuals or the way individuals interact in game-theoretic situations (Austen-
Smith & Banks, 1998). While polycentrism provides a normative panoramic vision of 
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the governance landscape, many of the inner workings – both in normative and 
empirical terms – have yet to be fully explored. 
2.3 Polycentrism – three ‘foundational’ ideas 
Building on the underlying ideas of heterogeneity in governance (see above), the 
polycentric governance approach flows from and finds support in three foundational 
ideas. The first foundational idea of polycentrism is that polycentric governance 
emerges precisely because actors at various levels have the capacity and, given adequate 
circumstances, the willingness to self-organize. In earlier writings, Vincent Ostrom has 
pointed to the “self-organizing tendencies” of such actors in polycentric systems (V. 
Ostrom, 1999a, p. 59). In order to self-organize, (new) actors need governance systems 
that are sufficiently open and flexible, a sense that they have some capacity to affect and 
change the rules to which they are subjected, and a feeling of motivation to actively 
participate in enforcement (V. Ostrom, 1999a). In this process, self-organizing actors 
may thus benefit from sufficient, place-sensitive information on previous climate 
policies that is readily available and accessible (see above). If these conditions are met 
and actors self-organize, outcomes may be ‘better’ than top-down solutions.  
Polycentric governance theory holds that this is because those who have 
knowledge of the particular ‘local’ governance context tend to be better placed and 
willing to make rules and regulate their own behaviour. In recent decades, empirical 
evidence from common pool natural resource management literatures has built up to 
emphasize this point. Crucially, the assumption that actors will always deplete common 
pool resources in the absence of coercion from a higher authority (Hardin, 1968) does 
not withstand empirical scrutiny across all cases (E. Ostrom, 1990), although Elinor 
Ostrom very much recognizes potential drawbacks of polycentric governance 
arrangements, such as the possibility for free riding and potential under-provision of 
public goods (E. Ostrom, 2010c). In fact, across multiple natural resource types 
including fisheries, and water or timber production, local actors managed to build 
enduring institutional systems to self-govern their local resource use (E. Ostrom, 1990). 
Thus, in some cases actors appear to exhibit the capacity to self-organize and 
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outperform top-down solutions. This thesis assesses to what extent this proposition 
materializes in the case of climate policy evaluation. 
The second foundational idea is that context matters and that no rule or policy will 
produce effects irrespective of their wider context (Aligica, 2014). Elinor Ostrom and 
others conceptualize the influence of ‘context’ through the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) Framework. According to McGinnis (2011, p. 51),  
The IAD framework contextualizes situations of strategic interaction by 
locating games within social, physical, and institutional constraints and 
by recognizing that boundedly rational individuals may also be 
influenced by normative considerations. 
This line of reasoning underpins one of Elinor Ostrom’s key messages, namely that 
there are no policy ‘panaceas’ that will hold in all situations irrespective of the context 
(E. Ostrom, Janssen, & Anderies, 2007). Different contexts require different approaches 
as there is no one-size-fits-all approach.  
This insight has long been acknowledged in international climate governance. In 
1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stated 
that in order to address climate change, “[…] policies and measures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts […]” (Article 3[3]). In consequence, it is 
only by paying close attention to the context that analysts can understand how actors and 
rules generate particular effects (Aligica, 2014)—and by extension policy evaluation 
should, therefore, also be place and time specific. Furthermore, because context and 
‘local’ conditions matter, multiple solutions at various governance scales including 
many actors may thus generate ‘better’ outcomes than a single, hierarchical approach. 
This is one of the most central ideas of polycentrism. However, “[n]o a priori judgment 
can be made about the adequacy of a polycentric system of government as against the 
single jurisdiction” (V. Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 838). The effectiveness of polycentric 
governance depends, at least in part, on its fit with the wider context into which it is 
placed. Building an understanding of the successes and failures of polycentric 
governance systems thus requires close attention to context—including in (public) 
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policy evaluation. Therefore, learning across contexts requires intimate knowledge of 
contextual variables—including historical, geographical, cultural or ideational aspects to 
name but a few (Aligica & Sabetti, 2014b). 
The third foundational idea holds that if polycentrism is to emerge, governance 
centres need to interact, but without generating strong interdependencies. But what is a 
‘governance centre’? Scholars in the polycentric tradition differ in their understanding. 
For example, Elinor Ostrom (2012, p. 355) writes that “[a] polycentric system exists 
when multiple public and private organizations at multiple scales jointly affect 
collective benefits and costs”, thus taking an ‘organization’ as the core unit of analysis. 
In a slightly different way, Vincent Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, p. 831) write 
about “centers [sic] of decision-making” as the core unit, with less emphasis on 
‘organizations.’ In a different vein, Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 257) stresses that “complex, 
polycentric systems of governance that are created by individuals”, thus focusing on 
people. In other places in the same book, Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 269) writes about “the 
presence of governance activities organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” 
(emphasis added). These differing definitions show that what constitutes a ‘governance 
centre’ is by no means clear, as it may range from individuals to all types of 
organizations or enterprises all the way to more fuzzily described ‘centres of decision-
making.’ To complicate things more, a recurring theme in Elinor Ostrom’s scholarship 
is that governance centres are ‘nested’ (see quote above), which creates the challenge to 
not only tell governance centres apart in a horizontal, but also in a vertical, way and to 
understand their potential linkages. Looking across the relevant literatures, the ideas of 
‘decision-making’ and ‘independence’ run quite deeply and are probably theoretically 
more relevant than the exact nature of the organization (or the number of people 
involved) that make up a governance centre. This thesis defines governance centre in a 
broad sense, that is, as any organization or organizational unit that has authority to make 
some decisions and is reasonably independent in doing so (see V. Ostrom et al., 1961). 
This definition therefore encompasses the level of the nation state and supra-national 
organizations like the EU. 
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Linked to the idea of ‘nesting,’ what drives interactions between centres of 
governance in polycentric systems? There are numerous potential mechanisms. Vincent 
Ostrom believed that governance centres will interact more or less automatically if they 
have sufficient incentives to do so (V. Ostrom et al., 1961). Overlapping jurisdictions 
may be one reason why centres interact. For example, writing on the IAD, McGinnis 
(2011, p. 52) proposes that interaction may take place through a “network of adjacent 
action situations” (NAAS) where individuals or organizations simultaneously participate 
in multiple rule-making venues in a polycentric system. These individuals or 
organizations become bridges between different governance centres to foster interaction. 
In other cases, interaction may emerge because of market-like competition—for 
example, when different governance centres offer the same service. If two municipal 
governance entities provide the same service, people are likely to choose the one that 
they see as most favourable, depending on the dimension that matters most to them (e.g., 
cost; quality of the service, etc.). However, scholars from other fields have proposed a 
range of additional mechanisms. For example, policy diffusion and transfer scholars 
distinguish between learning, competition, coercion and mimicry as forms of interaction 
(Marsh & Sharman, 2009). While multiple disciplines have identified these kinds of 
mechanisms, scholars differ significantly on which mechanisms matter more and, 
importantly, how much external stimulus may be required to stimulate interaction. By 
definition, the polycentric approach excludes ideas around top-down coercion, as 
governance centres are a priori thought to be independent. 
In climate change governance, the threat of ‘carbon leakage’ provides one 
potentially strong (external and market-driven) incentive for governance centres to 
experiment with reducing their carbon dioxide emissions efficiently and potentially 
cooperatively. Carbon leakage generally refers to the idea that actors may shift activities 
that cause carbon pollution from jurisdictions with more regulation to those with less in 
a classic ‘race to the bottom’ (E. Ostrom, 2014b). Thus, if public policy-makers perceive 
carbon leakage as a threat—such as heavy industry moving to other countries, with 
corresponding job losses—they may have significant incentives to identify the least 
intrusive ways to reduce carbon emissions and ensure that other governance centres take 
equivalent action.  
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An additional reason to look beyond one’s own governance centre is to learn from 
the successes and failures of others, especially because policy-makers tend to be risk-
averse (Howlett, 2014). While the concept of policy learning has been subject to much 
scholarly debate, multiple authors point to learning as some change in behaviour or 
beliefs, following the impact of experience, new information, or changing circumstances 
(Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Of particular interest to this thesis is ‘lesson drawing,’ 
which is one form of learning that focuses on using the ‘lessons’ or experiences from 
one governance context in another (Rose, 1991; 1993). Thus, Rose (1991) explains that 
A lesson is here defined as an action-oriented conclusion about a 
programme or programmes in operation elsewhere; the setting can be 
another city, another state, another nation or an organization’s own past. 
(p. 7) 
Crucially, rather than being compelled by some top-down authority, “lesson-
drawing tends to be voluntaristic” (Rose, 1991, p. 9) and thus fits well with ideas on 
polycentric governance. Climate policies may, for example, generate politically 
desirable side-effects, such as improvements in human health or reducing congestion (T. 
M. Thompson, Rausch, Saari, & Selin, 2014). Learning about experiences with such 
(beneficial) side effects and their political consequences may thus be another incentive 
to seek information about experiences in other governance centres. Lesson-drawing is 
not the ‘normal’ state of affairs, but rather emerges from an underlying level of 
‘dissatisfaction’ with the status quo that prompts a search for lessons from elsewhere 
(Rose, 1991). The aforementioned risk aversion among policy-makers may be one such 
source of ‘dissatisfaction.’ In the area of climate change, where there are currently no 
examples of far-reaching policy success in addressing this global issue, governance 
centres may be especially interested in the experiments of others as a key source of 
lessons  (Aligica, 2014, p. 66; Goodin, 1996, p. 42; Hildén, Jordan, & Huitema, 2017). 
An issue of course emerges with regard to the previous points about context. If 
context matters in policy-making, how can one learn from others? Following McConnell 
(2010), there are those who argue that policy is so contextual that nothing can be learnt 
across governance centres. By contrast, others contend that policies work irrespective of 
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the context through set mechanisms (e.g., the power of the market to efficiently allocate 
resources). Between these arguably extreme positions is what McConnell (2010, p. 200) 
terms the ‘familial way’ of contexts. In other words, while contexts may differ on a 
range of conditions, some settings are more similar than others. For example, if a 
country has a democratic parliamentary political system, all else being equal, a 
successful policy may be more likely to succeed in another country with a similar 
political system rather than a very different one (e.g., an authoritarian state). Thus, it 
may be possible to determine to what degree contexts are reasonably similar. This is of 
course no guarantee of success (McConnell, 2010). However, if a governance centre 
wishes to learn from the experiences of another, it may be helpful to decipher which 
contextual conditions were critical for the success of a particular intervention, and if 
those conditions are present elsewhere (see Benson & Jordan, 2011). 
This view of automatic interactions driven by a range of incentives contrasts with 
insights from other governance literatures that point to the need to stimulate interaction 
in some circumstances (e.g., Jordan & Schout, 2006). There are reasons to believe that 
self-organization and consequently ‘taking into account’ may not be automatic, 
something which has stimulated numerous debates on ‘meta-governance.’ In the 
absence of strong market signals or other powerful incentives—which is often the case 
in the public sector where duplication of services may be seen as a waste of resources—
other mechanisms may be necessary in order to generate enough pressure to compel 
governance centres to pay attention to one another. In other words, it may be necessary 
to externally induce some of the dissatisfaction that Rose (1991) considers essential for 
lesson-drawing to happen. This is also because while it may be perfectly rational from a 
collective standpoint to learn from others and continually improve governance practices, 
numerous factors such as vested interests, path-dependent behaviour, pre-existing 
institutions and general political inertia bolstered by overburdened policy-makers, may 
prevent such learning in practice, thus necessitating other forms of coordination. 
Hierarchies are one way to achieve this (see Peters, 1998), but hierarchy does not sit 
well with the Ostroms’ ontology of self-organization and may in some cases may not 
even be possible (notably in the international climate regime at the time of writing).  
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In increasingly networked arrangements, where neither markets nor hierarchies 
force coordination, mutual taking-into-account, or what others have termed ‘policy 
coordination’, may thus be subject to substantial collective action dilemmas (Jordan & 
Schout, 2006), an issue that the whole polycentric governance approach seeks to address 
(E. Ostrom, 1990). Even though the system as a whole could benefit from learning, 
individual governance centres may not be able or willing to draw lessons from others or 
provide their own lessons. For these reasons, some higher-level incentives, if only 
through coordination, may be necessary to drive interaction in polycentric systems (see 
also Hale & Roger, 2013; Jordan & Schout, 2006). To make this happen, ‘political 
pressure’ or some resource provision from ‘on high’ may be needed (Jordan & Schout, 
2006, p. 271). 
Polycentric governance scholars have over time acknowledged the need for 
‘higher-level institutions’ to some extent. In her work on polycentrism, Elinor Ostrom 
advocates a subtle blend of self-organization by local actors and “some larger-scale 
jurisdiction” (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 282). Ostrom is less clear, however, on the origin and 
precise nature of this ‘larger-scale jurisdiction.’ On the one hand, she argues that 
sometimes pre-existing higher governance levels (e.g., state structures) are ineffective 
and it may therefore be advantageous to grow higher-level structures from lower levels: 
Success in starting small-scale initial institutions enables a group of 
individuals to build on the social capital thus created to solve larger 
problems with larger and more complex institutional arrangements (E. 
Ostrom, 1990, p. 190) 
On the other hand, she argues on the same page that in a key case study on Californian 
water governance, recourse to pre-existing institutions such as the (public) court system 
proved vital in fostering self-organization among local actors. In a similar vein, Aligica 
(2014) stresses “[…] an over-arching system of rules […] (p. 57) as one of the ‘three 
basic features’ of polycentrism (p. 58)—which may be an ‘institutional and cultural 
framework’ (p. 58) that determines who participates in a polycentric governance 
system” (p. 59).  
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Based on the latter reasoning, Mansbridge (2014) argues that Elinor Ostrom in fact 
frequently alluded to higher-level governance functions that are often—but not 
always—conducted by states. Based on her reading of Ostrom, Mansbridge (2014) 
emphasizes that: 
Ostrom’s polycentric model assumes some levels higher than the local, 
which can threaten to impose other solutions, provide neutral 
information, provide venues and support for the local negotiation, and, 
crucially, sanction non-compliance. (p. 9) 
Mansbridge (2014) goes on to argue that more traditional public actors including states 
may deliver some or all of these four functions. Notably, although Mansbridge (2014) 
does not specifically define what she means by ‘the state,’ her discussion of fairly wide-
ranging functions included in the above quote appears to allude to a broad definition of 
what precise institutions are thought to form part of the state. This is in line with a 
relatively broad description in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, which defines 
‘the state’ as “[a] distinct set of political institutions whose specific concern is with the 
organization of domination, in the name of the common interest, within a delimited 
territory” (Burnham, 2009). Taken together, scholars working in the polycentric 
tradition would conceive of the state fairly broadly, including institutions forming the 
legislative, executive, and judicative branches. In sum, coordination or ‘taking each 
other into account’ may in some cases happen automatically, but in others require 
conscious effort and coordination. These questions have a direct bearing on the central 
questions of this thesis, namely where these ‘lessons’ are going to emerge from (i.e. who 
generates the lessons) and whether the lessons are provided in a way that can at least in 
principle enable lesson-drawing across governance centres (and thus the shift from 
polycentricity to polycentrism that Chapter 1 explains). 
Crucially for this thesis, a focus on information provision and enforcement via 
monitoring is a central and explicit component in polycentric governance theory. As 
Elinor Ostrom (1999) explains,  
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If all self-organized resource governance systems are totally independent 
and there is no communication among them, then each has to learn 
through its own trial-and-error process. (p. 525) 
Some scholars highlight “[…] that a polycentric arrangement has a built-in mechanism 
of self-correction” (Aligica, 2014, p. 48) and advance the (big) claim that “[…] 
reflexivity is a systemic feature […]” (Aligica, 2014, p. 66). As Elinor Ostrom (1999) 
writes, 
Thus, a self-organized resource governance system with a higher level of 
in-migration or greater communication with other localities is more likely 
to adapt and change rules over time than is a system where new ideas 
concerning how to use rules as tools are rarely brought in. (p. 525) 
But because reflexivity requires knowledge and critique of ongoing approaches, it 
depends on mechanisms to provide that knowledge. Otherwise, polycentrism, or “a 
system of reciprocal monitoring and assessment in dynamic interdependence” (Aligica, 
2014, p. 66) may not materialize. But who will provide this information, will it appear 
with or without central stimulation, and will what emerges be of sufficient quality to be 
useful? Aligica was rather optimistic, assuming that 
A system of ‘reciprocal monitoring and assessment for the range of 
institutions available in society’ is thus put spontaneously in place, but in 
addition a system of broad checks and balances emerges. (Aligica, 2014, 
p. 66) 
Others, such as Mansbridge (2014) envision a much stronger role for traditional public 
actors such as states, which could “help monitor compliance and sanction defection in 
the implementation phase” (p. 8, emphasis added). However, alternatively, states or 
other governance actors may shy away from the costs of collecting information about 
the experience in other governance centres or from making relevant changes once they 
know that another approach may generate better results. Thus, taken together, the 
question that runs through the literatures on common pool resources, polycentrism and 
policy coordination centres on who provides ‘collective’ or ‘public’ goods, which may 
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include the extent to which governance centres monitor their own practices and in turn 
pay attention to one another in order to learn and, perhaps, coordinate their activities. 
 
2.4 Monitoring: from common-pool resources to climate policy 
Common pool resource scholars in the polycentric governance tradition highlight 
that monitoring is an absolutely essential part of successful CPR governance. As Elinor 
Ostrom (1990, p. 45) emphasizes, “[w]ithout monitoring, there can be no credible 
commitment; without credible commitment, there is no reason to propose new rules.” A 
fairly general definition holds that monitoring may be defined as “[a] continuing 
function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide […] 
indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the 
use of allocated funds” (OECD-DAC, 2002, p. 27-28). In other words, monitoring refers 
to “[…] recipe[s] for the selection, organization and retention of large amounts of 
information” (Dahler-Larsen, 2011, p. 65). Elinor Ostrom strongly links monitoring with 
the idea of preventing rule defections (i.e. policing).  
But what makes monitoring particularly successful? Evidence from resource 
management literatures suggests that there is no general recipe for organizing 
monitoring activities. For example, Ostrom and Nagendra (2007) use multiple methods 
to show that the success of forest management depends critically on the fit of monitoring 
institutions with wider ecological, social, and political environments (or context, see 
above). Furthermore, the success of a monitoring regime often hinges on whether it is 
perceived as legitimate, which tends to be the case when people who are affected by the 
regime are involved in its creation and maintenance (E. Ostrom & Nagendra, 2007). 
Participants may then even be willing to bear some of the cost of monitoring themselves 
(E. Ostrom & Nagendra, 2007). The key lesson to take from these smaller-scale studies 
is that in some cases, decentralized monitoring appears to work ‘better’ than centralized 
activities for the reasons outlined above. But, again, the success of a particular 
monitoring regime depends critically on its fit with the particular context, including 
existing institutions, cultures and the nature of the resource. When monitoring is 
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successful, it can not only prevent rule defections, but also provide knowledge that may 
be of use to other governance centres—driven by self-organizing actors. 
When moving to larger common-pool resources (such as the atmosphere and a 
stable climate), Elinor Ostrom argues that the more successful governance systems tend 
to organize “appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities […] in multiple layers of nested enterprise” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 
101, emphasis added). This is because “[e]stablishing rules at one level, without rules at 
the other levels, will produce an incomplete system that may not endure over the long 
run” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 102). Thus, monitoring by a single actor at a single level is 
unlikely to work in these instances. 
At any level, monitoring is neither an easy nor a ‘cheap’ activity (E. Ostrom, 
1990; see also Schoenefeld et al., 2018). Kusek and Rist (2005, p. 301) have noted that 
“[t]he reality is that putting in place even a rudimentary system of monitoring, 
evaluating, and reporting on government performance is not easy in the best of 
circumstances.” Whether monitoring natural resource use or public policy, doing so 
requires significant and sustained effort, time, resources, and buy-in by multiple parties 
to set up and operate monitoring activities (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 202). But not all 
monitoring activities are created equal. Importantly, Elinor Ostrom (1990) argues that 
for natural resources, 
Monitoring costs are affected by the physical attributes of the resource 
itself, the technology available for exclusion and appropriation, 
marketing arrangements, the proposed rules, and the legitimacy bestowed 
by external authorities on the results of institutional choices […]. (p. 203) 
Furthermore, “[f]actors that enhance the capacity of users to see or hear one 
another as they are engaged in appropriation activities tend to lower monitoring and 
enforcement costs” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 204). Additionally, “[t]he availability of low-
cost facilities for recording and disseminating information about regulated activities will 
also decrease monitoring costs” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 204). In other words, the more 
detectable an activity—and potential rule breaking—is, the easier it is to monitor. 
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The physical size of a resource also has a strong bearing on monitoring. Generally, 
“[t]he larger the resource, the greater the costs of ‘fencing’ and/or patrolling the 
boundaries to ensure that no outsider appropriates” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 203). And if 
frequent monitoring is required, costs tend to increase (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 204). 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the nature of the rules to be monitored also 
affects the ease of monitoring: 
Rules that unambiguously state that some action – no matter who 
undertakes it – is proscribed are less costly to monitor than are rules that 
require more information about who is pursuing a particular behavior 
[sic] and why. (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 204) 
Furthermore, “[r]ules that place a limit on the quantity of resource units that can be 
produced during an entire season or year are more costly to enforce” (E. Ostrom, 1990, 
p. 205). The smaller and the more visible a resource and its use are, and the clearer the 
rules that govern it, the easier it is to monitor.  
In cases where more technical scientific knowledge may be required to monitor a 
resource (such as overall fish stocks to determine fishing quotas), Elinor Ostrom points 
to the self-organizing capacities of local actors through community organizations. She 
argues that 
While no single community-governed organization may be able to fund 
information collection that is unbiased and of real value to the 
organization, a federation of such organizations may be able to amass the 
funds to do so. Simply having a newsletter that shares information about 
what has worked and why it has worked in some settings helps others 
learn from each other’s trial-and-error methods.” (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 
280). 
Information generated in this way may be more sensitive to the interests and needs of 
the local actors who fund them—and help systemic learning. Crucially,  
Associations of local resource governance units can be encouraged to 
speed up the exchange of information about relevant local conditions and 
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about policy experiments that have proved particularly successful. (E. 
Ostrom, 2005, p. 283) 
Self-organization may in turn support interactions between governance centres.  
There is thus a strong argument to consider the ‘institutional fit’ between what is 
being monitored and the institutions to do so. As Keohane and E. Ostrom (1994) 
explain: 
Another implication of research on local CPRs and public goods and on 
international regimes for international environmental institutions is the 
importance of achieving a match between the characteristics of a 
successful monitoring and sanctioning scheme and the characteristics of 
specific situations. (p. 22; emphasis added) 
Table 2.1 summarizes the key insights from monitoring common pool resources with a 
view to applying them to monitoring climate policy in the next section in light of the 
three foundational ideas of polycentric governance theory identified above. For 
example, the nature of the resource relates to context, whereas information exchange 
through associations relates to interacting governance centres.  
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Table 2.1: Key insights from literatures on monitoring common-pool resources 
Self-
organization 
 Actors have the capacity to self-monitor; doing so may increase 
legitimacy of a monitoring regime and ownership/buy-in. 
 If individuals or community organizations do not have the 
necessary resources to conduct (scientific) monitoring, they 
may form associations that pool resources. 
Context  The type of resource matters – some are much more difficult to 
monitor than others. 
 Larger systems are more difficult to monitor than smaller ones. 
 Clear-cut and precise rules are easier to monitor than more 
general ones. 
 It is important to consider the ‘institutional fit’ between a 
monitoring institution and its context (the resource, community 
structure, etc.). 
Interaction  Associations of organizations can stimulate the flow of 
information between governance centres; this can lead to 
learning from different experiments. 
Sources: (E. Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom, 2005; E. Ostrom & Nagendra, 2007) 
What can we glean from these insights on monitoring natural resources for 
monitoring climate change policy? A first thing to note is that humans cannot readily 
detect carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases without significant technical 
equipment, making monitoring technically much more challenging than, say, monitoring 
the number of fish that have been taken out of a fishery. Monitoring greenhouse gases 
requires significant expertise and equipment, and has been subject to contestation, 
especially when there are direct policy consequences of monitoring decisions. For 
example, Canada and the EU have quarrelled intensely about the greenhouse gas content 
of tar sand oil (Neslen, 2011). It can also be extremely costly to accurately measure or 
estimate carbon emissions from certain sources—and may thus not viable in some cases 
(Öko-Institut, Cambridge Economics, AMEC, Harmelink Consulting, & TNO, 2012). 
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Second, the expanse of the atmosphere is vast and it is thus exceedingly difficult to 
establish boundaries for monitoring and ‘appropriation.’ Following Elinor Ostrom’s 
rationale (see above), the physical nature of greenhouse gases makes monitoring rather 
challenging. It is hard to imagine how individuals may conduct such highly complex 
policy evaluations as they have been shown to do when monitoring individual resource 
governance. 
But monitoring greenhouse gas fluxes is only one way of looking at policy 
outcomes, as other factors, such as impacts on congestion, public health, or employment 
are often equally at the centre of policy discussions—and the ‘goals’ of a policy may 
indeed be subject to significant contestation. Similarly, supply-oriented climate policy 
aims to leave a significant amount of hydrocarbons in the ground. Monitoring complex 
outcomes such as ‘public health’ typically requires the use of indicators, which 
“summarize or otherwise simplify relevant information, make […] visible or perceptible 
phenomena of interest, and quantify, measure, and communicate relevant information” 
(Gallopín, 1996, p. 108). However, using indicators to monitor policies is by no means a 
politically ‘neutral’ or ‘innocent’ activity, because these indicators embody underlying 
value orientations regarding what matters and what does not (Gudmundsson, 2003; 
Lehtonen, 2015) and are frequently constructed from information that is either readily 
available or can be generated (Gallopín, 1996). Even choosing indicators such as 
greenhouse gas emission reductions to compare climate policies embodies a deeply 
normative choice (Schoenefeld et al., 2018). The key difference is thus that CPR 
monitoring can often rely on direct measurement and observation of appropriation, 
whereas monitoring climate policies requires other tools to do so; and the goals of policy 
may be multifarious and sometimes fuzzy. 
Furthermore, monitoring the effects of climate policies differs from that of 
common pool resources because policing and detecting rule defection is only one and 
possibly not the major objective of monitoring, which may also aim at learning, an 
aspect that features only partially in Elinor Ostrom’s discussions of monitoring (see 
above). Related to the idea of indicators, climate policies may also generate a range of 
intended and unintended effects and potentially interact with other policies—as 
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discussed above, it is thus often necessary to use (multiple) indicators rather than direct 
observation; and it involves many more actors and jurisdictions. Last, because much 
may be at stake, climate policy monitoring tends to be so politically sensitive 
(Schoenefeld et al., 2018) that top-down monitoring has proven difficult if not 
impossible to do at the international level (see also Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017).  
In order to apply insights from CPR monitoring to climate policy monitoring, it is 
first necessary to somewhat relax the definition of ‘local.’ Clearly, the idea of local 
monitoring where one fisher(wo)man may observe the behaviour of her or his 
colleagues only has limited value when considering the monitoring of national climate 
policy. But if one allows the idea of more localized monitoring to apply to the nation 
state, it quickly becomes clear that some states and/or regions (and actors therein) do 
have the capacity to monitor their own climate policies. Thus, actors at ‘more local’ 
levels (here understood as national versus international) may be better placed—and 
viewed as more legitimate—to regulate their own actions. This view is certainly also in 
the spirit of the Paris Agreement, which relies on nation states putting forward their own 
contributions and assessing their progress over time (Schoenefeld et al., 2018). 
Similarly, when ‘self-organization’ is understood as an activity done at the nation state 
level (or certain actors within the nation state, which nevertheless do not necessarily 
have to be individuals), it becomes more feasible to apply these concepts. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the key conclusions from the discussion in this section. 
Similar to what was done above, it organizes the points by the three foundational ideas, 
namely self-organization, context, and interacting governance centres.  
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Table 2.2: Monitoring (public) climate policy 
Self-
organization 
 Self-monitoring can happen at national and sub-national levels 
(by both state and non-state actors). 
 Individuals/community organizations/states can pool resources 
to conduct monitoring. 
Context  Policy effects are difficult to monitor – many potential effects, 
greenhouse gases not easily detectable, lots of sources and 
actors. 
 The ‘climate system’ is very large (global). 
 It is difficult to define clear-cut and precise rules for 
monitoring, given technical issues and political sensitivities. 
 The ‘institutional fit’ between monitoring institutions and its 
context (the resource, community structure, etc.) matters for 
climate change, particularly when considering monitoring at 
‘lower’ governance levels (national, regional, etc.). 
Interaction  Associations of organizations can stimulate the flow of 
information between governance centres; this can lead to 
learning from different experiments; this can also happen at the 
international level, e.g. EU – (see Schoenefeld et al., 2018). 
 
Drawing on Table 2.2, scholars working in the polycentric governance tradition 
would thus likely ask with respect to climate policy monitoring: how do actors monitor 
climate policy, what do they include (or ignore), who conducts the monitoring, and how 
do those engaged in monitoring interact with one another and their context? These three 
core ideas relate closely to the foundational ideas of polycentrism, and thus become the 
basis for discussing the role of policy evaluation in the following section. 
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2.5 Evaluation in polycentric governance systems 
Some form of knowledge generation on the effectiveness of policy approaches in 
different governance centres is part and parcel of polycentric governance. Empirical 
research on monitoring in common-pool resource systems (see above) contains 
necessary, but not yet sufficient insights to interrogate what role—if any—policy 
evaluation could and potentially already does play in polycentric governance systems. 
Compared with the definition of monitoring at the beginning of this section, ex-post 
policy evaluation is a related, and yet substantially different activity. Recall that this 
thesis follows Vedung (1997, p. 3), who defines policy evaluation as the  “careful 
retrospective assessment of the merit, worth, and value of administration, output and 
outcome of government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future practical 
action situations” (see Chapter 1). Monitoring data may be an ingredient of evaluation, 
but evaluation goes a key step further than monitoring in making a value-based 
assessment, and evaluation can take a much broader view and consider factors and data 
that limited monitoring may struggle to pick up.  
Policy evaluation is thus a broader activity than monitoring, and therefore, its role 
in polycentric governance system must also be considered in broader terms. There are 
two headline reasons why policy evaluation may, in principle, play a role in polycentric 
settings—and which are also frequently cited as reasons for evaluating to begin with 
(see Borrás & Højlund, 2015; Sanderson, 2002): first, related to Elinor Ostrom’s ideas 
about detecting rule defection via monitoring, policy evaluation may play a role in 
enabling accountability relationships in polycentric systems (Versluis, van Keulen, & 
Stephenson, 2011, p. 206). Bovens (2007) defines accountability as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor 
may face consequences” (p. 107). A key issue in ‘new’ governance contexts—including 
potentially polycentric governance—is that traditional forms of accountability, which 
are enacted through often long principal-agent chains, are becoming increasingly 
problematic (Stame, 2006). Whereas democratic states usually boast civil servants who 
answer to elected leaders who in turn answer to Parliament, which itself answers to its 
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voters, such a conceptualization of accountability struggles in polycentric settings, 
where it may be much less clear who answers to whom. This state of affairs has given 
rise to ‘new forms of accountability,’ such as diagonal or horizontal ones where policy-
makers may be accountable to civil society or to ombudspersons (Bovens, 2007). From 
this perspective, policy evaluation may enable accountability in polycentric settings 
(Bovens, 2007). Alkin and Christie (2004, p. 12) have also highlighted that “[t]he need 
and desire for accountability presents a need for evaluation.” Relatedly, Hanberger 
(2012) focuses on the role of evaluation to support political accountability in different 
governance systems, including state systems, regional-local systems and network 
governance. Policy evaluation may thus make a significant contribution to enabling 
accountability (Fischer, 2006). But more than providers of ‘objective’ policy 
information, evaluators may also be seen as mediators between societal discourses and 
discussion about the merit of particular policies to achieve a number of different—and 
layered—goals (Fischer, 2006). In this model, evaluators are not aloof from society, but 
inextricably bound up and working within and through a system of values and facts that 
are at stake when a policy is evaluated. 
The second, and certainly no less widely discussed reason why policy evaluation 
may have a role to play in polycentric governance systems is as an enabler of learning 
(see Section 2.2 above for a definition and discussion of the concept). Scholars have 
already highlighted potential links between ex-post evaluation and learning. For 
example, Haug (2015, p. 5) stresses that “[e]x-post evaluation of programmes or policies 
[…] is a widely applied group of approaches aimed at stimulating learning in 
environmental governance.” There is still an ongoing and largely unresolved debate on 
what exactly is learned, which depending on one’s philosophical position may range 
from ‘facts’ to learning about value-based discourses (Borrás & Højlund, 2015; Haug, 
2015; Sanderson, 2002). This thesis focuses on the learning-related factors that feature 
most strongly in debates on polycentric governance, namely the importance of context, 
as well as learning as one vehicle of interactions between governance centres (see 
above). 
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While accountability and learning may be two theoretically relevant concepts for 
understanding a potential role of policy evaluation in polycentric governance systems, it 
is important to recognize that policy evaluation happens in a political environment and 
may therefore also be done for political - that is strategic and ‘irrational’ - reasons that 
have little to do with either accountability or learning. ‘Political’ in this context is 
understood as both processes and struggles that happen inside familiar governmental 
arenas, but also as a more pervasive process that happens when power operates, and 
regarding what is discussed and addressed in public and what is not (Hay, 2002; Lukes, 
2005; Mansbridge, 1999, p. 214). Numerous scholars have already highlighted the 
political characteristics of policy evaluation (Bovens et al., 2006; Greene, 1997; House 
& Howe, 1999; see also Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007; Nilsson et al., 2008; Owens, 
Rayner, & Bina, 2004; Vedung, 1997). First, Weiss (1993) argues that because 
government programmes emerge through political processes, political pressures are 
unlikely to disappear at the evaluation stage (though they could arguably change over 
time). Second, 
As social scientists increasingly recognize, no study collects neutral 
“facts”: all research entails value decisions and to some degree reflects 
the researcher’s selections, assumptions, and interpretations. (Weiss, 
1993, p. 102)  
Third, policy evaluation may also be political because it has the potential to affect 
the range of decisions political actors can take and thus act as a ‘destabilizing’ force 
(which links with the points on ‘dissatisfaction’ with regard to lesson drawing above). 
For example, a supportive evaluation may provide vital support to continue or extend a 
climate policy, whereas a negative evaluation may deprive decision-makers of the 
possibility to do so and can potentially lead to policy dismantling (see Gravey, 2016). 
Fourth, because policy evaluation has the potential to affect resource distribution across 
society (Bovens et al., 2006), it may be used in a strategic fashion such as to delay a 
political process or to move a decision to another forum. Thus, policy evaluation is 
political because it operates in a political context, can destabilize resource distribution, 
and can be used in a strategic way. 
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These political, and often strategic and normative elements of evaluation generate 
crucial but difficult questions for the role of policy evaluation in polycentric governance 
settings. If evaluation is done for more strategic and political reasons (see also Pollitt, 
1998), then the outcome of evaluation may be less-than-optimal from a polycentric 
governance perspective, and thus expectations towards evaluation may have to be 
tempered. By the same token, in situations of considerable political contestation, it is 
also possible that evaluative knowledge may emerge through self-organizing capacities 
by individual governance actors (see below). For example, informal actors may conduct 
or commission their ‘own’ evaluations in order to contest points made by formal (i.e. 
state) evaluations. A whole range of evaluations may therefore generate a more 
‘complete’ body of evaluative knowledge that does not rely on a single perspective. 
Thus, a polycentric governance perspective on evaluation would highlight the need for a 
broad range of evaluation perspectives and actors so as to generate diverse knowledge of 
policy effects. 
Against this important background, the remainder of this section reviews debates 
in existing literature on policy evaluation insofar as they relate to the three foundational 
ideas of polycentrism, namely self-organization, context, and interaction between 
governance centres. Where pertinent, the review connects with ideas on accountability 
and learning, while keeping in mind the political nature of policy evaluation. 
 
2.5.1 Self-organization 
This section draws on multiple strands of argument that have emerged from wider 
discussions on the role of actors in evaluation in order to develop insights into the role 
of self-governance in policy evaluation in polycentric settings. An understanding of 
what we currently know about who conducts, participates in and benefits from 
evaluation is crucial to theorizing the role of evaluation in polycentric settings. In order 
to map the literature, the section draws on numerous conceptual categories that have 
emerged in evaluation literatures over time. These include (1) who conducts evaluation, 
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including ‘contracted’ evaluation, formal and informal actors and the role of 
participation; and (2) who are the intended ‘users’ of evaluation. 
Multiple actors may in principle be capable of evaluating policy (see Ostrom, 
2005). A key point from the earlier discussion of common pool resource monitoring is 
that it matters a great deal who evaluates, for what purpose, and funded by whom. For 
analytical purposes, evaluation literatures have found it useful to distinguish between 
formal and informal evaluation. In an early article, (Weiss, 1993) distinguished between 
‘inside evaluation’, which is conducted by people inside government, and ‘independent 
evaluation’ by people not linked with government (see also Chelimsky, 2009). Weiss 
(1993) argues that the uptake of ‘inside evaluations’ may be higher because in-house 
evaluators may have a better understanding of the policy-making environment, but that 
the findings are also likely to be less radical. By contrast, ‘independent evaluations’ are 
thought to take a much more critical look at policies. Other researchers have recently 
developed a related notion of ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ evaluation, particularly in the 
climate policy sector in the European Union (Hildén et al., 2014; Huitema et al., 2011). 
Hildén, Jordan, and Rayner (2014) define formal evaluation as ‘state-led’ and informal 
evaluation as “evaluation activities by non-state actors” (p. 885). In sum, there are 
numerous actors who can become involved in evaluation activities, but knowledge on 
the impact of different actors on policy evaluation is only just emerging (for a review, 
see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). 
Relatedly, there are different views about where evaluation originates from. For 
example, Sager, Widmer, and Balthasar (2017, p. 316) have argued that “evaluation is 
not or mainly not self-motivated like basic research, but rather requires a demand in the 
form of commissioning actors” (translation by the author). By contrast, Elinor Ostrom 
(2005) has pointed to the potentially self-organizing capacities in scientific assessment, 
monitoring and potentially policy evaluation (see above). The available evidence thus 
far suggests that particularly governmental actors frequently commission evaluations. 
Pollitt (1998) has highlighted that in Europe, governments are among the most 
important evaluation sponsors. For example, a survey of climate policy evaluation in the 
EU showed that nearly half of all climate policy evaluations were commissioned 
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(Huitema et al., 2011); the rest were funded and conducted by the same organization. 
However, it should be noted that a footnote explains that many of the non-commissioned 
evaluations may have emerged from academic research projects, as this particular study 
used a wider operational definition of policy evaluation than that applied in this thesis 
(see Chapter 4). Differing definitions may thus also be one reason why scholars arrive at 
different conclusions regarding the self-organizing capacity of policy evaluation actors. 
While in an ideal world, commissioning would add an extra dose of independence 
to evaluation (see Chelimsky, 2009), emerging research suggests that in practice, it can 
be the site of political struggles where those who commission evaluations often try to 
control their contractors (Pleger & Sager, 2016). For example, a survey of evaluators 
revealed that governments may seek to directly influence commissioned evaluators  
(Hayward et al., 2013) or at least frame evaluation findings in a more positive light 
(Weiss, 1993). According to Hayward et al. (2013), governments have a range of 
strategies to do so – for example, by controlling the research questions in an evaluation, 
or by enacting budgetary-turned-methodological constraints—e.g., not enough funding 
for a control group (see Pleger & Sager, 2016 for a systematic approach). Thus, in 
contracted evaluation, the emerging principal-agent relationships have at least the 
potential to be fraught with politics. Those who instigate an evaluation may not 
necessarily conduct it or intend to use it (Pleger & Sager, 2016), although of course all 
three activities can—at least in principle—be done within a single institution or even by 
a single person. The aforementioned distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
evaluation becomes significantly more difficult once multiple actors become involved in 
a single evaluation (see Chapter 4). 
While evaluation literatures have long problematized the relationship between 
formal and informal evaluation and their influence on evaluation results, early scholars 
often considered formal and informal categories rather crudely i.e. paying insufficient 
attention to principal-agent relationships between evaluation funders and evaluators 
whenever evaluations are commissioned (Weiss, 1993). Emerging evidence challenges 
this limited view by suggesting that the process of commissioning evaluations correlates 
with evaluation results: Huitema et al. (2011), for example, show that climate policy 
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evaluations that were commissioned are much less reflexive (i.e. critical of extant policy 
targets) than evaluations that were not commissioned. There is thus an urgent need to 
further explore the influence on evaluation outcomes when both formal and informal 
evaluators commission evaluations. For example, Hayward et al. (2013) consider this 
principal-agent relationship and show how (formal) evaluation funders (British civil 
servants) sought to influence evaluators at various points. 
With a view to climate policy, some earlier scholars have made strong prescriptive 
statements on who ‘should perform’ climate policy evaluation. For example, Feldman 
and Wilt (1996) argue that informal (i.e. non-state) actors have a particularly critical role 
to play because “[…] evaluation of these [climate change] programs must ultimately be 
performed by some external entity, group, or institution” (p. 67). They go on to argue 
that 
Whereas NGOs [non-governmental organization] may certainly have 
their own agendas, as a supplement to national and international 
organization review of subnational plans, NGO review may provide 
alternative data, complementary criteria for evaluation, or other important 
information that could help improve the evaluation, and thus 
performance, of national climate action plans (Feldman & Wilt, 1996, p. 
67). 
However, in line with Elinor Ostrom (2005), Feldman and Wilt (1996, p. 66) also 
suggest that “[…] national-level guidance, particularly in commissioning research, is 
needed to ensure data quality.” Thus, these authors assume the need for a higher-level 
jurisdiction in assisting the evaluation of climate change policy by informal actors. 
A second way to look at self-organization is through public participation in 
evaluation. In general, prescriptive evaluation literatures have over time widened the 
circle of contributors to evaluation. For example, Vedung (2013) explains three 
evaluation models based around the actors that evaluation seeks to involve. For 
example, in the ‘client-oriented model’, clients, or the ‘receivers’ of policy, evaluate the 
policy according to their own criteria. There has certainly been no shortage of additional 
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approaches in the prescriptive tradition to encourage greater participation of actors with 
a ‘stake’ in evaluation. For example, the ‘empowerment evaluation’ approach aims at 
‘empowering’ those with a stake to participate in evaluation, while the evaluator is seen 
as a moderator who generates the circumstances in which people can empower 
themselves (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005). The approach has devout followers – for 
example, Diaz-Puente, Yaguee, and Afonso (2008) describe how they used 
empowerment evaluation in Spain to evaluate projects with EU structural funding in the 
Madrid region. However, the fact that the authors were also the evaluators, their overly 
positive assessment of the method, their claim that it is perfectly compatible with EU 
evaluation requirements, and their use of only positive quotes from participants in this 
evaluation leaves some doubt regarding the potential critical voices that may have been 
omitted in this particular article (Diaz-Puente et al., 2008). But not all participation is 
equally ‘empowering.’ For example, individuals may simply be asked how satisfied they 
are with a particular service. Other approaches in the participatory tradition go farther to 
suggest that those affected by a policy should participate directly in evaluation and that 
evaluators hence become facilitators of an emerging dialogue between various 
individuals (Fischer, 2006). Some evaluation methods (e.g. surveys or interviews) are 
much more participatory than others such as formalized modelling. Thus, one way to 
assess the level of public participation in policy evaluation is to look closely at the 
evaluation method and set-up. 
Another way to distinguish between more or less self-organizing evaluations is to 
consider whether or not they respond to a legal requirement to evaluate, often in the 
form of an ‘evaluation clause’ in legislation. There are, in principle, different types of 
evaluation clauses, ranging from general ones to clauses that apply to the activity of 
specific institutions or areas of administration (Bussmann, 2005). Emerging evidence 
suggests that legislation now commonly includes legal requirements to monitor or 
evaluate policy outcomes at regular intervals. For example, Mastenbroek et al. (2016) 
found that out of the 216 European Commission ex-post legislative evaluations they 
identified, 81% responded to an evaluation clause. In another case, Bundi (2016) 
explains that Switzerland introduced a general evaluation clause in its constitution in 
1999. By 2008, Bussmann had identified about 90 such clauses at the national level in 
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Switzerland. Evaluation scholars have taken the increasing presence of evaluation 
clauses as an indication of advanced evaluation institutionalization (Jacob et al., 2015). 
This thesis uses the presence of evaluation clauses as a way to indicate the level of ‘self-
organization’ – an evaluation that responds to a legal requirement can be considered one 
of the least self-organized. However, there appears to be little data on the existence of 
evaluation clauses or corresponding evaluations in the climate change sector. 
In sum, there are numerous questions that emerge from this review. Although the 
formal-informal distinction has proven a useful conceptual tool, it remains an open 
question to what extent the categories of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ evaluators blur or even 
interact, as has been suggested in other policy areas (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, & 
Ostrom, 2006). Furthermore, the above discussion explains how thinking about policy 
evaluation in the polycentric governance tradition would not stop at simply adding more 
actors or methodologies. This view would crucially pay attention to how these actors 
interact in their evaluation endeavour. The following section focuses on this core issue. 
 
2.5.2 Context 
The idea that context matters in policy evaluation is not new, but is certainly 
contested. The Encyclopaedia of Evaluation defines context as “the setting within which 
the evaluand (the program, policy, or product being evaluated) and thus the evaluation 
are situated. Context is the site, location, environment, or milieu for a given evaluand” 
(Greene, 2005, p. 83). The entry then goes on to emphasize that context “is an 
enormously complex phenomenon” (Greene, 2005, p. 83). Other evaluation scholars 
have echoed these arguments. For example, Vedung (1997, p. 213) explains “that 
explanations involving administrative action are circumstantial. Universal explanations, 
valid for all times and regardless of surroundings, simply do not and cannot exist in the 
social world.” Theorists proposing ‘realistic evaluation’ have argued that mechanisms 
(i.e. the connection between cause and effect) operate within contexts, and evaluators 
need to pay close attention to both the former and the latter in their endeavours (Pawson 
& Tilley, 1997, p. 63-78). More fundamentally, Guba and Lincoln (1981, p. 39-47) 
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argue that the merit and worth of a policy depends critically on the context; policies that 
may be valuable in one context could exhibit little value in another. Taken together, 
Patton (2008, p. 40) stresses that 
Program evaluation is undertaken to inform decisions, clarify options, 
identify improvements, and provide information about programs and 
policies within contextual boundaries of time, place, values and politics” 
(emphasis added). 
As Tilly and Goodin (2006) argue in their introduction to the Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, these are impressions of a more long-standing debate 
between those who hold that political processes have general attributes that are stable 
over contexts and time, and those who argue that political outcomes are highly 
contingent with regard to context (see also Pollitt, 2013). While some argue that there 
are mechanisms that function independently of contexts, others such as Martin (2001, p. 
204) highlight that “local context matters in the formation and practice of policy” and 
Kaufmann and Wangler (2014) add that this holds especially in the case of environment 
and climate policy. In the area of evaluation, Guba and Lincoln (1989, p. 45) have for 
example argued that “[p]henomena can be understood only within the context in which 
they are studied; findings from one context cannot be generalized to another; neither 
problems nor their solutions can be generalized from one setting to another.” But others, 
such as Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 22) disagree in arguing that generalizations of 
context-bound mechanisms may indeed be possible. In practice, both elements are likely 
to emerge—for example, the EU greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme drew on 
experiences with sulphur dioxide trading in the United States in a more or less 
instrumental way. However, following the experiences in the EU, actors such as 
California and Australia were able to gain a much richer, contextual understanding of 
the struggles that emerged with this instrument (particularly the impact of the global 
financial and economic crisis) and design their own instruments accordingly  (Bang, 
Victor, & Andresen, 2017; The Economist, 2014). Thus, evaluations that seek to 
‘correct for context’ by making contextual variables explicit, but that still seek to 
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identify some general ‘lessons’ may prove most adequate in polycentric settings (see 
Tilly & Goodin, 2006). As Greene (2005, p. 84) asserts, 
All evaluators agree that context matters, for the programs, policies, and 
products we evaluate and for the conduct and probable effectiveness of 
our work as evaluators. All evaluators also agree that good evaluation is 
responsive to, respectful of, and tailored to its contexts in important 
ways. 
Such arguments have also been advanced in more scholarly debates. For example, 
Wells (2007) argues that “evaluative research undertaken with an understanding of 
political ideas, institutions and contexts provides a richer basis on which to inform 
policy, and equally, practice” (p. 27). Overall, Fitzpatrick (2012) notes in her review of 
the evaluation literature that attention to context has continuously featured in writings on 
evaluation since the early days in the 1960s and 1970s; yet, she also writes that “context 
is an amorphous issue” (p. 7). Polycentric governance scholars, too, would strongly 
reject the argument that public policy generates comparable effects regardless of 
contexts, making direct, instrumental learning challenging. By contrast, they would 
emphasize that because contextual factors generate highly idiosyncratic pathways of 
policy development, direct, instrumental learning may be difficult—though other forms 
of learning, such as political learning, which involves gaining knowledge of the political 
preferences of others or drawing lessons in context may still take place (see Zito & 
Schout, 2009 for a discussion of different types of learning). Given the clear arguments 
on context by polycentric governance scholars (see above) this thesis works in the latter 
tradition. 
There are generally two ways in which evaluation literatures propose to deal with 
context. The first includes accounting for contextual factors either in an inductive or 
deductive way, and scholars have started cataloguing potential factors that may matter, 
while emphasizing differences across policy areas. This section begins with a general 
discussion of potentially relevant contextual factors and then turns to factors that are 
especially discussed in literature on environment and climate policy evaluation. A 
second way in which context may be dealt with in policy evaluations is through the 
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evaluation approach, for example expressed through the evaluation methodologies used 
or the criteria applied. The second part of this section thus turns to the relevant 
discussions in this area. 
On accounting for contextual factors in policy evaluation, Greene (2005, p. 84), 
who has a social psychology background, highlights contextual dimensions such as 
demography, material and economic aspects, institutions and organizations, personal 
interactions and norms, as well as politics as key contextual factors. Seven years later, 
Rog (2012) proposes a new framework, which identifies five key areas where contextual 
factors could be considered in policy evaluations: the nature of ‘the phenomenon and the 
problem’ (e.g., how much is known about the problem);  the ‘nature of the intervention’ 
(e.g., how complex it is), and thus the need for multiple indicators and multiple methods 
and pathways to understanding effects; the ‘broader environment/setting’ including 
potentially layers of administration or institutions; ‘the evaluation context’ such as the 
budget or time available for evaluation; ‘the decision-making context,’ including the 
evaluation audience and its needs. In each dimension, there are “physical, 
organizational, social, cultural, tradition, political and historical” elements to consider 
(Rog, 2012, p. 27). However, the conclusion of the special issue stresses that this 
framework should not be applied in a ‘rigid’ manner; in fact, assessing context still 
requires ‘subjective judgements’ and skilled evaluators, given the plethora of potential 
contextual effects (Conner, Fitzpatrick, & Rog, 2012). 
Based on such earlier work, Vo and Christie (2015) reviewed relevant literature 
and proposed an even broader framework in order to consider context in evaluation, 
namely one that focuses on the “who, what, where, when, why, and how (including 
“how much,” which deals with valuing and is unique to evaluation)” (p. 48-49). The 
core argument here is that the contextual factors that other studies have catalogued (see 
Greene, 2005; Rog, 2012) proved too specific. However, given the specific focus of this 
thesis on climate policy evaluation, it is still useful to identify potential contextual 
factors within the specific field of climate policy evaluation. What, then, are the 
contextual factors that have already been discussed as particularly relevant for climate 
policy evaluation? The paragraphs that follow review the factors of time, geography and 
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spatial aspects, policy effects, external shocks and influences, and the political 
environment and structures. While this is clearly not an exhaustive list, these factors 
provide starting points that have received considerable scholarly attention in the past and 
which are likely to be relevant for climate change policies. 
Time: While there may have been a time when scholars considered policy-making 
largely a-temporal and independent of the effects of time, more recent discussions in 
public policy and management have sought to re-introduce the variable of time (see 
Pollitt, 2008). These general debates have also been addressed in the context of policy 
evaluation. For example, Bressers, Twist, and Heuvelhof (2013) argue that time 
introduces a key element of complexity and unpredictability into public policy. This is 
especially relevant for environment and climate policy, which often exhibits ‘time-lag 
effects’ (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008, p. 38). For example, a policy that changes fundamental 
aspects of energy infrastructure may take a significant amount of time to take effect and 
produce measurable outcomes, given significant lock-ins in the sector (a power plant 
may take several decades to recover initial investments and produce returns, for 
example). Further, particularly with regard to climate change, the on-the-ground effects 
of a policy may play out over very long time scales (Mickwitz, 2003). Importantly, 
effects may develop over time, and short-term positive effects may not necessarily 
translate into long-term policy success (McConnell, 2010, p. 92). For example, in 
climate policy, a shift from coal to natural gas generates short-term reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions because natural gas produces less carbon dioxide per unit of 
energy than coal, but locks the energy infrastructure into using fossil fuels for decades to 
come (unless there are viable alternatives to natural gas). Therefore, scholars generally 
recommend evaluating policies over time (the longer the time scale the better), and 
considering a wide variety of intended and unintended effects (Bressers et al., 2013; 
Kaufmann & Wangler, 2014; Mickwitz, 2013; Mickwitz, 2003). From the perspective of 
addressing climate change, long-term success ultimately matters much more than short-
term effects that may prove transient and or even counter-productive. Taking into 
account a longer time horizon also matters because “policies rarely have a fixed 
beginning and end; usually new policies are piled upon old ones, or policy goalposts are 
shifted” (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008, p. 39). Thus, a short time horizon may miss crucial 
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elements in policy development and effects. In a similar vein, Hildén (2009) argues that 
taking into account a longer time horizon allows identifying path dependencies and 
outcomes that may have nothing to do with the policy intervention. Vedung (1997) 
further argues that legislative history may affect the outcomes of policy interventions, 
driven for example by the strength of political support at the time of instituting an 
intervention or the participation of affected parties in the policy-making process (p. 213-
219). Taken together, evaluation theorists thus suggest expanding ex-post evaluation 
from a snapshot to a more long-range view, which potentially includes even the time 
before an intervention started. 
Geography and spatial aspects: There are two key issues of importance here: one 
is the physical geography of a jurisdiction where a policy is implemented. Offshore 
wind energy, for example, may be an effective policy choice for the UK precisely 
because the country has ample coasts with comparatively shallow waters where erecting 
wind turbines is a viable option. By the same token, Norway may be particularly well-
suited to hydro power, whereas southern Spain has geographical conditions that are 
particularly suited to solar power. Taking such factors into account will likely improve 
the understanding of policy effects and be a key element in lesson-drawing. 
The second issue is a broader, spatial consideration that is ultimately tightly linked 
with what concerns polycentric governance: policy outcomes may to a great extent 
depend on the characteristics of the governance centre where they are implemented. As 
Crabbé and Leroy (2008) remind us, environmental issues often cross borders, and 
policies are often most effective when they address the scale at which the problem is 
caused (p. 39). While there are various conundrums about the causes and consequences 
of climate change in a broader sense (e.g., historical and current distributions of 
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as climate impacts) that have been discussed 
elsewhere (e.g., Raupach et al., 2014), the key issue here is the extent to which a policy 
has been applied at the ‘right’ scale. Arguably, putting in place an emissions trading 
policy versus planning local bike infrastructure is probably done best at different 
governance levels. Thus, evaluators may pay attention to scale in their evaluation. But 
the logic also goes the other way around: given their contextual nature, policy impacts 
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may not be evenly distributed across space, and success or failure may very much 
depend on that distribution (Martin, 2001). In sum, in order to understand the impact of 
geography on policy outcomes, it is relevant to understand whether evaluators discuss 
and analyse these dimensions. Thus, paying close attention to the physical, but also the 
socio-political factors that play a role in generating policy outcomes should be part of 
policy evaluation (Martin, 2001). 
Policy effects: Given the highly complex nature of environmental policy systems 
(Crabbé & Leroy, 2008; Mickwitz, 2013) and potential emergent effects, policy 
evaluation scholars have argued that it is necessary to go well beyond the ‘official’ 
policy goals defined at the outset, and rather consider a range of policy effects, including 
unintended ones (Kaufmann & Wangler, 2014). Thus, the argument goes that it is 
necessary to consider a wide range of evaluation criteria in order to capture both 
intended and unintended main and side effects. Crucially, these effects also include 
interactions with other policies (Kaufmann & Wangler, 2014), given that policies hardly 
ever produce effects in isolation (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008, p. 39). Sometimes, a policy 
may be effective precisely because it is functioning in unison with others (such as siting 
policies to support subsidies for wind turbines). However, at other times, policies may 
detract from each other or be in conflict, such as providing subsidies for renewable and 
fossil-fuel based energy production (see Sorrell et al., 2003). Taken together, policy 
makers should thus consider a wide range of policy effects, as well as causal 
explanations that extend well beyond the logic of a singular policy. 
Going beyond original policy goals has also been described in terms of reflexivity, 
especially with a view to climate policy evaluation (Fischer, 2006; Huitema et al., 
2011). ‘Reflexivity’ in evaluation may be understood as the willingness to challenge 
extant policy goals (Fischer, 2006; Huitema et al., 2011). Given both the aforementioned 
‘political’ context of evaluation, it is important to recognize that this context may 
include ill-defined policy goals, and that the entire context may shift over time (see also 
Conner et al., 2012). Thus, scholars have argued for more reflexive policy evaluations, 
or the idea that evaluators critically examine and if applicable revise the extant policy 
goals set at the initiation of policy. 
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External shocks and influences: External events, whether they are natural 
disasters, economic developments or other large-scale shocks can at times 
fundamentally change the overall system in which a policy operates. As Vedung (1997, 
p. 224) explains, 
The larger environment impacts on the outcomes. A program may be 
inherently clear, perfectly communicated to implementers, meticulously 
executed according to plan, and yet basically ineffective because of 
changes in the larger policy environment that upset the initial 
prerequisites for implementation. 
For example, the global recession that began with the financial crisis in 2008 has 
arguably contributed significantly to (unexpectedly) reaching emissions reductions goals 
in Europe because of lower overall economic activity (Jacobs, 2012). Indeed, in this 
example, European climate policies may have contributed little – or not at all – to the 
achievement of that goal (see Kerr, 2007). In other circumstances, wider economic 
shifts, such as shutting down decrepit industries in East Germany after reunification in 
1990 or the ‘dash for gas’ in the UK can generate significant greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions in the absence of an explicit intention to do so through climate policy (Jordan 
et al., 2010). Greenhouse gas emissions may decrease as part of a regular industrial 
transition towards a more diverse and service-based economy. Thus, where applicable, 
evaluators need to consider such external developments in order to generate a fuller 
understanding of policy impact. 
Political environment and structures: General factors of the political 
environment, at times based around the way in which an intervention came about in the 
first place (see above), and at other times based around implementation, can influence 
the success of a policy and are thus crucial knowledge when seeking to understand the 
effectiveness of an intervention (Weiss, 1993). Vedung (1997, p. 226 – 245), for 
example, draws on implementation theory to explain how the nature of implementers, 
and especially their comprehension, capability and willingness to implement has an 
important bearing on outcomes. For example, a government agency that understands the 
intervention, has the necessary capabilities (e.g., financial resources, personnel and 
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equipment) and the willingness to implement is much more likely to implement 
successfully than an agency where the opposite is true. By the same token, the nature 
and reaction of the receivers of an intervention influences outcomes (Vedung, 1997, p. 
238 – 241). For example, if a government implements subsidies for renewable energies, 
there is likely to be more uptake among a population that is well-informed about the 
existence of the intervention, and that has the necessary resources to make investments 
in order to capture these subsidies than among a population where the opposite is true. 
Finally, as Vedung (1997, p. 241 – 245) explains, policy outcomes also likely depend on 
interactions with other policies (sometimes strengthening, sometimes detracting from 
the policy – see above), as well as wider networks of stakeholders in support or in 
opposition to an intervention or the role of the media. All these factors related to the 
wider political environment have a potentially important role on the outcome of an 
intervention. 
The second approach to consider context in evaluation is through conscious 
choices in the evaluation approaches, including the evaluation methods and criteria. 
With a view to the dimensions of her framework (see above), Rog (2012, p. 27) 
proposes using several methodological approaches, notably including stakeholders in the 
evaluation; using multiple methods; using quantitative indicators and explaining their 
variation. She stresses that “[h]ow we measure and incorporate context measures in each 
evaluation will likely have various levels and focus on relevant aspects of the each area 
of context (political, cultural, social, organizational)” (Rog, 2012, p. 37). The argument 
to use multiple methods has also been advanced by other evaluation scholars: Fischer 
(2006) lists key methodologies including ‘experimental program research’, ‘quasi-
experimental evaluation’, ‘cost-benefit analysis’, and ‘risk-benefit analysis.’ But even 
when one uses particular models, Elinor Ostrom highlights that “[m]odels are useful in 
policy analysis when they are well-tailored to the particular problem at hand. Models are 
used inappropriately when applied to the study of problematic situations that do not 
closely fit the assumptions of the model […]” (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 29). Thus, analogous 
to the ‘institutional fit’ in monitoring, Elinor Ostrom’s arguments can be extended to 
consider the ‘methodological fit’ of monitoring as well (and, by inference, tailoring 
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methodologies to contexts). Prominent evaluation scholars have echoed this argument: 
As Toulemonde (2000, p. 356) writes, 
I consider it a universal rule that a good evaluation is “custom made”; in 
other words, each evaluation is unique […]. A good evaluation is 
designed at a given time, for specific users and in a specific context. 
These insights may also hold for other evaluation methods, in that interviews and 
surveys can be adjusted to a particular policy and its context. In order to capture the full 
range and particularly higher levels of analysis, Fischer (2006) argues that qualitative 
methods such as interviews, participant observation and stakeholder surveys are 
particularly useful to ‘get inside the situation’—or the context. For climate policy 
evaluation, the Öko-Institut et al. (2012, p. iv) emphasize that there is no “one-size-fits-
all solution,” and in some cases context may matter more than in others. 
Very similar arguments on multiple methods have also been advanced in the realm 
of environmental policy. Mickwitz (2003) emphasizes in his framework for 
environmental policy evaluation that the complex nature of many environmental issues, 
and their uneven and at times remote effects make for an especially challenging 
treatment of context (see also Rog, 2012). He thus recommends using multiple methods, 
multiple criteria, as well as side-effect evaluation, intervention theories and participatory 
aspects in order to understand the multifarious effects of environmental policy in context 
(Mickwitz, 2003). Thus, a polycentric approach would advocate multiple and, in the best 
case, ‘tailored’ methods in policy evaluation. 
Related to the idea of multiple evaluation methods is a debate that deals with using 
multiple evaluation criteria (Majone, 1989). Policy evaluation scholars and practitioners 
have emphasized the need to substantially widen policy evaluation criteria than what has 
been done earlier. As Vedung (2013) explains, “[i]n earlier literature, public sector 
evaluation was goal-attainment appraisal, period” (p. 389, emphasis in original). Using 
the goal-attainment approach, evaluation seeks to understand to what extent and how a 
particular public policy reached its own, predefined policy goals. However, the 
realization that goals may be ill-defined and that policy may generate significant 
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unforeseen effects due to contextual factors became a driver to conduct ‘side-effect 
evaluation’ that pays attention to a much wider range of policy impacts (Vedung, 2013). 
Knowing about wider and at times unpredictable policy effects led evaluators in turn to 
develop the ‘relevance model,’ where evaluation asks to what extent policy solves the 
‘underlying problem’ that it seeks to address, even though policy impacts may not be in 
line with earlier predictions (Vedung, 2013). Fischer’s (2006) key book also advocates 
using a broader spectrum of evaluation criteria, ranging from program verification (often 
described as goal attainment elsewhere) to situational validation (is the particular policy 
relevant to the situation its seeks to address?), societal vindication (does the program 
provide value for society as a whole?); and finally social choice (do the values that are 
behind the policy provide a good way of solving conflict?). It is thus clear that 
prescriptive evaluation theory has widened its criteria over time, and that this was done, 
at least implicitly, with a view to the importance of context in evaluation. 
The idea of broader evaluation criteria also chimes with recent theoretical 
developments in polycentric governance theory. As Aligica (2014, p. 1) explains, 
[…] when it comes to organizing human coordination and 
interdependence in diverse circumstances, with diverse preferences, 
endowments, and beliefs, institutional pluralism is a fact, a challenge, and 
a prima facie normative answer. If that is the case, then the pluralism of 
criteria and values should as well define the way institutions and 
their performance are assessed (bold emphasis added). 
Using a small set of singular evaluation criteria will unlikely do justice to the contextual 
richness of many (polycentric) governance arrangements. 
Taken together, contextual factors related to history/time, geography, intended and 
unintended policy effects, external shocks and influences and the general political 
environment are potentially relevant factors in climate policy evaluation. However, true 
to ideas about the contextual nature of policy, it would be difficult if not impossible to 
create an exhaustive, a priori list of factors that are likely to matter for climate change 
policy in particular. The above tentative list should thus be understood as a starting point 
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for the empirical investigation (see the following chapters), rather than as a definite 
statement. It should also be noted that  
Not all interventions are as susceptible to their contexts and not all 
investigations have to study each area of context with the same level of 
rigor and intensity used to study the core elements of a program and the 
outcomes (Rog, 2012, p. 37). 
The above section has shown that there are numerous ways in which climate policy 
evaluation may pay attention to context, ranging from individual contextual dimensions 
to methodological adjustments. For example, context-sensitive evaluation may be able 
to shed a light on important co-benefits at varying scales in addition to reducing global 
carbon dioxide emissions (E. Ostrom, 2010b, p. 553; Somanathan et al., 2014). 
Crucially, paying attention to context also matters to the two headline concepts: for 
accountability, context-conscious evaluation can be a way to account for the whole 
range of policy effects, both intended and unintended. For learning, contextual 
information can provide crucial knowledge on a range of contextual mechanisms that 
brought about policy effects. 
 
2.5.3 Interaction 
As noted above, one of the key (normative) aspects in moving from polycentricity 
to polycentrism is that independent governance centres take each other into account and, 
ideally, learn from each other. Learning from each other necessitates some mechanism 
through which governance centres can know what happens elsewhere and bear in mind 
the contextual aspects discussed earlier. As reviewed above, there is some recognition in 
polycentric governance literatures that decentralized approaches may only be able to 
generate limited scientific information, particularly when dealing with larger governance 
systems (E. Ostrom, 2005). However, when such information becomes available vis-à-
vis policy evaluation, it may be useful to foster the learning processes that polycentric 
governance scholars envision. In principle, policy evaluation could play a key role in 
facilitating this ‘taking into account’ through making activities in multiple centres 
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visible and intelligible. This is particularly relevant, because in order to benefit from 
governance experimentation in polycentric settings, “[…] we ought, furthermore, to 
encourage reflection upon the lessons from elsewhere and a willingness to borrow those 
lessons where appropriate” (Goodin, 1996, p. 42). For example, writing on the role of 
policy evaluation in the EU, Stame (2006) highlights that 
Just because the national states and the regions are so different, and 
thanks to the fact that public, private and civil society actors are neither 
absent nor mute, there would be a great scope for listening to what the 
local situations have to say, scope also to compare the working of 
mechanisms in different contexts, for creating a new body of European 
knowledge […]. (p. 14; emphasis added) 
This remains a rare example, however, as in the past evaluation scholars have seldom 
considered such interactions across governance centres. Various factors may make 
lesson-learning across governance centres more or less likely. A crucial first step is that 
policy evaluations must become available to other governance centres in order to be able 
to have an effect. When governance actors can easily obtain evaluations from other 
governance centres (for example through indexed databases), they may be in a better 
position to use them (see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). Once this is the case, the nature 
of the evaluations also matters. For example, executive summaries can add to the clarity 
of evaluation reports and help (busy) policy-makers to quickly assess whether an 
evaluation may be relevant to their situation (Zwaan, van Voorst, & Mastenbroek, 
2016). Furthermore, the comparability of evaluation findings (Schoenefeld et al., 2018) 
becomes a core issue when the goal is to carry lessons from one governance centre to 
another. Related to the issue of comparability, Feldman and Wilt (1996) have argued 
that 
To ensure that states and other regional jurisdictions can be equivalently 
evaluated on their progress in achieving these [climate] goals, some 
means must be developed to collect valid energy and emissions data 
across jurisdictions and—equally important—to ensure that these data 
measure the same things in the same way (p. 49). 
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Thus, the extent to which an evaluation includes metrics that allow comparison across 
governance centres matters in this respect. 
And yet reverting back to the debate on idiosyncratic evaluation criteria and 
generalization (see above) raises key and difficult questions about comparability and 
thus learning opportunities (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). A 
combination of providing both contextual analysis that takes into account contextual 
effects, but also some more general criteria or metrics that enable comparison seems of 
order. Aligica and Sabetti (2014b) draw on Elinor Ostrom to explain that this may be 
done by conceptualizing and researching ‘basic units’ of policy or interaction that 
appear across multiple contexts, without aiming to make broad and sweeping 
generalizations that are unlikely to hold. True to the argument that supposed panaceas 
are unlikely to work (see E. Ostrom et al., 2007), the polycentric approach would 
highlight the importance of context in determining to what extent lessons can ‘travel.’ In 
line with the discussion on context above, in order to be a useful tool in fostering 
interactions between governance centres, climate policy evaluations would have to carry 
some level of contextual information in order to enable lesson drawing in context. The 
idea that evaluation can generate knowledge that travels between different governance 
centres is relatively new and has surprisingly been little discussed in evaluation 
literatures. 
Then there is the potential interaction between formal and informal evaluation 
activities. As discussed earlier, scholars have developed the distinction between formal 
and informal actors in evaluation. But how do the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal’ spheres of 
policy evaluation interact, if at all? There has been a growing interest in informal 
governance (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) with a particular focus on the EU in recent 
years (Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Kleine, 2013). These literatures suggest that the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions may be “complementary, 
accommodating, competing [or] substitutive” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 725). In the 
complementary case, informal institutions may fill gaps left by formal institutions, 
whereas in the accommodating variant, informal institutions may influence the way 
formal institutions work without seeking to do away with them. By contrast, in 
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competing or substitutive cases, informal institutions ultimately seek to replace formal 
institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).  However, particularly when formulating policy 
recommendations, ‘informal’ does not necessarily mean ‘disorganized’ or ‘worse’ 
(Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006). In sum, theory suggests that there are numerous ways in 
which informal and formal institutions may interact. In studying evaluation in 
polycentric systems, this distinction is crucial, because it begins to identify the multiple 
actors that could be involved in evaluation, and goes beyond assuming that the main site 
of evaluation is necessarily government. 
Evidence suggests that actors do pay attention to one another on climate policy 
questions. For example, The Economist wrote in November (2014) that 
Officials in California, for example, made several fact-finding visits to 
Brussels to investigate the EU’s emissions-trading regime when 
preparing their own […]. Before its launch two years ago the 
Californians told sceptics that they had learned important lessons from 
the European example—even if these were largely about what to avoid. 
Earlier on, the EU had looked to the USA for key lessons from sulphur dioxide trading 
for their own emerging carbon dioxide emissions trading scheme; an example of this 
activity is a 1999 report by the EEA, which looks at several procedural issues and the 
overall US experience with emissions trading systems (Mangis, 1998). Such effects 
have been studied much more systematically in relevant policy diffusion literatures. In 
their review of these literatures, Jordan and Huitema (2014) explain that states may have 
significant incentives to interact, with a desire to learn as one of the headline motives. 
But in addition to these points of learning, policy evaluation may also aid 
governance centres to hold each other to account (as is the hope of the transparency 
mechanisms in the Paris Agreement), and potentially also allow actors within 
governance centres to contribute to accountability mechanisms. In addition, knowledge 
flowing from evaluation may, to a certain extent, also enable competition between 
governance centres (see V. Ostrom et al., 1961) by for example providing a basis for 
benchmarking. However, the extent to which this happens with a view to accountability 
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and competition remains an open question, as the political and potentially strategic 
nature of policy evaluation (see above) may also make evaluation actors reluctant to 
publicize their findings, particularly when they describe key factors that drive success. 
Linked to the above discussion is the question of intended evaluation use. While 
knowledge use in public policy is a widely debated topic in political science (e.g., 
Albaek, 1995; P. Haas, 2004; Radaelli, 1995; Rich, 1997) for space and practical 
reasons this thesis considers the more circumscribed intended target audiences (and thus 
potential users) of an evaluation. Intended evaluation users are often policy-makers, 
although some evaluations may be conducted for accountability or even strategic 
purposes. Prominent evaluation approaches focus in particular on utilization. For 
example, Patton (2008, p. 37) takes the view that “the focus in utilization-focused 
evaluation is on intended use by intended users” (emphasis in original). This statement 
thus begs the question who the intended users are, but to date, there is virtually no 
empirical evidence to address this question, especially for climate change policy. In 
these conceptualizations the users of evaluations tend to come from fairly small circles. 
By contrast, the polycentric approach would envision uses of evaluation that go well 
beyond a relatively narrow set of users, such as the creators of a policy, or those who are 
being affected by it. 
Currently, evaluation is typically done by policy-makers themselves (either in-
house or commissioned) or by those who have a stake or interest in the outcomes of a 
particular policy. In polycentric systems, one key difference that has so far received 
little attention is that the circle of potential evaluation users widens to include others in 
governance centres that do not have a direct stake in the outcome of a particular policy, 
but who may be able to benefit from insights generated by an evaluation elsewhere 
(related to learning, see above). Another function is to provide some accountability in 
governance settings where traditional accountability chains have been weakened or no 
longer exist (see Bäckstrand, Zelli, & Schleifer, 2018). In this understanding, evaluation 
becomes in effect a public good, which is non-exclusionary (if evaluations are public) 
and non-rivalrous (the use of insights by one user does not preclude another one from 
benefitting from the insights). In this regard, policy evaluation in polycentric 
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governance systems potentially departs from current understandings of policy evaluation 
as the scope of possible evaluation users expands. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The previous sections have endeavoured to make a theoretical case for examining 
the importance and actual roles of policy evaluation in facilitating climate governance 
by contributing to the shift from polycentricity to polycentrism. They show that 
literatures on polycentric governance and policy evaluation have already engaged with 
concepts that are highly relevant, yet often ill developed and with virtually no 
connection to the body of literature on the other side. The respective debates have by 
and large taken place in relatively self-contained, and often self-referential, scholarly 
communities with their own set of dedicated journals, conferences, and networks. For 
example, evaluation literatures have already debated the role of context in evaluation, as 
well as the role of multiple actors and—to a much lesser extent—the notion of 
interacting governance centres. But to date there is a severe paucity of studies that 
consider all these factors simultaneously. Insights from this kind of integrative research 
across different factors could help shed light on the potential and actual roles of 
(climate) policy evaluation in polycentric governance systems. The above review shows 
how information provision via policy evaluation is in many ways implicit in Ostrom’s 
polycentric governance theory, but its precise role and to what extent this happens in 
practice have yet to be explored. 
This chapter set out to identify the basic theoretical building blocks of 
polycentrism, which as a theory contains both normative and positive elements. It shows 
that these foundational insights are that context matters in governance, that actors can 
and sometimes do self-organize to muster governance solutions and that interaction 
between otherwise independent governance centres appears indispensable in order to 
move from polycentricity to polycentrism (see Chapter 1). Bearing in mind arguments 
about scale in governance, the chapter shows that we can draw key theoretical insights 
from monitoring studies in common pool resource governance systems in order to 
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conceptualize the role of policy evaluation in polycentric governance systems. Crucially, 
policy evaluation can potentially make significant contributions to the emergence of 
polycentrism, but in order to do so, it must exhibit certain features outlined in the 
sections above. Moving forward, this newly developed theoretical approach thus 
provides some yardsticks against which we can evaluate the practice of climate policy 
evaluation in the next chapters.
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Chapter 3 Climate Policy Evaluation: the 
EU Level, Germany, and the UK  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews existing literature on the historical evolution and current 
functioning of (climate) policy evaluation activities at the EU level, in Germany, and in 
the UK. In each case, this chapter reviews the emergence and drivers of policy 
evaluation in general and then provides an overview of the institutions and organizations 
that support evaluation, including key evaluation actors. This is followed by an 
overview of the rise and nature of environment and climate policy evaluation at the EU 
level, as well as in Germany, and in the UK. Finally, this chapter assesses the current 
state of knowledge against the foundational ideas of polycentric governance, namely 
self-organization and context in evaluation, as well as interaction between governance 
centres through evaluation (see Chapter 2). In sum, the chapter assesses the current state 
of the literature, and it exposes key gaps in our knowledge and understanding. 
 
3.2 Evaluation at the EU level 
3.2.1 Historical development 
Following growing pressures on governments since the 1960s to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their various policies, the EU very much stepped up its activities to 
evaluate the outcomes of structural and cohesion funding in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Stame, 2003; Summa & Toulemonde, 2002). At the same time, policy evaluation 
received a boost from ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) thinking and reforms with 
their focus on value for public money and accountability in the 1990s (Stame, 2003). 
70 
This manifested in several EU member states and finally at the EU level in the ‘better 
regulation’ (Radaelli, 2007) and, since 2010, in the ‘smart regulation’ agenda (European 
Commission, 2010). More recently, other factors such as the financial crisis, the 
recession and Euroscepticism have added additional pressures to evaluate policies 
(Stephenson, 2015). In sum, evaluation has been discussed and addressed at the EU 
level for various decades. 
 
3.2.2 Actors and institutions 
There are a range of formal, state-like actors at the EU level that in one way or 
another participate in and contribute to policy evaluation. Key actors include the 
European Commission (EC), the European Environment Agency (EEA), and, to a lesser 
extent, the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Court of 
Auditors. This section reviews existing knowledge and literature on the role of these 
institutions in policy evaluation. 
 
European Commission. The historical pressures toward evaluation explained in 
the previous section generated significant—and growing—evaluation demand and 
corresponding activity levels in the European Commission, which is located at the 
centre of EU policy-making as the guardian of the EU treaties, as well as the sole policy 
initiator (Peterson & Shackleton, 2012). Back in 1996, Nordic Commissioners pushed 
for a communication in order to spread evaluation across all Commission Directorate-
Generals (DGs) (European Commission, 1996; see also Summa & Toulemonde, 2002). 
This initiative generated a decentralized evaluation ‘system’ within the Commission 
where each DG coordinates its own evaluations (Hojlund, 2015). This structure 
continues to be in place at the time of writing (European Commission, 2013), and it has 
led to varying levels of evaluation capacity in individual DGs (van Voorst, 2017). Given 
limited staff capacity, the Commission in practice typically outsources policy evaluation 
(European Commission, 2013; Summa & Toulemonde, 2002). Even though internal 
evaluation standards have provided a broad framework since 2002, in practice the 
71 
standards became a rather loose set of ‘guiding principles’ (European Commission, 
2002). This leaves considerable discretion to those who contract evaluations. As Stame 
(2008, p. 124) writes, “at the EC level, evaluations are conducted according to 
predetermined and once commissioned generally inflexible terms of reference, 
established by the commissioning DG.” For example, in the field of cohesion policy 
evaluation, this means that when evaluations are commissioned, the choice of 
methodology is largely up to the individual contractor (Batterbury, 2006). Furthermore, 
the Commission standards are largely process-oriented (including the establishment of a 
steering group for each evaluation) so that 
[a]s to the content and type of evaluations, the rule is not one of 
standardization. On the contrary, the Commission emphasizes that 
evaluation projects should be tailored to the objectives and delivery 
mechanisms of the policy or program concerned. (Summa & 
Toulemonde, 2002, p.415) 
Taken together, the European Commission has been organizing its internal evaluation 
activities decentrally since the 1990s. In order to provide more cumulative insights, DG 
Budget produced ten ‘Annual Evaluation Reviews’ between 2000 and 2009.6 However, 
even in 2013, Per Mickwitz asserted that policy evaluation in the EU “[…] is still not 
well institutionalized […]” (Mickwitz, 2013; see also Mickwitz, 2003).  
Evaluation literatures recognize that contracting evaluations generates a range of 
potential issues regarding the (perceived) independence of evaluation results (see 
Chapter 2). The European Commission has not escaped these dynamics. In some 
instances, it has been criticized heavily for producing internal policy evaluations that 
selectively present information to suit its own political interests (Versluis et al., 2011, p. 
224). Furthermore, in some areas the Commission frequently relies on the Member 
States to conduct evaluations decentrally. According to Batterbury (2006, p. 184), 
                                                 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/documents_en.htm 
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In theory, the decentralization of evaluation should give it a greater 
proximity to the stakeholders and offer greater opportunities for locally 
sensitive evaluation design. In practice, evaluation capacity is highly 
differentiated across the EU territory, reflecting differing evaluation 
traditions, experience and resources […]. 
The European evaluation landscape that developed from these early beginnings became 
highly variegated, with different ‘evaluation cultures’ in different countries (Furubo et 
al., 2002; Jacob et al., 2015; Polverari & Bachtler, 2004). In general, Versluis et al. 
(2011, p. 224) write that  
[…] EU evaluation culture is political and pluralistic, characterized by a 
variety of organizations willing to pay significant sums of money to 
finance research that may produce data in support of their political views. 
This has generated an overall European evaluation landscape that is pluralistic, a feature 
that evaluation scholars describe as a sign of more advanced evaluation activities (Jacob 
et al., 2015), but which is certainly a challenge for the Commission in seeking to bring 
together insights from across Europe. 
 
European Environment Agency. The second key actor with an increasingly 
important role in policy evaluation is the European Environment Agency (EEA). 
Overall, scholars agree that from the start in the 1990s, the evaluation role of the EEA 
and especially its relationship to the European Commission (see above) has been 
contested (Martens, 2010; Zito, 2009). Early on, EU Member States and Members of the 
European Parliament disagreed over the EEA’s role, with some of the former (in 
particular the UK and Spain) advocating a ‘data collection’ or monitoring role for the 
EEA, whereas some members of the European Parliament preferred inspection powers 
in order to hold national policy implementers to account (Zito, 2009) – so a more 
explicit evaluation role. For example, an Institute of European Environmental Policy 
(IEEP) evaluation in 2003 reported on letters from two Directors-General of DG 
Environment, which indicated that 
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The development of policies, implementation reviews, policy evaluations 
and recommendations were the responsibility of the Commission alone. 
The Agency should not get ‘sidetracked by the more glamorous but rather 
sensitive hot political issues.’ (IEEP & EIPA, 2003, p. 39) 
Although a compromise ultimately weaved these divergent views into the regulation that 
underwrites the EEA (Martens, 2010), there was initially a focus on monitoring and data 
collection. However, over time, the EEA became more involved in developing ex-post 
evaluation methodologies without conducting the evaluations themselves (see IEEP & 
EIPA, 2003). This shift may signal a gradual acceptance that the EEA’s role is evolving 
in a more policy-analytical direction. While in the early days, some actors such as DG 
Environment in the Commission felt threatened by the EEA, these tensions eased over 
time, with the EEA building much closer relationships with the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council (Zito, 2009). 
 
The European Parliament. In contrast to the European Commission, the 
European Parliament has generally engaged less in policy evaluation (Stern, 2009; 
Hojlund, 2015). This is especially true for environmental policy (Mickwitz, 2013). 
Historically, it has lacked internal evaluation capacity. However, in a 2008 speech, the 
then Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control in the European Parliament argued 
in a debate that 
A parliamentary evaluation function would try to make transparent to the 
citizens what they are getting for their money. This objective is quite 
different from predominantly helping the policy system to justify how it 
is spending the money. Evaluation should not be brought down to a 
‘management tool’ as is now the case in the EU system. (cited in Stern, 
2009, p. 70) 
New evaluation capacity has subsequently slowly materialized within the European 
Parliament. In 2012, it created a ‘Directorate G for Impact Assessment and European 
Added Value,’ which comprises various units that address ex-ante impact assessments 
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and ex-post evaluations (Poptcheva, 2013). Academic researchers have recognized this 
development, confirming that “[…] the Parliament… [has] sought to strengthen… 
organizational capacity to perform better, by increasing resources for research and 
placing greater emphasis on results and impact assessment” (Stephenson, 2015, p. 83). 
 
European Council and Court of Auditors. Similar to the European Parliament, 
the European Council has been a weak evaluation actor (Stern, 2009). As Mickwitz 
(2013) details, it has had no role in environmental policy evaluations. By contrast, the 
European Court of Auditors appears to have a growing role in policy evaluation, 
especially as it extends its remit from financial auditing to evaluating broader policy 
effects. Some of these evaluations concerned environmental policy (Mickwitz, 2013). In 
a similar vein, Stephenson (2015) describes a development towards performance 
evaluation in the form of ‘special reports.’ To do so, the court has introduced a new 
diploma course, given that performance evaluation requires a much broader skillset than 
relatively straightforward and streamlined financial audits (Stephenson, 2015). 
However, the special reports also differ from other evaluation reports, because the court 
often evaluates policy-making across many sectors and because it has access to 
privileged financial information that may not be available to other evaluators 
(Stephenson, 2015). In sum, the European Court of Auditors is becoming more 
important in evaluation. 
Similar to Germany and the UK, much less is known about evaluation outside the 
formal EU institutions or by extension of argument, beyond the state. European 
evaluators founded the European Evaluation Society (EES) in 1994 (Bemelmans-Videc, 
1995), which brings together national evaluation organizations and serves as an 
international platform for information exchange and learning through conferences, 
newsletters and journals (Schröter, 2007). However, the association has not been very 
visible on environment and climate policy evaluation and relevant literatures lack 
debates on its interactions with the governmental actors. 
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3.2.3 Climate policy evaluation 
Policy evaluation activities in the environment sector – the traditional ‘home’ of 
climate policy in the EU - have been slower to develop than in other sectors, even in 
general evaluation forerunner jurisdictions such as the US (Knaap & Kim, 1998). 
However, by 2001, the European Environment Agency reported significant, if still to-
be-improved, evaluation activities in the environmental sector around the EU (European 
Environment Agency, 2001). In 2002, the EU thus called for improved ex-post 
environmental policy evaluation in its sixth ten-year Environmental Action Programme 
(Mickwitz, 2003). 
The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 became a watershed moment for climate policy 
because it laid some of the foundations for later climate policy evaluation in the EU and 
beyond. After the issue of climate change had risen to the attention of international 
policy makers in the late 1980s (T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013), the EU found itself under 
pressure to attend this summit with concrete policy proposals. Having failed to agree on 
an EU-wide carbon tax, European negotiators instead focused on creating systems for 
greenhouse gas monitoring at the international level, which were agreed at the summit 
(Bodansky, 1993; Jordan et al., 2010; Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 327). This, in turn, 
led the EU to adopt a Monitoring Mechanism for greenhouse gases and later policies 
and measures in 1993 (Haigh, 1996; Hyvarinen, 1999; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). 
Successive revisions of that mechanism—usually in the context of international 
negotiations—attempted to refine the mechanism in order to collect more data on 
individual policies in addition to the national-level greenhouse gas inventories (Farmer, 
2012; Hilden et al., 2014). These developments laid the groundwork for some more 
basic data collection through a formal monitoring system, which would later allow 
evaluators to generate more wide-ranging evaluations. 
Aside from the discussion on the Monitoring Mechanism, there is little systematic 
knowledge on the engagement of the various EU institutions in the area of climate 
policy evaluation. While an early meta-analysis found that evaluators at the EU level are 
the most productive across the EU (Haug et al., 2010), most scholarship has focused on 
evaluation institutions in general and on evaluation in other policy fields, generating an 
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immense knowledge gap on the nature of climate policy evaluation. This remains true 
for the case of the European Commission, although scholars have detected a tendency 
by the Commission to work towards harmonizing climate policy evaluation by 
encouraging independent reviews of evaluation methodologies and practice around the 
member states (AEA, ECOFYS, Fraunhofer, & ICCS, 2009; Hildén et al., 2014; Öko-
Institut et al., 2012; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). This paucity of knowledge contrasts with 
an overall assessment of environment and climate policy evaluation in the EU by the 
EEA, which argues that “[t]he evaluation of environment and climate policies is, today, 
a well-established discipline” (European Environment Agency, 2016, p. 4). 
An exception of sorts may be the EEA itself. Climate policy—and at times its 
evaluation—is perceived as a central work area for the EEA. For example, a 2008 
evaluation of the EEA found that 
The majority of the Commission officials interviewed consider climate 
change has been a core element of the EEA’s work. […] The EEA’s 
inventory on GHG emissions as well as its monitoring of progress in 
GHG emissions and projections in the EU via the European Topic Centre 
for Air and Climate Change are valuable for DG Environment. 
(Technopolis, 2008, p. 35) 
Furthermore, a 2013 report shows that people believed that climate change is one of the 
policy areas where the EEA has most impact (COWI, 2013, p. 47). In a similar vein, the 
2008 evaluators found the EEA receives comparatively high press coverage on climate 
change and that it is one of the top interests of its website users (Technopolis, 2008). 
Paradoxically, while the Commission appears to value perceived EEA independence in 
climate change reporting, because it fears legal challenges through the UNFCCC 
(COWI, 2013, p. 35), it simultaneously continues to reject a more active role for the 
EEA in policy analysis, even though this is an area where the EEA continues to become 
more engaged. For instance, the Technopolis (2008) evaluation identified a clear 
appetite by the EEA’s Management Board, as well as National Focal Points, for a 
stronger policy measure effectiveness evaluation role on climate change (p. 41). This 
may be especially because these two groups of people consider climate policy measure 
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effectiveness evaluation one of the EEA’s established roles (p. 40). Member states may 
indeed have more data available that they are not willing to supply to the EEA via the 
Monitoring Mechanism. As the COWI (2013) report explains, 
While the Member Countries appreciate the need to establish pan-
European datasets and assessments, the value of these is considered 
modest in the national context. While it is recognised that it is valuable 
for benchmarking and learning, most Member Countries still emphasise 
that they have more detailed data at national level and thus derive 
national assessment on a different basis. (p. 23-24) 
However, the Commission position remains largely unchanged: as the Technopolis 
(2008) report explains, “[t]he overall view [by the Commission] was that the Agency 
might have a role in developing tools and methodologies in some cases but not in actual 
policy assessment […] (p. 42, see also IEEP & EIPA, 2003, p. 49). Thus, the role of the 
EEA in climate policy evaluation may be described as ambivalent, and evolving. While 
it is clear that it is heavily bound up in the wider dynamics of European politics, there is 
today no systematic overview of the climate policy evaluation outputs by the EEA. 
Even less is known about the level and nature of climate policy evaluation in the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors where an analysis of their 
outputs, particularly with regard to climate change policy, does not yet exist. Little is 
known about the outputs of these formal evaluation actors in the EU. However, in a 
recent study, Mastenbroek et al. (2015) highlights that “[ex-post legislative evaluation] 
is primarily a matter of legislative obligation instead of own initiative” (p. abstract). 
 
3.3 Evaluation in Germany 
3.3.1 Historical development 
While policy evaluation became increasingly prominent in the late 1960s in Germany 
(Derlien, 2002), sometimes described as an ‘explosion’ in the activity (Lange, 1983), the 
public budget crises of the 1970s considerably reduced the enthusiasm for evaluation 
78 
(Stockmann, 2006). Since the 1990s, evaluation has gained importance again, driven by 
factors such as greater legitimacy demands towards government (Brandt, 2009), 
increased use of EU structural funds following Germany’s reunification in 1990 (Taylor, 
Bachtler, & Polverari, 2001) and the need to restructure and in some cases shut down 
decrepit institutions in East Germany (Derlien, 2002). Furthermore, the philosophy of 
New Public Management (NPM) with its concern for efficiency and effectiveness in 
governmental affairs arrived in Germany in the 1990s and became another driver of 
evaluation (Derlien, 2002; Löwenbein, 2008; Pattyn, Van Voorst, Mastenbroek, & 
Dunlop, 2018). Overall, while frontrunner jurisdictions such as United States have 
certainly influenced evaluation in Germany (Struhkamp, 2007), some have argued that it 
never reached the level found in the Anglo-American sphere (Stockmann, 2006). A 
more recent study however points towards relatively mature evaluation activities within 
Germany (Jacob et al., 2015). 
 
3.3.2 Actors and institutions 
The general level of institutionalization of evaluation in governmental institutions 
remains relatively low in Germany (Jacob et al., 2015). While multiple actors at various 
governance levels became involved in evaluation (or ‘success control,’7 as it was 
sometimes called in German), few established in-house evaluation capacities 
(Struhkamp, 2007). The federal government has emphasized the need for evaluation 
rhetorically, but this has not yet led to a firm establishment and use of evaluation in 
government (Stockmann, 2006), where evaluation remained highly fragmented even 
within individual ministries (Derlien, 1990; Löwenbein, 2008). There is no central 
institution that manages evaluations in Germany (Duscha et al., 2009). An exception 
may be the creation of an ‘Independent Evaluation Agency’ by the German Parliament 
(Jacob et al., 2015).  
                                                 
7 Erfolgskontrolle 
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The German Federal Court of Auditors8 has also published two studies in 1989 
and 1998 that highlighted the need for evaluation, and to this day courts are among the 
most ardent advocates of evaluation in Germany – especially in the area of evaluating 
the use of public funds (Stockmann & Meyer, 2014, p. 48; Struhkamp, 2007). In sum, 
while the nature of evaluation activities varies by sector (Beywl, Fabian, & Widmer, 
2009; Derlien, 2002), they are highly decentralized in Germany, especially in the case of 
environment and climate policy evaluation (Duscha et al., 2009). A general lack of 
coordination of evaluation activities has fostered many sectoral, but few comprehensive, 
evaluation activities (Stockmann, 2006). 
This is also true for evaluation developing outside the echelons of government or 
other state institutions. The field of professional evaluators was equally slow to develop 
– but the founding of the German Society for Evaluations (DGeEval)9 in 1997 appeared 
to bring together many decentralized activities, as the association boasted almost 800 
individual and institutional members by 2014. In a more recent study, Brandt (2009) 
documents a professionalization process in German evaluation activities, but also limits 
thereof—expressed for example by a reluctance of members of the German Evaluation 
Society to see evaluation as a separate profession. The founding of the German 
‘Zeitschrift für Evaluation’10 in 2002 generated a new platform for sharing evaluation 
experience and knowledge. Importantly, the DGeEval publishes evaluation standards – 
which appeared in 2008 in their fourth incarnation.11 
Some knowledge has also emerged on the nature of policy evaluations from 
Germany. Löwenbein (2008) estimated that total spending on evaluation in Germany 
amounted to 134 Million Euros – far from insignificant and considerably more than the 
45 Million Euros that the European Commission spends per annum on evaluation 
(Hojlund, 2015). Furthermore, Löwenbein (2008) estimated costs of about 100.000 
                                                 
8 ‘Bundesrechnungshof’ in German. 
9 http://www.degeval.de/nc/home/ 
10 Journal of Evaluation (http://www.zfev.de/) 
11 http://www.degeval.de/degeval-standards/ 
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Euros per evaluation in Germany. Finally, existing literature suggests that Germany has 
a long tradition of commissioning evaluations—in part because of the decentralization 
discussed above—(Struhkamp, 2007), with private consultancies as the prime evaluation 
producers (Löwenbein, 2008) but also a vibrant and on-going debate on what one means 
by ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ as well as ‘self-evaluation’ (Struhkamp, 2007) – a point to 
which this thesis returns in later chapters. 
 
3.3.3 Climate policy evaluation 
By and large, environment and climate policy evaluation practices emerged in 
Germany in the 2000s (Duscha et al., 2009). However because many of the institutes 
that evaluate environmental policy have their roots in the natural sciences, their work 
has to date only benefitted from very limited engagement with insights on evaluation 
from the social and policy sciences  (Duscha et al., 2009; Kaufmann & Wangler, 2014). 
For example, environment and climate policy evaluation actors generally do not use the 
evaluation standards by the DGeEval, and they typically do not attend the conferences 
of the association either (Duscha et al., 2009). Other authors, such as Wörlen, Rieseberg, 
& Lorenz (2014, p. 2) came to similar conclusions, stating that “in the energy and 
environment field, the evaluation tradition in Germany is so far rather weak.” However, 
this is different in the case of the Energiewende and other climate-related policies, 
which are increasingly dynamic sites of evaluation, including by governmental and non-
governmental actors  (Kaufmann & Wangler, 2014; Wörlen et al., 2014). The German 
‘Integrated Energy and Climate Program’12 by the German federal government, which 
has been in place since 2010, prescribes a regular monitoring and evaluation exercise, 
starting in 2010 (Doll et al., 2012). The federal government commissioned various 
research institutes and individuals to assist in designing this monitoring program (Doll 
et al., 2012). However, as Wörlen et al. (2014, p. 2) point out, this monitoring process 
could still be improved, for example by providing better and more streamlined 
                                                 
12 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Service/gesetze,did=254040.html 
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indicators, and by defining the target audience more clearly and by better 
communicating findings with the public. Importantly, in response to the perceived 
shortcomings of the governmental reporting, various other and non-governmental actors 
have prepared their own indexes and evaluation approaches, although some of them 
turned out to be rather short-lived (Wörlen et al., 2014). 
Beyond the discussion of specific monitoring processes, Germany has also been 
identified as one of the most productive origins of climate policy evaluations in the EU 
– roughly one fifth of all evaluations identified by Haug et al. (2010) came from 
Germany. However, which kinds of actors funded and/or conducted these climate policy 
evaluations is not reported in relevant papers on the ADAM project (see also Huitema et 
al., 2011) and there is very little information on the content of the evaluations, and their 
methodologies. Such gaps in the knowledge are in line with Duscha et al. (2009), who 
recommend collecting and carefully analysing evaluations in the climate and energy 
sector and beyond. 
 
3.4 Evaluation in the UK 
3.4.1 Historical development 
The United Kingdom has been an early adopter of policy evaluation, which first 
emerged from concerns over policy effectiveness in the context of new public 
management reforms dating back to the 1960s (Gray & Jenkins, 2002). In contrast to 
Germany, the United Kingdom is a highly centralized state, and this has affected policy 
evaluation endeavours. By and large, central government and its constituent parts drove 
the first attempts to evaluate. For example, the Treasury established the ‘Public 
Expenditure Survey’ in the 1960s or the ‘Program Analyses Review’ in the 1970s, but 
these initiatives never fully materialized given internal resistance (Levine, 1984). Later, 
evaluation was mainly seen as a tool to avoid overspending and allocate scarce 
resources, especially after an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in the mid-
1970s (Pattyn et al., 2018), although during the Thatcher years there was an attempt to 
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decentralize evaluation into the departments and issue evaluation guidelines (Jenkins & 
Gray, 1990). 
Since the late 1990s, much of the academic discussion on evaluation-related 
activities in the UK sailed under the banner of ‘evidence-based policy-making,’ as this 
was one of the major tenets of the Labour governments between 1997 and 2007. Tony 
Blair’s ‘New Labour’ government saw evaluation as a key component of a ‘third way’ 
of pragmatic, evidence-based policy-making beyond political ideology and subsequently 
issued a range of evaluation guidance documents  (Pattyn et al., 2018; Sullivan, 2011). 
Wells (2007, p. 27) argues that, as a function of evidence-based policy-making under 
New Labour, 
evaluation has become a more widely accepted part of the policy making 
process, more frequently and knowledgably used by central government 
and local and regional agencies. For instance, evaluation designs have 
become more sophisticated with greater use of a range of data, including 
longitudinal elements as well as theoretically based approaches. 
While much more evaluation funding became available during this period and 
while evaluators became a more important source of policy advice, several 
characteristics limited evaluation. Even though there was an emphasis on ‘theory-based 
evaluation,’13 scholars admonish that evaluation practitioners focused mainly on 
rationalistic approaches to evaluation, and tended to avoid more discursive ones 
(Sullivan, 2011). This, in turn, has partially stifled the potential role of formal evaluation 
in the United Kingdom. However, the theory-based approach also led to a greater 
attention to context, because this method necessitates theorizing individual programs, 
rather than the policy system at large (Sullivan, 2011). To what extent such 
developments appear in climate policy in particular remains very much an open 
question.  
                                                 
13 The idea that evaluation should be based on programme theory, that is, programme-specific theories of 
cause and effect. 
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This brief history shows that the waxing and waning of policy evaluation in the 
UK has always to a certain extent depended on the powers that be at any one point in 
time. Conservative governments often believed that market forces were enough as an 
evaluation force, and as a result “[i]t is not hard to argue that systematic policy and 
program evaluation in the U.K. became about as impoverished in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as at any time since 1945” (Gray & Jenkins, 2002, p. 135). Tony Blair’s 
Labour government proved more receptive to evaluation, but it had clear preferences for 
certain types of evaluation. 
 
3.4.2 Actors and institutions 
The UK has experimented with various evaluation institutions since the 1960s 
(Gray & Jenkins, 2002; Jenkins & Gray, 1990). In contrast to Germany, there was 
initially a much stronger drive to centralize evaluation in national-level institutions and 
to provide national-level evaluation guidelines as evaluation dispersed into the 
departments (Gray & Jenkins, 2002, p. 135; Jenkins & Gray, 1990). Over the last two 
decades or so, there has subsequently been a general trend towards standardizing and 
prescribing evaluation methods, which was set out in general terms in the Green Book 
on Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (HM Treasury, 2003) and, as an 
extension thereof, the Magenta Book on Guidance for Evaluation  (HM Treasury, 2011). 
These documents aim to streamline and define evaluation not only in government, but 
also beyond as the authors emphasize in the introduction to the Magenta Book (HM 
Treasury, 2011). Generally, they emphasize economic aspects of evaluation. 
Often changes in government meant significant institutional swings that have 
stifled attempts to build enduring evaluation institutions in order to generate long-term 
insights (Gray & Jenkins, 2002). Pollitt (1993) noted early on that  
Perusal of the history of the last thirty years reveals that policy evaluation 
[in the UK] has never found a secure or permanent home near the heart of 
a (relatively centralised) state. (p. 354) 
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For example, the UK never created the types of more long-standing policy research 
organizations like those found in Germany or in the USA, and what existed by way of 
evaluation institutions tended to be short-lived, financially instable, and highly 
dependent on the (political) support of the powers that be at any one point in time 
(Parsons, 2007; Pollitt, 1993). Therefore, 
[…] the activity of policy evaluation has been a precarious one, and its 
practitioners have had to become hardened to their work frequently being 
ignored or ridiculed by politicians and the mass media. Britain still lacks 
a political culture which is broadly supportive of deep analysis and 
assessment of complex policy problems (Pollitt, 1993, p. 354). 
The New Labour government under Tony Blair created a range of units and institutions 
aimed to further rationalistic, evidence-based policy-making (Parsons, 2007). 
While evaluations in the early decades of the practice in the UK were often 
conducted internally (Levine, 1984), this practice changed in later years. A recent UK-
based survey suggests that when the government funds evaluations, a number of 
(academic) evaluators felt that government officials sought to influence evaluation 
results (Hayward et al., 2013). This may affect the independence of evaluation results, 
and could make it difficult to reflect critically on the program goals (Huitema et al., 
2011), or assess co-benefits that may policies may generate (E. Ostrom, 2010c). But 
more recent assessments have emphasized that some evaluation institutions appear to 
have crystallized in the intervening decades. Today, various state institutions play 
relevant roles in the UK. Aside from central government with various ministries in 
leading roles, select committees in Parliament, as well as the National Audit Office 
(NAO) have been cited as strong producers of evaluations (Pattyn et al., 2018). In sum, 
Pattyn et al. (2018, p. 7) argue that in the late 2010s, “[t]he UK’s institutional 
arrangements for conducting and disseminating evaluations are strong.” 
In addition to these mainly state institutions, professional evaluators have also 
formed the UK Evaluation Society in 1994 (Risley, 2007). The association has between 
200 and 300 members (UK Evaluation Society, 2013), it holds regular conferences, 
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publishes several journals and has produced evaluation guidelines, which it publishes on 
its website. However, while Widmer (2004) notes that UK evaluators were relatively 
late in discussing evaluation standards, he also acknowledges that the literature has not 
discussed interactions between the UK Evaluation society and the governmental efforts 
to evaluate, or more specific aspects of environment and climate policy evaluation. 
 
3.4.3 Climate policy evaluation 
The UK is one of the most active and advanced evaluators of climate policy (AEA 
et al., 2009; Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011; Öko-Institut et al., 2012). A major 
meta-analysis identified the UK as one of the most prolific producers of climate policy 
evaluations (Haug et al., 2010). In line with the general attempts to streamline 
evaluation in the UK (see above), in 2010 the UK government published specific 
guidance on how to estimate the effect of policy on greenhouse gas emissions (HM 
Treasury & DECC, 2010). However, in the intervening decade, little has been written on 
the evaluation of climate policy in the UK, constituting a key research gap. 
 
3.5 Self-organization, context, and interaction 
This section brings together insights from the above review and extends them with 
a view to the three foundational ideas of polycentric governance that Chapter 2 
specified.  
 
3.5.1 Self-organization 
The literature review above suggests that while existing evaluation literatures 
focus almost exclusively on formal (i.e. state-led) evaluation institutions, actors, and 
outputs (for a recent example, see Mastenbroek et al., 2015), there is a recognition 
among scholars in the EU that “[v]arious multi-level stakeholders will conduct their own 
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evaluations and choose from a mix of qualitative and quantitative data” (Stephenson, 
2015, p. 82). However, very little else is known about informal evaluation activities 
outside the more familiar (state) institutions. This underexplored area thus constitutes a 
vast research gap. As Chapter 4 explains in greater detail, self-organization may 
engender a range of other, non-state actors in climate policy evaluations. And yet, extant 
literature on policy evaluation in Germany, in the UK and at the EU level has almost 
nothing to say about the role of self-organization in climate policy evaluation, let alone 
any interactions between state and more self-organized policy evaluation activities. This 
lack of knowledge is puzzling especially because the bulk of the climate policy 
evaluations analysed in a recent meta-analysis was done by informal actors (Huitema et 
al., 2011). In other words, a significant number of actors appear to conduct evaluation 
outside formal state structures. However, given that academic papers were included as 
‘evaluations’ and given that universities and research institutes were one of the most 
productive locus of evaluation by author affiliation, it remains an open question to what 
extent we can see self-organizing tendencies in evaluation, meaning that those directly 
or indirectly affected by a policy also conduct their own evaluations (Huitema et al., 
2011).  
What we do know from this analysis, however, is that ‘informal’ or supposedly 
more independent evaluations exhibited a somewhat greater, but not overwhelming, 
propensity to critically question the goals of the original policy they evaluate, that is, 
reflexivity (Huitema et al., 2011). This may, in turn, also come with greater attention to 
the specific context of a climate policy under evaluation, but the current literature 
provides no insights on the extent to which this may be happening. 
 
3.5.2 Context 
This literature review could not unearth any studies that may have assessed 
attention to contextual factors in climate policy evaluations in the EU directly in the 
sense that evaluation scholars have discussed it (see Chapter 2). However, there are 
several elements in the literature that point in useful directions. One issue is the extent to 
87 
which evaluation actors in the EU have attempted to harmonize evaluation practice. 
Echoing Ostrom, context-sensitive policy evaluation is hard, or perhaps even 
impossible, to standardize. But this is not to say that it hasn’t been tried in other policy 
fields. Writing on the evaluation of structural funds, Batterbury (2006, p. 187) suggests 
that  
The decentralization approach should ensure that greater contextual 
relevance is integrated into the evaluation process. However, the heavy 
emphasis on both quantifying impact and measuring performance misses 
the key question: why things work (or not) in specific contexts. 
In other words, at least with regard to cohesion policy, one of the early fields of policy 
evaluation, current methodological aims to standardize evaluation practice appears to 
stand in the way of paying closer attention to the context in which a policy may operate. 
This is especially relevant for climate policy making because, as Elinor Ostrom 
suggests, co-benefits of climate policy may contribute significantly to success in 
polycentric settings (E. Ostrom, 2010c). Simple indicator-based monitoring and 
evaluation—such as that practiced by the EEA in the context of the Monitoring 
Mechanism (see above)—may be unlikely to capture unexpected co-benefits or provide 
data on the full range of policy impacts, given that the latter likely vary with different 
policies and in different contexts. This chapter has disentangled various standardization 
attempts in (climate) policy evaluation, for example the methodological studies of the 
European Commission, or the evaluation guidelines issued by the UK government. But 
by the same token, a significant part of policy evaluation appears to be fashioned in a 
decentralized manner (especially in the European Commission), which may foster more 
attention to context. But the extent to which this is so has not been sufficiently studied. 
Second, as Chapter 2 explained, scholars have argued that using multiple methods 
may help in capturing multiple contextual policy effects. In the context of European 
spatial planning policy, Dabinett and Richardson (1999) explain how the ‘hegemony’ of 
economics and a ‘pro-integration bias’ tends to make evaluation a tool of powerful 
interests in policy-making, rather than a means to engage in pluralist democratic 
discussions and debates about policy alternatives. A recent meta-analysis suggests that 
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more than half of the 259 climate policy evaluations at the EU level and from various 
member states used just one evaluation methodology (Huitema et al., 2011). This lack of 
methodological diversity again calls into question whether current climate policy 
evaluation practices capture the full range of co-benefits and thus contextual effects of 
various policies. Climate policy evaluation literature entirely miss out on gauging to 
what extent evaluations pay attention to the various contextual dimensions that Chapter 
2 describes, such as political, spatial, or scientific aspects. This constitutes a knowledge 
gap in extant literatures. 
 
3.5.3 Interaction 
Last, to what extent climate policy evaluations engage with and draw on 
experiences and activities in other governance centres has not been analysed in this 
particular meta-study or elsewhere (Huitema et al., 2011). Crucially, the researchers 
behind this meta-study did not assess formal and informal evaluation activities in the 
various jurisdictions they considered. In other words, the extent to which evaluations are 
placed to foster interactions between different governance centres in the EU has to date 
not been systematically studied. The existing literature by and large confines itself to 
cataloguing and analysing climate policy evaluation at broad brush, but not in fine 
enough detail to understand evaluation’s role in interactions between governance centres 
(Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011; Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). This constitutes 
a key gap in available knowledge in policy evaluation literatures. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
So far, the literature reveals that the EU level, as well as Germany and the UK 
have been evaluation forerunners in the EU. However, the vast majority of evaluation 
literatures has focused on describing and to a certain degree assessing state evaluation 
institutions and actors in these countries. Very few studies have in turn focused on 
cataloguing or let alone assessing evaluation output at the EU level (but see Haug et al., 
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2010; Huitema et al., 2011; Mastenbroek et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2016 for notable 
exceptions). And even less is known about the activities and outputs of informal 
evaluation actors. Thus, the current state of the literature is heavily lopsided, and 
potentially fails to address an important and vibrant aspect of evaluation activity in 
Europe. The following chapters address some of the gaps identified above.
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In seeking to apply the Ostroms’ ideas about polycentric governance to climate 
policy evaluation, it is necessary to recognize that Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators 
did not only pursue novel theoretical endeavours. They also proposed a methodological 
approach that attempts to understand a world where, in her view, long-standing 
ontological and epistemological disputes have balkanized and at times paralyzed 
political science and related disciplines for far too long (E. Ostrom, 2006). In order to 
fully grasp her approach, it is thus necessary to not only explore its theoretical origins 
and developments, but also its philosophical foundations. In the first part of this chapter, 
I thus critically engage with the Ostroms’ key ideas about political science and beyond, 
with a particular focus on how they respond to existing epistemological and 
methodological debates in Section 2 and Section 3. Building on these insights, Section 4 
outlines how the current project seeks to implement these ideas, focusing on the main 
design and methods choices made in this thesis. This includes an overview of a database 
of climate policy evaluation studies (including a brief overview of the data contained 
therein), as well as an outline of the coding scheme devised for analysing policy 
evaluations from a polycentric perspective. Finally, this chapter discusses relevant 
ethical considerations, reflects critically on the research process, discusses limitations, 
and concludes. 
 
4.2 The Ostrom approach to ontology and epistemology 
The vast majority of ontological (how the world is) and epistemological (how we 
gain knowledge of the world) debates in political science and related disciplines in 
recent decades have boiled down to a fundamental clash between those who harbour 
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foundationalist/positivist beliefs (essentially the idea that the physical and social world 
exist independently of human conscience and interpretation) and those who argue in the 
anti-foundationalist/interpretivist tradition that the world is ‘socially constructed’, 
implying that reality is a product of the human mind and the interaction between 
different minds (Furlong & Marsh, 2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that each of 
these ontological traditions corresponds with epistemological and methodological 
approaches, with positivists preferring quantitative and ‘objective’ methods, and 
interpretivists stressing the need for qualitative, in-depth approaches to explore how 
humans construct the world around them. Symptomatically of these divisions, Furlong 
and Marsh (2010, p. 193) conclude that “[…] researchers cannot adopt one position at 
one time for one project and another on another occasion for a different project.” 
According to these scholars, these positions are not interchangeable because they reflect 
fundamentally different approaches to what social science is and how it is conducted. 
In recent years, however, there have been various attempts to soften the edges of 
these rather stylized and often entrenched philosophical fault lines. Or, in Elinor 
Ostrom’s words, to make better use of the “the excessive energy devoted to factional 
fights” (E. Ostrom, 2006, p. 3). One such approach is critical realism, which accepts a 
positivist ontology while broadening its methodological reach to both quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Furlong & Marsh, 2010). However, this approach still retains many 
of the dualisms from the positivist/interpretivist divide. By contrast, Elinor Ostrom and 
colleagues have argued that the reasoning expressed by Furlong and Marsh (2010) and 
many others unnecessarily and unhelpfully balkanizes academic practice. In the spirit of 
making progress in this divided world, the ‘Ostrom approach’ is essentially a pragmatic 
one, focusing in its methodological variant more on research practice than theory, and 
avoiding “name calling” (E. Ostrom, 2006, p. 4). This approach is critically reviewed 
below, while engaging with various additional insights that have emerged from different 
quarters of political science and beyond. 
The key underlying ontological proposition that Elinor Ostrom—along with many 
others in the social sciences—hold is that the social world is fundamentally different 
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from the biophysical world, and that this has implications for how we study the former. 
As she explains: 
The basic difference between the social world and the biophysical world 
is that the biophysical world exists whether or not humans reflect on it, 
but the social world is constituted by human thought, language, and 
action. Given the importance of language, a more serious threat to the 
future of our discipline than the lack of universal laws is our lack of 
common definitions for key terms we use including power, norms, and 
institutions. Can we ever escape from the “Tower of Babble” that we 
have created? (E. Ostrom, 2006, p. 4) 
In other words, studying human beings and their social world is not the same as 
studying worms or molecules. This is because unlike worms or molecules, human 
beings are ‘reflexive’, meaning that they have at least the potential to react to the way 
scholars theorize about them (see Hay, 2002). Thus humans can “[…] contemplate, 
anticipate, and can work to change their social and materials environments […]” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 129). In a reflexive social world where unwritten rules or 
social conventions exist only in people’s minds and through commonly-shared 
knowledge, Elinor Ostrom holds that the quest for ‘universal laws’ is futile, because 
such ‘laws’ tend to hold only in highly constrained situations. In other words, related to 
the arguments developed in Chapter 2, context matters immensely (E. Ostrom, 2006; 
Sprague, 1982). Conceptualizing political actors as reflective agents means in turn that 
these actors are not immune to or insulated from insights generated by scholars engaged 
in theorizing and studying the social world (Hay, 2002). 
This view is largely in line with other powerful criticisms of applying the 
foundationalist ontology in social science. As Furlong and Marsh (2010) explain, an 
influential critique of positivism suggested by Quine is that whatever knowledge we 
gain of the world passes necessarily though the filter of our senses, as well as our 
existing concepts. Consequently, our existing concepts and theoretical approaches 
extend our physical senses to perceive, prioritize, order, and categorize the bewildering 
amount of stimuli or ‘data’ that we can access on a particular question or phenomenon. 
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In the early 1980s, Elinor Ostrom contributed to related lines of reasoning by 
launching a critique of positivism in the form of an edited collection (E. Ostrom, 1982). 
As she explains there, “[t]o some extent the heavy emphasis on descriptive, empirical, 
quantitative work may have resulted from the naïve acceptance of a particular school of 
philosophy of science” (E. Ostrom, 2014a, p.214). However, as her later writings show, 
Ostrom would strongly disagree with the argument that holding certain ontological 
positions forces researchers to take particular epistemological stances, in contrast to 
Furlong and Marsh (2010). In part, this is because no matter how much researchers 
disagree about their philosophical convictions or dogmas, these considerations are 
usually only one consideration when choosing certain research methods —and perhaps 
not even the most important. As Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom (2010, p. 10-11) argue:  
The influence of theory—and the implied influence of ontology—on 
methodological practice cannot be assumed and should not be over-
stated. Theoretical changes can and do occur independently of changes in 
methodological practice […]. We argue that methodological choices are 
often driven as much by data availability or career incentives.  
Related considerations led Elinor Ostrom and colleagues to a ‘pragmatic’ 
approach to research, which centres on the productive synergies of different research 
methods in practice, rather than their theoretical antagonisms – while however stressing 
that logical congruence between one’s philosophical orientations and research methods 
remains important (E. Ostrom, 2006; Poteete et al., 2010). In essence, they argue that 
each methodological approach brings to the fore potentially useful elements—and thus 
advocate a pragmatic approach to research methodology, driven by the needs and 
constraints of researchers and their particular questions (Poteete et al., 2010). Facing 
increasingly complex systems that defy traditional reductionism, some philosophers of 
science have argued for a similar epistemological pluralism (see Mitchell, 2009). Taken 
together, even if higher-level ontological positions prove ultimately irreconcilable, 
productive synthesis may be possible through research practice and ultimately 
combining multiple approaches to look at a phenomenon. Much of the work of Elinor 
Ostrom and collaborators follows this line of thinking. The implications for this thesis 
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are thus to explain how the chosen method (i.e. database development and subsequent 
quantitative coding, see below) offers one important, but undeniably partial, view into 
the world of climate policy evaluation. It is partial in the sense that it cannot capture all 
of the relevant aspects of policy evaluation, but contributes crucially to developing a 
deeper understanding of this important governance practice. 
While accepting the basic difference between the natural and the social world, in 
this thesis I draw on this pragmatism with a view to using the at least partially normative 
polycentric governance theory (see Chapter 1) to study empirical patterns of climate 
policy evaluation. I therefore focus less on defining an ‘ideal’, atomistic ontological and 
epistemological approach, but rather seek to maximize the congruence between the 
nature of my questions and the methods used to answer them, while remaining fully 
aware of the very real limits of this methodology (see Section 4.7). 
 
4.3 Normative theory in social research: theory and empirics 
While I argued in Chapters 1 and 2 that much of the Ostroms’ work on polycentric 
governance contains undeniably normative elements, the idea that the social world 
differs markedly from the natural world goes a long way to reconcile tensions that 
emerge when seeking to reconcile a more positivist account of the social world with the 
use of normative theory in social research. In a nutshell, given that humans are reflexive, 
any theory about them or their behaviour has at least the potential to have a normative 
effect, because people may adjust their behaviour and choices in response to a theory, 
which can in turn become a self-fulfilling prophesy. For example, arguing that climate 
policy has become increasingly polycentric, and that polycentric governance can (or 
even should) yield positive results (e.g., E. Ostrom, 2010c; 2014b; Victor et al., 2005) 
may in turn affect the expectations of governance actors and thus their subsequent 
decisions and actions (as Chapter 1 argues, the 2015 Paris Agreement may be an 
example of this). In other words, governance theory on climate change and European 
integration has at least the potential to effect (normative) change in the (social) world 
(see Gravey, 2016). Building on the argument of the co-constructed nature of the 
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political world and reflexive political agents, stricto sensu the scholar becomes an 
additional political participant in constituting the political world. Based on the view 
explained above, inhabiting an a-theoretical, disinterested and uninvolved position—
particularly with a view to something as normative as evaluating climate policy (see 
Chapter 1)—simply is not one of the available options. Therefore, at least in the social 
sciences, the scholarly enterprise always has at least an implicit normative character and 
may thus explain Elinor Ostrom’s overt use of normative elements in her own work (see 
Chapter 2). 
This does not mean, however, that empirical research is futile or even unhelpful. 
As political scientists and colleagues in other disciplines are well-aware, social 
structures are often slow to change, and they are influenced by a range of factors, 
including history, culture, and others (see Tilly & Goodin, 2006). Thus, while the 
‘Ostrom approach’ holds that in principle theory should precede empirical investigation 
(Aligica & Sabetti, 2014a, p. 2), given that the social world is highly unlikely to change 
immediately and unequivocally in response to some theorist’s propositions, there is 
room for a dialectic relationship between theory and empirical insights (E. Ostrom, 
2014a). In other words, once launched, theory can enter into a co-productive 
relationship with empirical data, where theory stimulates data collection, and data in 
turn ‘speaks back’ to theory. It is in this spirit that I seek to subject some of the 
normative and positive claims regarding the role of information/evaluation in 
polycentric governance systems to empirical scrutiny (see Chapter 1). However, I do so 
with an awareness that such work also contributes to or at least engages with the larger 
normative project of polycentric governance and, crucially, with climate policy 
evaluation and broader debates on European integration and collaboration. 
By and large, my approach aligns with recent developments in political science. 
While positivists once advocated strictly separating empirical investigation and 
normative theory, the advent of ‘applied normative theory’ has gradually led to 
intellectual cross-fertilization between what had become increasingly separate scholarly 
endeavours with often equally separate communities (Bauböck, 2008, p. 42). This trend 
has been particularly pronounced within scholarly communities working on policy 
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evaluation—where traditionally there has been a strong focus on normative aspects and 
at times very limited attention to empirical evidence (see Chapters 2 and 3). As Bauböck 
(2008) argues, subjecting normative theory to empirical evidence can add a sense of 
realism and reflection into normative debates and evaluate to what extent normative 
ideals appear workable in various political settings. Facing the argument that this 
amounts to policy advocacy, Bauböck (2008) suggests:  
Not to abandon normative theory altogether or to confine it to an arcane 
academic discourse, but to expose it instead to the full force of critique 
from explanatory theory and empirically grounded research to analyse the 
application context for normative ideas. (p. 59) 
My approach in this thesis—empirically examining the emerging theory of 
polycentrism in the context of climate policy evaluation—follows the approach in the 
quote above. I thus accept to a degree that particularly in social and political settings a 
quest for ‘value-free’ research is indeed futile, but nevertheless endeavour to rigorously 
and systematically test the underlying values and assumptions of polycentrism. In doing 
so, I “[…] treat the empirical claims not as assumptions but as hypotheses […]” (D. F. 
Thompson, 2008, p. 498). Thus, once theory is launched, empirical evidence becomes 
an important ‘helping hand’ to its further development (D. F. Thompson, 2008, p. 500). 
Empirical research can thus make a very useful contribution to more normative debates 
on governance (see Smith, 2004). 
Before I describe the specific research design used in the current project, a key 
point about generalization in the Ostrom tradition is warranted. One of Elinor Ostrom’s 
key contributions is her more nuanced view of generalization than that which has been 
advocated in natural and social sciences. In a nutshell, her argument that context matters 
immensely in policy (see Chapter 2) renders problematic attempts to generalize from the 
individual characteristics of one governance context to another. Therefore, she argues 
that there are no “panaceas” (E. Ostrom et al., 2007). Yet in her work on natural 
resource governance, she argues strongly that much can be learnt from the large number 
of case studies that she analyses. However, her approach to ‘generalization’ or more 
general learning from case studies is grounded in the idea that direct generalization from 
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clearly measurable variables in natural resource governance (e.g., the number of fishers 
in a fishery, the size of their boats, the number of fish, the exact appropriation and 
decision rules etc.) is largely impossible, because particular contexts and large numbers 
of variables combine to produce unique governance outcomes that vary from one place 
to another (see E. Ostrom, 1990). This does not mean, however, that nothing more 
general can be learned from these cases. Elinor Ostrom proposes a focus on 
generalization at a higher level of abstraction, namely governance ‘principles’ rather 
than precise ‘variables.’ Her natural resource governance principles, drawn from 
multiple case studies, show higher-level, but not exactly/numerically specified 
guidelines that can be drawn from her cases (E. Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom, 2005). For 
example, she explains a need for low-cost, local conflict-resolution mechanisms or for 
continuous monitoring (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). However, precisely how to design these 
mechanisms effectively depends on the particular situation. Taken together, Elinor 
Ostrom’s approach to generalization thus clearly connects with her approach to 
conceptualizing analysis at different levels, that is, frameworks, theories and models (E. 
Ostrom, 2005, p. 27-29). Their assumptions and specificity vary, with frameworks being 
the most general approach (see Chapter 1). A generalization may not be possible at the 
same analytical level, but higher-level principles can be derived. This is how Elinor 
Ostrom conceptually reconciles the need for broader policy knowledge policy with the 
importance of context—an argument that matters immensely for the use of the 
knowledge that policy evaluations generate. 
Policy evaluation literatures have also engaged in significant ontological and 
epistemological discussions, which matter for the factors considered at the centre of this 
thesis. For example, on the concept of context, Greene (2005) explains how for 
experimentalists and more quantitative evaluators, context is something to be controlled 
(i.e. a confounding, but not a relevant factor); realists see context as an additional 
explanatory factor (in addition to other factors) and finally, qualitative evaluators see 
context as inextricably bound up with the outcomes of a policy, thus requiring detailed 
description. In mirroring the debates in political science explained above, this thesis 
draws on Elinor Ostrom’s approach as a way forward. 
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4.4 Research design and methods 
4.4.1 Studying policy evaluation in polycentric systems 
The way polycentric governance centres are thought to work guides the analyst’s 
approach to studying them. One approach in traditional political science tends to place 
the state or large-scale institutions at the centre of analysis. In contrast, at the other end 
of the spectrum, behaviourists focus on individuals and seek to strip them of any 
external influence to expose the basic building blocks of human behaviour. The 
polycentric approach follows neither of these arguably extreme positions, but seeks to 
position itself somewhere in the middle in order to conceptualize individual and 
structural influences simultaneously.  Most centrally, as Vincent Ostrom (1999b) 14 
argues, the central unit of analysis becomes the individual, or in some instances groups 
of individuals, rather than ‘government.’ However, individuals are not ‘atomistic:’ 
Vincent Ostrom (1999b, p. 124) draws on key contextual variables to argue that 
[…] the critical variables of concern to scholars in the polycentric 
tradition include (1) individuals; (2) decision rules; (3) sets of events; (4) 
outcomes; and (5) measures of performance.  
In this thesis, I focus in particular on the fifth element, namely ‘measures of 
performance,’ here defined as policy evaluations—also in the context of the other 
elements, such as relationships between the individuals or groups in producing these 
evaluations (e.g., between formal and informal actors). Vincent Ostrom (1999b, p. 124)  
furthermore explains that there are multiple criteria against which we can evaluate 
policy outcomes. But 
                                                 
14 Vincent and Elinor Ostrom were married, worked in the same research team and have significantly 
advanced polycentric governance theory over time (see Chapters 1 and 2). While Vincent Ostrom 
advanced key theoretical building blocks as early as the 1960s, Elinor Ostrom turned back to this work in 
the late 2000s in the context of climate change, while incorporating insights from her earlier work on 
common pool resources. 
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[i]f evaluative criteria can be developed into general measures of 
performance, then different patterns of organization or different 
institutional arrangements can be measured in relation to common 
standards of measurement or yardsticks.  
The latter can be understood as a call for ‘harmonized’ evaluation criteria. However, this 
view creates a key tension with arguments for more de-centralized policy evaluation 
detailed in Chapter 2. As a consequence, when studying the role of policy evaluation 
from a polycentric perspective, it is necessary to pay close attention to how this tension 
plays out in practice. 
Following the pragmatic approach proposed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, this 
thesis uses methods that include both more quantitative approaches to understand the 
‘big picture’ of key characteristics of the database of evaluation studies (‘what is out 
there?’), but also more detailed, and in part qualitative, coding to understand a smaller 
number of evaluations and practices in detail. The following section unpacks this 
analysis, focusing on case selection, sampling, and coding, as well as a first descriptive 
overview of the evaluations that this thesis analyses. 
 
4.4.2 Study focus and case selection 
Research design refers to the overall conceptual architecture of a research project 
in light of the broader ontological and epistemological issues discussed above. Overall, 
the aim of this project is to build a theoretically and empirically informed account of 
climate policy evaluation practice in the EU from a polycentric climate governance 
perspective (see Chapter 1). To do so, I focus on the EU level—the main locus of 
climate policy development and evaluation (see Chapter 1), as well as on Germany and 
on the United Kingdom (UK), which are the EU’s two largest economies and carbon 
dioxide emitters, and thus especially relevant for climate change, and who are also 
active climate policy adopters and evaluators. This makes the EU a ‘crucial case’ 
(Eckstein, 2000) or a ‘critical case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) for the role of policy evaluation in 
polycentric governance systems. As Eckstein (2000, p. 148) explains, a crucial case is 
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one “[…] that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s 
validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” 
(emphasis in original). As Chapter 1 explains, starting from the point that European 
Union climate governance is polycentric par excellence (E. Ostrom, 2010c; E. Ostrom, 
2014b; T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013), makes this a ‘most likely’ case for an active role of 
evaluation in the emergence of a polycentric climate governance system. In other words, 
if evaluation does not facilitate polycentric governance in the case of EU climate change 
governance, it is highly unlikely to do so in other polycentric arrangements. In addition 
to these theoretical considerations, I am a German native speaker, which allowed me to 
analyse evaluation studies in the German and English languages. In order to capture the 
full range of climate policy evaluation activities in Germany, in the UK and at the EU 
level, I considered both formal (state-driven) and informal (society-driven) evaluations 
(see Chapter 2). 
Overall, my goal was thus to locate and catalogue climate policy evaluation 
studies (‘evaluations’ from now on) generated up to 2014,15 a time period during which 
the EU substantially increased its climate policy-making (see Jordan et al., 2010). 
Earlier studies under the auspices of the Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies (ADAM) 
Project (see Hulme, Neufeldt, Colyer, & Ritchie, 2009) analysed ex-post climate policy 
evaluation activities in the EU between 199816 and March 2007 (Haug et al., 2010; 
Huitema et al., 2011). Since 2007, there has been no systematic audit of evaluation 
activities, even though there have been discussions on the need for more meta-analyses 
of climate policy evaluations (see Wörlen, 2011). The current study extended these 
analyses to 2014 while including a much wider range of evaluation actors, considering a 
vital area of EU climate policy development, and applying a novel theoretical 
perspective. 
                                                 
15 In line with Haug et al. (2010), the goal was to identify and catalogue as many evaluations as possible, 
given time and resource constraints. As I explain below, this is likely to have generated an extensive, but 
probably not entirely exhaustive, list of evaluations. 
16 Prior to 1998, there were very few ex-post evaluation studies (see Huitema et al., 2011). 
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4.4.3 Assembling the evaluation database 
The first step of this research was to build a novel database of ex-post climate 
policy evaluations published between 199717 and 2014. The focus is on published 
evaluations. Recognizing that evaluation is a wider process involving a range of actors 
and many different types of interactions (e.g., participation of various actors), this study 
focuses on the concrete and publically available—but inevitably only partial—outputs of 
that process (see Chapter 1). Researchers who had worked on the ADAM project (see 
above) kindly provided their database of evaluations, but they used a slightly different 
operational definition of ex-post evaluation studies than I did for my own database. 
Specifically, the ADAM project included articles from professional academic journals, 
as well as book chapters, whose primary aim may not have been to analyse existing 
policy with a view to establishing its performance or worth (the standard definition of an 
evaluation – see Chapter 1) and often providing recommendations, but rather collecting 
data and/or testing theory developed in academia or otherwise.  
In contrast to this broad definition of evaluations, and in line with the definitions 
of evaluation discussed in Chapter 1, for the current project I chose a narrower 
definition of ex-post evaluation and therefore excluded publications in academic 
journals while including a wider range of organizations and actors given the broad 
orientation of polycentric governance with a keen interest in formal and informal actors 
(see Chapter 2). The operational definition concentrates on four key dimensions, namely 
the focus, the purpose, the analysis, and the temporal orientation of an evaluation: 
 Focus: Evaluations of ‘public policy’ only, that is, policies put forward by 
governments/governmental actors at the EU level, as well as at the national level 
in Germany or in the UK. This is in line with Vedung’s classic (1997) definition 
of evaluation (Chapter 1). My database therefore does not include evaluations of 
                                                 
17 The general search extended to the middle of the twentieth century, but the first evaluation located was 
from 1997. This corroborates Huitema et al. (2011), who also pointed to the extremely low numbers of 
climate policy evaluations before the mid-1990s. 
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other governance approaches, such as city networks. In substantial policy terms, 
and following Huitema et al. (2011), I focused on evaluations of policies that 
ultimately seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and which countries 
routinely report to the United Nations (UN). I limited the search to mitigation 
policies; that is, policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
database therefore excludes all evaluations on climate adaptation policy (i.e. 
policies that seek to enable societies to live with certain levels of climate 
change). I only included evaluations of policies in all sectors (such as transport, 
energy or agriculture) that address greenhouse gases (see above). A policy sector 
may be defined as “a place where an empirically observable set of actors defines 
a general set of rules and norms for commonly accepted characterizations of 
policy-relevant issues or concerns” (J. Rayner, Howlett, Wilson, Cashore, & 
Hoberg, 2001, p. 320). To ensure a policy focus on climate change, in each case 
I keyword searched the evaluation for ‘climate change’ and ‘greenhouse gases’18 
to determine whether or not the evaluation focused on a policy that was thought 
to have a significant climate change impact. Geographically, the database only 
contains evaluations that address policies enacted at the EU level, or at the 
national level in Germany or in the UK, that is, evaluations of regional or local 
policies were not included. Furthermore, the database only includes evaluations 
that were funded by formal and informal actors at EU level, in Germany or the 
UK (see below for a more detailed discussion of the ‘funding’ criterion). 
Evaluation ‘funding’ here is a broad category that includes both an organization 
funding its own evaluation, as well as an organization funding others to conduct 
the evaluation (a more restrictive category would be commissioning evaluation, 
which means that one actor commissions another to conduct the evaluation). For 
example, a policy evaluation of a UK policy funded by actors in the UK would 
be included in the database (and analogously for the EU level and Germany). 
Furthermore, a German or UK policy evaluation funded by EU level evaluators 
                                                 
18 In the German-language evaluations, I used the German equivalents, namely “Klimawandel” and 
“Treibhausgase.” 
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would also be included in the database, as would evaluations of EU level policy 
funded by German or UK-based evaluators. By contrast, evaluations of EU level 
policy funded by for example US-American actors, or evaluations of 
German/UK/EU policy funded by Belgian evaluators would not be included in 
the database. However, evaluations funded by actors at the EU level, in Germany 
or in the UK (conducted anywhere) were included. 
 Purpose: The database only includes evaluations whose primary goal is to 
evaluate a policy and provide some type of recommendations or policy-relevant 
conclusions (i.e. not academic theory-testing or use as a case study in broader 
theoretical arguments), as has been argued in relevant evaluation literatures (see 
Chapter 1). Because publications in academic journals are not included, my 
operational definition is narrower than that used by researchers in the ADAM 
project (see Haug et al., 2010; Huitema et al., 2011). 
 Analysis: To be included in my database, evaluations needed to include 
sufficient and systematic analysis – containing and analysing novel information 
collected for the evaluation, or alternatively recombining existing information 
and arguments in new ways. Therefore, short documents such as press 
releases/policy briefs or political position statements were not included (see 
Haug et al. (2010), who adopted a very similar approach). However, if a policy 
brief/position statement was based on a more extensive evaluation that satisfies 
these criteria, I sought to locate the original evaluation for inclusion in my 
database. 
 Temporal orientation. The main orientation of the evaluation had to be ex-post, 
that is, retrospectively looking at the outcomes/performance/worth of an existing 
or terminated policy. Evaluations mainly anticipating future effects (ex-ante 
evaluations or ‘impact assessments’ – of which there are many (Turnpenny et al., 
2016) of some proposed policy measure were not included in the database – 
again following the approach by Haug et al., (2010). 
Table 4.1 summarises these inclusion and exclusion criteria based on a combination of 
evaluation funding and the policy level. 
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Table 4.1: Evaluations included in the database 
 Policy level  
E
va
lu
a
ti
o
n
 f
u
n
d
er
s 
fr
o
m
…
 
 DE 
national  
UK 
national 
EU Regional/local 
(anywhere) 
All 
else 
DE      
UK      
EU 
level 
     
All 
else 
     
 
Overall, I searched for evaluations with the aforementioned geographical 
orientation published any time until 31 December 2014. I only included evaluations in 
my database that were at least in principle in the public domain; that is, they did not 
require special access permission arrangements and were available in electronic format 
on the Internet (or as part of an existing database) at the time of searching (2014-2016). 
For example, I did not file Freedom of Information (FOI) requests in order to retrieve 
evaluations. This approach is in line with earlier research in this area (e.g., Huitema et 
al., 2011). I focused only on public evaluations, because all but the most well-connected 
actors in a polycentric governance system would be unlikely to know of or be able to 
request/use evaluations that are not publically available. Furthermore, in practical terms 
there is currently no systematic way of knowing which non-public evaluations exist, 
thus it would not have been possible to assemble a reliable population of these 
evaluations (and the totality of climate policy evaluations outside those publically 
available remains unknown). Last, earlier literature suggests that specific aspects of 
freedom of information differ in Germany, in the UK and at EU level so that conducting 
related requests may have yielded different results as a function of different underlying 
approaches (e.g., Bugdahn, 2008).  
Aside from drawing upon the database from the ADAM project, I located 
evaluations through web searches by drawing both on my personal knowledge of 
evaluation organizations, using key evaluation databases where available (see Table 4.2 
below), and using ADAM project evaluations to identify key organizations that have 
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conducted policy evaluations before. In addition, I attended several relevant conferences 
and workshops with practitioners (see the acknowledgements for a list), where I asked 
for advice on how to locate publically available evaluation sources through 
‘snowballing.’ In each case, I recorded where I first encountered an evaluation in order 
to build a knowledge base on where most of the evaluations could be found. 
Given that there is no central European database or source for climate evaluations 
that encompasses all jurisdictions of interest in this study, and especially because 
nobody systematically collected informal evaluations anywhere, I had to build a new 
database from various sources. I began assembling my unparalleled database by 
combining relevant climate policy evaluations from a range of existing databases, which 
were mainly compiled by academics in the context of other projects. Furthermore, I 
collected evaluations from individual organizational websites online. Table 4.2 provides 
an overview and brief description of these sources. 
 
Table 4.2: Source databases 
Database title Key characteristics Source Number of evaluations 
retrieved 
ADAM project 
database 
 Contains 259 ex-post 
climate policy 
evaluations. 
 Includes published 
academic studies as 
evaluations. 
Huitema et al. 
(2011) and 
personal contact 
with researchers 
involved in the 
project. 
130 
Monitoring 
Mechanism reports 
to the European 
Environment 
Agency 
 The Monitoring 
Mechanism is a tool 
to collect mainly ex-
ante data on climate 
policies across the 
European Union. 
 Reviewed reports 
published in 2009, 
2011, and 2013 for 
additional 
evaluations. 
European 
Environment 
Agency 
(EIONET 
website and 
personal contact 
with EEA 
officials). 
14 
Forschungsradar 
Energiewende 
Database 
 Large, online 
database of 
evaluations on the 
German 
Energiewende. 
Online at: 
http://www.forsc
hungsradar.de/st
udiendatenbank.
html. 
127 
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 Operated by the 
German Agency for 
Renewable Energy 
and co-funded by 
the German Federal 
Government. 
Warren Demand-
Side Management 
Database 
 Large meta-analysis 
by Peter Warren at 
the UCL Energy 
Institute. 
 200+ evaluations. 
The database is 
published in 
Warren (2014) 
1 
European 
Commission Smart 
Regulation/Evaluat
ion Database 
 Online database with 
evaluations 
conducted by the 
European 
Commission. 
Available online 
at: 
http://ec.europa.
eu/smart-
regulation/evalu
ation/search/sear
ch.do. 
18 
Mastenbroek et al. 
(2015) dataset 
 Dataset with 216 
evaluation reports 
from 2000-2012 
compiled from 
various sources. 
See 
Mastenbroek et 
al. (2015). Stijn 
van Voorst 
kindly provided 
information on a 
number of 
relevant climate 
policy 
evaluations via 
email. 
6 
European 
Commission Multi-
Annual Overviews 
of Evaluations & 
Impact 
Assessments 
 
 Reviewed all 
Commission Multi-
Annual Overviews 
between 2002 and 
2009. 
Available as 
official 
publications 
from the 
European 
Commission. 
2 
Eureval Database  Dataset from private 
consulting company 
with 144 evaluations 
in total. 
Thomas 
Delahais, who 
was involved 
with building the 
database, kindly 
gave permission 
to use it. 
 
1 
EU Climate Policy 
Bibliography (EUI) 
 Online database with 
mainly academic 
climate policy 
evaluations. 
Available online 
at: 
https://cprubibli
ography.wordpre
ss.com/. 
3 
N/A (specific, 
individual 
collection for this 
thesis) 
 Individual 
organizational 
websites and other 
internet sources 
Various (see 
Appendix 2 for 
the full list). 
316 
My database (for 
comparison) 
 See above. See above. 618 
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The research involved reviewing each database in detail in order to extract 
relevant evaluations for the current project and subsequently encode them in my own 
database. Following this database review, I browsed organizational websites to locate 
additional climate policy evaluations. I started with key organizations that had emerged 
in the database review above and checked their individual websites for additional 
evaluations. Overall, this process was lengthy, sometimes difficult, and cumbersome. It 
required searching extensively for evaluations on individual websites, and reviewing a 
vast amount of evaluations in order to identify those that matched my selection criteria 
(see above). Following initial review, I presented the list of organizations I had 
consulted three experts19 with relevant experience in this field, who checked for 
completeness and suggested additional organizations to consider. For a complete list of 
sources and the activities used to locate them, see Appendix 2. Overall, generating the 
database took over two years (2014-2016). In contrast to other studies, such as in the 
impact assessment domain (e.g., Fritsch et al., 2013), where governments have set up 
databases that can be combined by researchers, the source databases I used ultimately 
returned about half (48.87%) of the evaluations in my database (see the last column in 
Table 4.2 for the complete breakdown), and thus necessitated a wide-ranging and time-
consuming search on individual organizational websites. This approach was particularly 
necessary for ‘informal’ evaluations (i.e. evaluations funded by societal actors, see 
Chapters 1 and 2), which have so far not been catalogued in an existing database after 
2007 (see Huitema et al., 2011). Taken together, this generated an extensive and novel 
database of 618 climate policy evaluation studies in the UK, Germany and the EU. 
Novel because it covers both a far greater range of actors than had previously been 
considered and a period of rapid climate policy development in the EU. Extensive 
because it is nearly three times as large as the ADAM database, and because I only 
ended the search for evaluations once all the sources I and experts in the field could 
identify had been reviewed. 
 
                                                 
19 Prof Andy Jordan, Mr. Christoph Priebe, Dr Tim Rayner. 
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4.4.4 Database overview 
General overview. The first stage of the analysis involved creating a set of 
overview statistics on the whole database (N = 618). To this end, I extracted information 
on a small set of criteria from the evaluations and where necessary from the websites 
that published them, including the publication year, who conducted the evaluation 
(hereafter, ‘the evaluator’), including broad evaluator categories (e.g., research 
institute/university, private consultancy, government body etc.), and who paid for the 
evaluation (the evaluation funder), including broad funder categories (e.g., policy 
makers, foundations, or environmental groups). Furthermore, I catalogued the climate 
policy sub-area that the evaluation addressed (e.g., renewables, transport, waste or cross-
cutting). The analysis revealed some challenges. First, it was not possible to determine 
the evaluation funder for 74 evaluations, which translates into 11.97% of the entire 
database. These evaluations remained in the database, but received the qualification 
‘Not known’ for this category.  
Second, when multiple organizations from multiple governance centres funded 
evaluations together, I used the label ‘EU’ as the country label, indicating that they came 
from more than one EU country and to reflect the fact that the evaluation emerged from 
joint efforts of funders in several EU countries. When multiple types of organizations 
were involved in conducting an evaluation, I used the category of the first, or lead, 
evaluator for the evaluator category. For example, if an evaluation was led by a research 
institute with contributions from a commercial consultant, I coded the evaluation as 
‘research institute.’ The following section contains a description of these general 
overview statistics on all evaluations contained in the database. Understanding the 
database in general terms is a necessary precondition in order to choose a smaller sub-
set of evaluations for further analysis (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
The data collection yielded 618 evaluations focusing on climate policy at the EU 
level, or in Germany or in the UK (both national-level policy only) between 1997 and 
2014. Figure 4.1 reveals that while the number of evaluations per year grows until the 
mid-2000s, there are notably fewer evaluations 2007-2009, when evaluation output 
drops to under 30 evaluations per year, in comparison to 57 evaluations produced in 
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2006 (a nearly 50% drop). However, by 2010 the evaluation output resumes previous 
levels and begin to surpass them in the following years. After 2011, the number of 
yearly evaluations remains at a high level with minor fluctuations with about 70-80 
evaluations per year. Thus, these data are generally in line with Huitema et al. (2011), 
who detected strong climate policy evaluation growth until 2007 (although, notably, 
their sampling frame is somewhat different). 
 
Figure 4.1: Climate policy evaluations over time: EU level, DE, UK (N = 618) 
 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of these emerging patters and their 
potential explanations (see Chapter 8), a crucial step is to further disaggregate these data 
in order to understand (1) who has funded the evaluations, (2) who has conducted the 
evaluations, and (3) on which governance centres they focused. While previous studies 
have pointed to relatively high numbers of commissioned evaluations (Huitema et al., 
2011), they did not yet distinguish between the location of those who fund and those 
who conduct evaluations—they focused mainly on the jurisdiction that evaluations were 
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concerned with; see Haug et al., (2010).20 The following sections provide the overview 
data on these three dimensions with a view to further unpacking the data presented in 
Figure 4.1.  
Evaluation funders. The location of the evaluation funders is a good proxy for 
locating the original ‘impetus’ of evaluation. As Chapters 2 and 3 discussed, this is 
relevant because producing evaluations requires significant resources. Doing so provides 
a much more precise set of data on the origin of evaluation. Figure 4.2 thus presents the 
number of evaluations over time against the location of the evaluation funder. 
 
Figure 4.2: Evaluations funded at the EU level and in DE & UK over time (N = 617)21 
 
While the overall growth in evaluations is reflected here, Figure 4.2 reveals that 
funders in the three governance centres analysed here do not drive this growth evenly. 
                                                 
20 These authors relied on double-counting when a report concerned more than one governance centre. 
21 One evaluation did not include a publication date and is thus excluded here. 
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While formal and informal actors in the UK and in the EU funded a comparatively high 
number of evaluations published in 2005 and 2006 (with actors in Germany funding 
comparable levels in 2005, but much less in 2006), the number of evaluations funded by 
actors in the UK grew at a much lower rate than in Germany after 2010. Actors in 
Germany funded smaller numbers of evaluations early in the period studied (2005 is 
somewhat of an exception), but starting in 2010, they surpassed all others, including EU 
level actors, in funding evaluations. The data thus reveal a climate policy evaluation 
‘funding boom’ in Germany starting in 2010. It should also be noted again that it was 
not possible to decipher who funded 11.97% of all evaluations (74 evaluations across all 
years). 
Crucial for this thesis is the distinction between formal (state-led) and informal 
(society-led) evaluations (see Chapter 2 and below). Taking again a funding ‘impetus’ 
perspective, Figure 4.3 shows that in the different governance centres, different types of 
organizations fund evaluation. Notably, courts or scrutiny bodies, as well as parliaments, 
play an important role in funding climate policy evaluations in the UK, whereas there is 
comparatively more involvement of environmental organizations, state-owned banks, 
governmental agencies, and policy-makers themselves in Germany and at the EU level. 
Strikingly, as far as evaluation funding goes, the types of evaluation funders in Germany 
and the EU appear to more or less resemble each other whereas the UK differs notably.  
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Figure 4.3: Evaluation funders by organizational type and location (N = 618) 
 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, all evaluation funders who are linked with the state 
(i.e. part of government or drawing on public resources) will be considered ‘formal.’ 
This is in line with the relatively broad definition of ‘the state’ put forward in Chapter 2. 
However, as Chapter 8 explains further, it is important to recognize that, as Figure 4.3 
reveals, the ‘formal’ category contains a range of organizational types with often very 
different functions within the state. For example, the Departments of the UK 
government have a very different role from the UK Parliament or the UK National Audit 
Office (NAO), but crucially, all draw on public resources to operate. Drawing on the 
categorization here, the ‘formal’ category thus includes courts and scrutiny bodies, 
parliaments, governmental organizations, state-owned banks, governmental agencies, 
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independent advice committees, research councils, research institutes (which often 
either draw direct monies from public actors or significantly depend on the public purse 
for contracts), as well as (executive) government. In total, formal actors funded 458 
evaluations, or 74.11% of the database.22 By contrast, informal actors that funded 
evaluations included industry, environmental pressure groups, and foundations or public 
interest organizations. Compared to the formal category, informal actors funded a 
relatively limited number of evaluations (84 evaluations or 13.59% of the overall 
database). Thus, formal, state-linked actors were the main financial supporters for the 
climate policy evaluations in the database in all three governance centres. 
Evaluators. The second key perspective on evaluation is the geographical location 
of the evaluators. Given the previously noted practice of funding others to conduct 
evaluation studies, evaluation funders and evaluators are not necessarily located in the 
same governance centre (but self-funding is possible). Figure 4.4 thus presents the 
distribution of evaluators across governance centres and time. 
                                                 
22 The complete breakdown by evaluation funders is as follows: Total N = 618; of which formal 
evaluations = 458, informal evaluation = 84; unknown = 74; organizational type ‘other’ = 2. 
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Figure 4.4: Evaluations by the location of the evaluators over time (N = 618)23 
 
                                                 
23 The publication year could not be determined for one evaluation (indicated as n.d.). 
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Figure 4.4 reveals that across all years, the majority of evaluations were produced 
by actors at the EU level, in Germany, or in the UK (the largest sections in the bars for 
each year). The number of evaluations that evaluators from each governance centre 
produced varies over time. In terms of the location of evaluators, the EU level, 
Germany, and the UK by and large resembled each other until 2009. From 2010, 
compared to the EU and the UK, which remained similar, evaluators in Germany 
conducted nearly two to three times as many evaluations between 2010 and 2014. Thus, 
in addition to many of the climate policy evaluations being funded in Germany (see 
above), many evaluations were also being conducted in Germany. As explained in the 
previous chapter, it should be noted that these data reflect the geographic location of the 
‘lead evaluator’ only, as many studies were conducted by consortia made up of multiple 
organizations. 
Another way of looking at the same data is to consider the organizational type of the 
evaluators across the whole database (see Figure 4.5). These data were obtained by 
reviewing the author information in each evaluation and, where necessary, on the source 
website or similar. The categories were obtained from Huitema et al. (2011) and adapted 
to suit this database. Figure 4.5 shows that research institutes conducted the largest share 
of evaluations (just under half of the evaluations in the database), followed by 
commercial consultancies and government bodies. The low number of evaluations 
conducted by civil society organizations and industry/trade associations is also notable. 
Environmental organizations conducted just under 60 evaluations. Furthermore, Figure 
4.5 reveals that German research institutes produced a very sizeable number of 
evaluations.24 In the other categories, evaluators in these three governance centres 
produced comparable numbers of evaluations, with the exception of government bodies, 
which appeared to be more active in climate policy evaluation at the EU level compared 
to Germany and the UK.
                                                 
24 The category ‘research institutes’ includes universities; however, the number of evaluations conducted 
by universities is very small. 
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Figure 4.5: Evaluator category by evaluator country (N = 617)25  
                                                 
25 See above – the organizational category of the evaluator could not be determined in one case. 
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Geographical focus of the evaluation. The third perspective in this general 
overview is to consider the governance centre on which an evaluation focuses. This 
perspective thus analyses where evaluations are directed. Figure 4.6 summarizes the 
number of evaluations focusing on climate policy in each of the three governance 
centres. 
 
Figure 4.6: Evaluations of climate policy at the EU level, DE & UK over time (N = 
617)26 
 
 
Figure 4.6 reveals that the number of evaluations focusing on climate policy in 
each governance centre fluctuates over time. While early on there was less evaluation 
of climate policies in Germany, this reversed from 2008 onwards, when German 
climate policy became the most evaluated dimension compared to the UK and the 
EU level from 2011 onwards. 
                                                 
26 In one case, the evaluation year could not be determined; see above. 
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Figure 4.7 then draws together the aforementioned information on the number 
of evaluations by funder, evaluator, as well as the location of the policy under 
evaluation. The thickness of the connectors between funders, evaluators, and the 
evaluation in Figure 4.7 represents the number of evaluations with the respective 
characteristics (i.e. the bigger the number of evaluations, the thicker the connector). 
It demonstrates a strong congruence between the location of the funder, the 
evaluator, as well as the policy under evaluation. By and large, German funders tend 
to fund German evaluators to evaluate German policies, and so on for the EU level 
and the UK. 
 
Figure 4.7: Evaluation funders, evaluators and policy under evaluation (N = 618) 
Note: the thickness of the connectors represents the number of evaluations with the respective 
characteristics. 
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Climate policy sub-types. The fourth key dimension to understand the 
evaluation output is to consider on which climate policy sub-type each evaluation 
focuses. Figure 4.8 thus presents the number of evaluations by country and climate 
policy sub-type.  
 
Figure 4.8: Evaluations at the EU level, DE & UK by climate policy sub-type (N = 
618) 
 
 
Figure 4.8 reveals that evaluations on climate policy at the EU level and in 
Germany and the UK differ in their focus on the climate policy sub-type. For 
evaluations focusing on Germany, the large number of evaluations on renewables 
policy stands out, but also evaluations on environmental taxation, buildings and 
bioenergy. In many ways, this is not surprising, given Germany’s strong policy 
preference for renewable energy through the Energiewende and related efforts to 
boost energy efficiency. Historically, environmental taxation has also played an 
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important role in Germany since the early 1990s. Evaluations on emissions trading, 
transport, greenhouse gas emissions and various targets (Kyoto and EU) focused 
mainly at the EU level. Again, this is unsurprising given the central role the EU plays 
in the EU Emissions Trading System, as well as in assessing policy achievements 
against international climate targets. However, notably on energy efficiency, most 
evaluations focused on Germany and the UK, with relatively few evaluations 
conducted on policies in the EU as a whole. Furthermore, given the EU’s tendency 
for package programs and the UK’s ‘technology neutral’ attempts at making climate 
policy, the number of cross-sectoral climate policy evaluations appears 
correspondingly greater in the UK and at EU level than in Germany. 
 
4.4.5 Analysis with a novel coding scheme 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the evaluations in the database, and 
study the key aspects discussed in Chapter 2, I developed a novel coding scheme in 
order to analyse a sub-set of the evaluations (for the results, see Chapters 5-7). 
Starting from the long-standing standard evaluation categories reviewed in Chapter 2 
(such as time, formal/informal evaluation, etc.), I worked backwards to the 
foundational ideas of polycentric governance (Chapter 2)—namely self-organization, 
context and interacting governance centres—in order to turn these into empirically 
usable coding categories. Doing so involved an iterative process, where I first 
developed a draft coding scheme, reviewed that draft with experts in the field27 and 
made further improvements. Once I arrived at a workable draft, I conducted pilot 
coding to test the usability of the scheme, and made adjustments whenever I noticed 
aspects that required further work. 
The coding scheme used a mixture of deductive and inductive coding in that it 
started from a number of coding categories that have proven relevant in evaluation 
literatures and that are linked to the previous discussion on polycentric governance 
(see Chapter 2). For example, drawing on the discussion on context, the coding 
scheme sought to capture the length of time over which the climate policy is assessed 
                                                 
27 Professors Mikael Hildén, Dave Huitema, and Andy Jordan. 
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or the extent to which the evaluation pays attention to the political environment in 
which a policy operated. However, I also kept the coding scheme open, allowing for 
flexibility to generate additional categories that emerged in the coding process. The 
aim was to generate a broad overview of the way in which context has been taken 
into account (or not) in climate policy evaluations, starting with standard evaluation 
categories, but not being limited by them. In this iterative process, I added the 
category of ‘reference to climate science’ in the contextual elements, which is quite 
specific and relevant to climate policy. Whenever I encoded a particular score, I 
recorded the relevant page number and justification for that score. 
As a final check before beginning the analysis, I tested the coding scheme with 
a colleague28 in order to assess the inter-rater reliability of this analysis tool. As 
D'Lane, Love, and Sell (2012, p. 42) detail, “[r]eliability in coding means that the 
biases inherent in the observers/researchers are substantially less than the ‘true 
variation’ of the behaviour being coded.” In practice, we both coded three 
evaluations independently and then compared the results. Initially, we on average 
agreed on 53% of the items across the three evaluations (the scores were 64%, 50% 
and 46%). However, in the vast majority where we did not have immediate 
agreement, the scores varied by a point or so on a five-point scale. Following the 
independent coding, we discussed each score in detail and were in this process able 
to agree on a final score, as well as to calibrate the coding scheme in order to clarify 
it. Following the calibration of the coding scheme, I analysed the remainder of the 
sample (see below) alone, given time and resource constraints. Table 4.3 summarizes 
the key elements of the coding scheme. See Appendix 3 for the full coding scheme 
including the full scales.  
                                                 
28 I am grateful to Christoph Priebe for his generous help. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the coding scheme 
Foundational 
idea 
Item Scale 
Self-
organization 
Stated or implied purpose of the evaluation 
(Categorical) 
Legal requirement, 
accountability, learning, 
none/not clear. 
Stated or implied target audience of the evaluation 
(Categorical; multiple mentions possible) 
Politicians, bureaucrats, 
wider public, not clear. 
Is the evaluation a legal requirement? Yes/no. 
Evaluation a continuous or one-off activity? Ad-hoc/continuous. 
Context Time (historical developments) 1-6 
Policy goals (intended outcomes) 0-4 
Policies in other sectors (interactions?) 0-4 
Unintended policy outcome(s) 0-4 
External events/circumstances 0-4 
Political environment/structures 0-4 
Geography 0-4 
Scientific findings (e.g., climate science) 0-4 
Evaluation methods Record methods. 
Number of methods Record number. 
Evaluation criteria Record criteria. 
Number of criteria Record number. 
Side effects Yes/no 
Evaluation method tailoring 0-2 
Reflexivity 1-3 
Interaction For informal evaluation: Does informal evaluation 
attempt to identify and fill gaps left by ‘formal’ 
evaluation activities? 
No gaps, gaps identified, 
gaps identified & 
addressed. 
Reference to evaluation studies conducted in other 
centres (but focusing on the same centre) 
0-3 
Reference to (evaluation studies of) experiences in 
other centres. 
0-3 
To what extent do ‘formal’ evaluations draw on 
information from ‘informal’ evaluations and vice 
versa? 
0-3 
Is there a common metric (e.g., quantification?) that 
can be used to compare across governance centres? 
0-4 
Are there key lessons/recommendations for others or 
the policy itself? 
0-2 
If there are recommendations, is it clear whether/how 
the context matters? 
0-2 
Ease of use Executive summary 
(yes/no). 
If executive summary: 
(Categorical) 
Hierarchy of information 
(yes/no) . 
Linguistic access Summary in other 
language (yes/no). 
Availability of the evaluation 0-3 
Not used/no 
data. 
Evaluand – substance or process? 
(Categorical) 
Policy substance, policy 
process, both policy 
substance & process. 
Evaluation budget Budget. 
General comments  
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4.4.6 Selecting a sample of evaluations 
The large size of the ‘population’ of climate policy evaluations collected in the 
aforementioned database (comprising 618 evaluations) required selecting a sub-
selection of evaluations for in-depth analysis with the coding scheme. Preliminary 
coding had revealed that applying the coding scheme in a systematic way often 
required reading large passages, if not the entire evaluation, in detail in order to 
extract the relevant information. Although the length of the evaluations varied, many 
had dozens, if not hundreds of pages of text. It was not uncommon to take several 
hours or even a full working day in order to code a single evaluation. In order to 
generate a sample, I used all informal evaluations and a random sample from the 
formal evaluations. 
A crucial first step at this stage involved distinguishing between formal and 
informal evaluations for analytical purposes. The database overview above revealed 
that there are in principle two ways in which one could distinguish between formal 
and informal evaluations: focusing on evaluation funders or on evaluators 
themselves. Theoretically, the focus on the formal/informal distinction in this thesis 
derives from the Ostroms’ ideas about self-governance, which is one of her 
foundational ideas (see Chapter 2). As Ostrom (2005) highlights, the crucial question 
on self-governance in monitoring and evaluation relates to the extent to which 
organizations can muster the necessary (i.e. principally the financial) resources in 
order to conduct rather expensive studies or, here, climate policy evaluations. With a 
view to self-governance, the key characteristic to distinguish between formal and 
informal evaluation is thus related to who pays for policy evaluations – information 
that can also in many cases be readily found in the evaluations, although none of the 
evaluations analysed here indicated any specific amounts spent on evaluation (the 
item was included in the coding scheme, but due to lack of data, no further analysis 
is possible). 
Taking these aspects into account, I extracted 168 evaluations for in-depth 
analysis with the coding scheme, which the following section explains. Fritsch et al. 
(2013) had used an analogous method to draw a sample for coding from a population 
of impact assessment studies. In fact, given that there were only 84 informal 
evaluations, I analysed all of them, and drew a random sample of 84 evaluations 
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from the formal ones. I generated the sample of the formal evaluations with a random 
number generator in Microsoft Excel (asking the program to generate 84 random 
numbers out of a pool of 458). Alternatives to random sampling may have included 
random stratified sampling, which would have involved holding some attributes of 
the sample constant (such as, for example, the distribution of evaluations form the 
EU level, from Germany and the UK). However, given that earlier literatures did not 
suggest any a-priori factors that may have impacted significantly on the findings, I 
chose a standard random sampling approach, which in turn allows statistical 
extrapolation below (other sampling approaches may have made this more 
challenging). 
 
4.5 Ethics 
In the context of this thesis, ethical considerations relate to the fact that this 
research contributes to and is indeed part of wider political processes. Given that this 
study involved desk research of publically available evaluations, a whole gamut of 
ethical issues related to research with individuals did not emerge (see Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). However, there were other important ethical issues to 
consider. The first is that many climate policies emerge from difficult political 
compromises, and their evaluation may thus touch on these sensitive political 
elements. In other words, to the extent that this thesis can also be understood as an 
intervention in debates about options for climate governance, policy evaluation, as 
well as the allocation of scarce resources to governance activities, it has the 
possibility to influence future outcomes. In order to address this issue, I endeavoured 
to work as diligently as possible and to discuss theoretical and methodological 
choices openly in Chapters 1-4, as well as in Chapters 8 and 9.  
Furthermore, I collected and analysed a large number of evaluations from the 
public domain from a range of organizations with various stakes in climate 
governance. The key concern here was to generate findings and insights as accurately 
as possible, and to represent all organizations I could identify that had produced 
climate policy evaluations. In order to ensure fair and equal treatment of each study, 
I took great care to analyse each evaluation with the same standards and criteria, as 
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explained above. The goal was not to single out any one organization or evaluation, 
but rather to contribute to an understanding of broad trends and characteristics of 
climate policy evaluation practices in Germany, the UK and at EU level. Therefore, I 
only present aggregate data on evaluation characteristics in this thesis. 
 
4.6 Reflections on the research process 
This thesis has, in many ways, served as an intellectual groundswell of ideas 
and potential research directions that I have been able to address here, but also in 
flanking publications that accompany this thesis and consider important additional 
areas that were beyond the scope of these chapters, but nevertheless highly pertinent 
to the core questions addressed here and therefore also referenced throughout the 
thesis (see Jordan et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2018; Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017; 
Schoenefeld et al., 2018). Doing so in fact significantly enlarged the scope of this 
project, allowed me to receive early feedback and engage with the reactions of other 
scholars to my ideas. By the same token, it also meant that dealing with a significant 
larger workload than ‘only’ writing the thesis and keeping a reasonable balance 
between different tasks was challenging at times. 
With a view to the specific analysis in this thesis, the heterogeneity of the 
climate policy evaluations in the database presented a challenge when creating a 
coding scheme that was both theoretically meaningful, and at the same time broad 
enough to incorporate many different approaches without running the risk of 
comparing ‘apples and oranges.’ The foundational ideas from polycentrism became a 
novel—and suitable—way to do so (see Chapter 2). In practical terms, this however 
also meant that it was difficult to gauge the time it would take to first assemble the 
database and then analyse a sub-section of it. With the knowledge I have now, I 
would have created a similar coding scheme, but endeavoured from the start to link it 
more closely with extant evaluation literatures and draw more on the work of others, 
an approach that I only developed relatively late in the thesis (and as I became more 
familiar with the evaluation literatures that Chapter 2 summarizes). Altogether, this 
process stretched well over three years and became therefore a highly ambitious 
undertaking with vast time requirements. 
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There are many key learning moments when embarking on a project of a length 
and duration that surpassed anything I had ever done before. During my research stay 
in Finland, Professor Mikael Hildén once remarked to me that ‘getting a PhD is a lot 
about stamina,’ and having gone through the experience, it is now very clear to me 
what he meant. The countless hours of database work and coding, as well as the 
process of writing up, tested my patience and willingness to engage with small, but 
often highly relevant or at least consequential, details. Then there is the process of 
‘zooming in’ and ‘zooming out,’ or in other words, being able to see the thesis and 
its components as a whole, but also the nature and structure of the different elements. 
My supervisor Professor Andrew Jordan once cited his own PhD supervisor 
Professor Tim O’Riordan to say that writing a PhD (or a book for that matter) is ‘like 
a symphony’ and that creating harmony between the different parts is by no means 
trivial. In the process of creating my own symphony without too many dissonances, 
it has both been helpful to draw on relevant literature (e.g., Dunleavy, 2003), but also 
to use various ‘navigation aids’, such as drafts of the thesis abstract or the table of 
contents to keep all the relevant pieces well within sight.  
Perhaps one of the most pertinent insights I am taking away from this process 
is that I have learned a great deal about creativity and especially how to stimulate it. 
This process is highly idiosyncratic and probably different for different people. 
While not all aspects of writing a PhD require creativity (some simply require 
stamina to get a task done), at some critical junctures, this is absolutely vital. I have 
experienced these points mainly towards the beginning of the PhD as I was working 
hard to delimit my research question and identify and understand the relevant 
literatures and various strands of argument. But the task of seeing beyond what is 
already there, recombining existing elements while creating new ones, is what 
ultimately requires high levels of creativity. It is a real art to identify a research 
question and approach that is ambitious enough to qualify as something novel, and 
yet still doable and realistic within the inevitable resource and time constraints. I 
learned how, on an individual level, creative moments are not equally distributed 
across a working day or working week and that the right mixture of activities, such 
as times of intense engagement with intellectual material, but then also times of 
relaxation and disengagement tends to generate better outcomes. 
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4.7 Limitations 
As with any larger research endeavour, this project contains a number of 
limitations within which its analysis and findings have to be understood and 
contextualized. The first is that due to the novelty of many elements of the project – 
notably the development of polycentric governance theory, but also the climate 
policy evaluation database and the coding scheme – there were many areas where 
previous work as a reference point for my own research activities was severely 
limited. Wherever possible, I endeavoured to link with previous work (as for 
example with the coding scheme—see above), both theoretically and empirically, but 
I remain keenly aware that there are many areas where what I propose here could be 
further tested and explored. I sincerely hope that my work will serve as an impetus 
for future researchers to engage in relevant aspects of this research. 
A second set of limitations emerged from the inevitable resource and time 
constraints that come with conducting a research project with a scope that has in 
other instances taken entire research teams to address (see for example Haug et al., 
2010; Huitema et al., 2011). Working with limited resources required prioritizing 
various approaches and making strategic choices while ensuring continuously high 
research standards throughout this project. These included, for example, analysing a 
sample of the formally-funded evaluations (rather than the entire database), and 
testing the inter-coder reliability on a smaller sub-set of evaluations (rather than 
having a second coder for the entire process). I however hope that my database will 
allow others to do this work in the future and to continue exploring the various 
aspects of climate policy evaluation in the EU and well beyond. 
Third, the novelty of the thesis and of the entire field of studying climate policy 
evaluation means that this thesis is, by and large, more descriptive than explanatory 
in nature. However, doing more descriptive, empirically-driven analysis is precisely 
what scholars working on climate change in the polycentric governance tradition 
have long called for (Jordan et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2018; E. Ostrom, 2010c). In 
fact, deeper knowledge of the structure of polycentric (climate) governance is a vital 
pre-condition for further, causal analysis that I hope this thesis will support in the 
future (see Chapter 9). Making the climate policy evaluation landscape intelligible, 
and suggesting a theoretically-driven role for policy evaluation in polycentric 
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arrangements not only allows testing additional causal mechanisms, but also provides 
fertile ground for comparing the mechanisms hypothesized and tested here against 
others which could fulfil similar roles (see also Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006). For 
example, while policy evaluation may be one approach to spread knowledge and 
experience in a polycentric system, it is by no means the only one. Another 
mechanisms may include for example epistemic communities (see P. M. Haas, 1992) 
– again, this thesis allows a starting point for testing and contrasting a range of other 
mechanisms that may support polycentric governance. 
Fourth, it is important to recognize that the data presented in Chapters 4-6 are 
based on overt statements of evaluation requirements and intent; it is possible that a 
number of evaluations do not explicitly mention legal requirements, but that the 
evaluation in fact responds to a legal requirement. Similarly, the coding scheme can 
of course only capture elements that are overtly (i.e. textually) available in the 
evaluations. By its very nature, it cannot capture other (and potentially more covert, 
but nevertheless important) elements, such as the process through which the 
evaluations emerged, relationships between funders and evaluators, or power 
struggles between different evaluation actors. As discussed above and in Chapter 1, 
the perspective in this thesis is undeniably a partial one, and it cannot make definitive 
statements about the nature of the process that generated the evaluations under 
analysis here. But doing so is a vital area for future research (see Chapter 9). 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Studying policy evaluation from a polycentric perspective involves engaging 
deeply with the ideas of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom in order to not only understand 
key theoretical lines of polycentrism, but also their research philosophy. This thesis 
draws on these relevant debates and shows that the Ostroms advocated a combination 
of methodological pluralism and pragmatism, with which they aim to move beyond 
what are in their view entrenched methodological debates in political science. In their 
work, they actively combine normative and positive elements and advocate a 
dialectic relationship between them. This thesis engages seriously with their call for 
empirical work through collating a novel database of climate policy evaluations, and 
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subjecting the evaluations to analysis with a coding scheme that builds on the three 
foundational ideas on polycentric governance (see Chapter 2). Doing so involves a 
range of key methodological decisions, which this Chapter discusses (see also 
Chapter 9, which returns to some of these choices in light of the findings). The 
following three chapters discuss the detailed results from coding formal and informal 
evaluation.
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Chapter 5 Formal Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of in-depth coding of 84 evaluations funded by 
‘formal’ actors; that is courts and scrutiny bodies, parliaments, governmental 
organizations, banks, or agencies, independent advice committees, research councils, 
universities/research institutes, and government (policy-makers). The data resulted 
from the analysis of the formal evaluations with the coding scheme that was based on 
polycentric governance theory (Chapter 2) and which Chapter 4 explains in detail. 
The 84 evaluations constitute a random sample from the 458 formal evaluations in 
the overall database. This chapter presents the results relating to the foundational 
ideas of self-organization, context, and interacting governance centres. Where 
appropriate, this chapter presents the data on the relative contribution of evaluations 
from the three governance centres considered in this thesis, namely the EU level, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
 
5.2 Self-organization 
None of the evaluations that this chapter analyses are self-organized because 
formal (state) actors (or actors that receive state money) funded all of them. But the 
‘formal’ category is by no means monolithic and contains considerable underlying 
variation, a core concept in polycentric governance (where heterogeneity is a key 
concern, see Chapter 2) and also important knowledge in order to understand the 
outcomes of formal evaluation below. Therefore, it is illuminating to unpick the 
‘formal’ category into its component parts. Figure 5.1 unpacks the ‘formal funder 
category’ by funder location. The bar chart reveals that most formal evaluations 
(42.86%) are supported by funders from Germany, followed by the EU level (i.e. the 
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main EU institutions – see Chapter 4) with 40.48% and, to a considerably lesser 
extent, the UK with 16.67%.29 
 
Figure 5.1: Funders by location 
 
Figure 5.2, then, presents these country-based data over time. It shows that, 
first, formal actors commenced funding climate policy evaluations in the year 2000 
(in the current sample – the total variation in the overall database is larger, see 
Chapter 4). While overall the number of evaluations is growing in line with the 
overall database (Chapter 4), there are also considerable variations in the number of 
formal evaluations at EU level, in Germany, and in the UK over time. Figure 5.2 
shows that evaluation peaked around 2005, 2011, and around 2014 (although given 
                                                 
29 The percentages add up to slightly more than 100% because of rounding errors. 
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that the data here only extend to 2014, the latter point must be understood much 
more tentatively). In most cases, EU level funders appear to provide more continuous 
funding, and assure that total evaluation output never goes much below five climate 
policy evaluations per year after 2005. By the same token, evaluations funded by 
actors in Germany wax and wane considerably in number over the past decade or so. 
The number of evaluations funded by actors in the UK remain at a comparatively 
low but stable level, even though they commence later than those funded by actors at 
the EU level or in Germany. 
 
Figure 5.2: Evaluations by year and funder location 
 
Then there is the question of what types of formal organizations actually fund 
the evaluations. Looking at the overall height of the bars in Figure 5.3 reveals that 
governments (policy-makers) fund the overwhelming majority of evaluations, 
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followed by governmental organizations (such as agencies or public banks), and still 
a smaller share by parliaments, research councils, and courts, as well as research 
institutes or universities. This set includes courts, which may be independent from 
government, but are still part of the state, and therefore bound to legal requirements 
(such as previously defined policy targets), even though they of course also have a 
role in interpreting the law. Given that the number of climate policy evaluations 
conducted by courts or public scrutiny bodies is very low, any potential distortions 
are likely to be of limited effect. Figure 5.3 thus also points to the insight that the 
internal differentiation of the ‘formal’ category matters. Note that German funders 
only include governments, research institutes/universities and governmental 
organizations/banks, while the range of funders at the EU level and in the UK is 
broader and includes parliaments, courts and research councils. 
 
Figure 5.3: Evaluation funders by organizational category 
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Turning from evaluation funders to those who actually conducted the 
evaluations (i.e. the evaluators), Figure 5.4 presents the number of evaluations by the 
location of the evaluators who produced them, as well as by the location of the 
funders. The first thing to note is that evaluators located in Germany produced thirty-
eight formal evaluations (the total number of evaluations contained in the second 
bar), which is the biggest sub-group in this sample. Evaluators at the EU level (recall 
that this category includes cases where evaluators from several European countries 
teamed up to produce the evaluation—Chapter 4) were the second-largest with 24 
evaluations altogether. Evaluators located in the UK produced 15 evaluations, which 
is significantly less than those from the EU level, and less than half of the 
evaluations produced by evaluators in Germany. Evaluators from other countries, 
including Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Finland, also conducted a 
handful of formal evaluations. 
 
Figure 5.4: Evaluations by evaluator and funder location 
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The second thing to note is how the combination of the location of the 
evaluation funder and the evaluator plays out—which in the context of Figure 5.4 
involves considering the differently shaded elements of each bar. By and large, 
Figure 5.4 suggests that evaluation funders tend to fund evaluators within their own 
governance centre, so that EU level actors funded an overwhelming majority of 
evaluators at the EU level (only two funded by German actors and none by UK 
actors), German funders funded 34 out of 38 evaluations conducted by evaluators in 
Germany (the remaining four were funded by EU actors) and, even more extreme, 
actors in the UK funded 14 out of 15 evaluations conducted by UK based evaluators. 
These findings suggest that funding and conducting formal climate policy 
evaluations remains, by and large, a national or EU level affair with relatively little 
cross-border interaction via funding evaluators from other governance centres in this 
sample. But it also points to an important role of the EU, which funded evaluators in 
other governance centres to a limited extent, such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, and the Netherlands. 
In addition to the location of the evaluators, Figure 5.5 (below) reveals the type 
of organizations that that formal actors funded in order to conduct their evaluations 
(recall that self-funding is possible). It demonstrates that formal actors mainly fund 
research institutes to conduct evaluations, followed by government bodies and 
commercial consultancies. Parliamentary bodies, courts, and environmental 
organizations rarely receive funding in order to conduct evaluations. Then there are 
differences in who evaluation funders choose: whereas EU evaluation funders used 
research institutes, commercial consultancies and government bodies in about equal 
numbers (with negligible funding for other types of evaluators), German actors make 
stronger use of research institutes, followed by government bodies and a very small 
number of evaluations conducted by commercial consultancies. Funders in the UK 
spread relatively evenly across the categories, but did not fund environmental 
organizations to conduct evaluations.  
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Figure 5.5: Evaluators by organizational category 
 
A slightly different way of looking at the current sample of formal evaluations 
is to consider the governance centre in which the evaluated policy is located (rather 
than the location of the evaluators in the previous chart). Figure 5.6 presents the 
respective data. Looking at the height of the three bars, it suggests that the greatest 
number of climate policies under evaluation were located at the EU level (36 in 
total), followed closely by climate policy in Germany (34) and, to a considerably 
lesser extent, the UK (14). Combining these insights with the location of the funder 
(i.e. considering the different patterns of each bar) shows that, again, formal 
evaluation funders mainly funded evaluations focusing on their own governance 
centre in terms of their content. Formal German evaluation funders only funded 
evaluations of climate policies in Germany. A similar trend is evident for the EU and 
the UK levels. Considering Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6 together reveals that, for 
example, German funders mainly funded evaluators in Germany focusing on German 
policies. A similar pattern applies to the EU level and to the UK. 
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Figure 5.6: Evaluations by location of the policy under evaluation 
 
Figure 5.7 combines the data on the location of the funders, the evaluators, as 
well as the policy under evaluation. Analogous to Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4, the 
diagram contains the three perspectives on evaluation, and the thickness of the 
connectors between them represents the number of evaluations with the respective 
characteristics. A readily visible feature is that funders in the UK mainly funded 
evaluators in the UK in order to evaluate UK climate policy, with similar trends for 
the EU level, as well as Germany.  
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Figure 5.7: Location of funders, evaluators and policy under evaluation 
Note: the thickness of the bars represents the number of evaluations with the respective 
characteristics. 
 
Finally, Figure 5.8 groups the evaluations by climate policy sub-type. Similar 
to the overall database (Chapter 4), the main substantial focus of formal evaluations 
is renewables policy, followed by cross-sectoral analyses (i.e. focusing on more than 
one of the individual climate sub-policies listed in Figure 5.4), and energy efficiency. 
Notably, evaluation against policy targets tends to focus on those emerging from the 
Kyoto Protocol, rather than the EU-specific targets (even though the two are of 
course closely related). There is also a marked paucity of evaluations in sectors that 
have considerable greenhouse gas emissions, such as transport, agriculture, or 
buildings. Formal climate policy evaluation thus mainly focuses on a few climate 
policy-sub types, namely renewables, cross-sectoral issues, energy efficiency and the 
Kyoto targets and does not consider some sectors at all, such as waste or forestry. 
Looking at the evaluation funders again shows that EU funders exclusively funded 
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evaluations on the Kyoto targets, and German funders focusing on renewables, cross 
sectoral, and especially energy efficiency policies. 
 
Figure 5.8: Evaluations by climate policy sub-type 
 
 
 
But what stimulates formal actors to fund evaluations? Figure 5.9 shows to 
what extent formal actors were following legal funding requirements in their climate 
policy evaluation activities. As Chapter 2 discussed, the presence or absence of legal 
requirements may also be an indicator of how ‘spontaneous’ or ‘self-organizing’ the 
evaluations were, even among state-funded ones. Figure 5.9 reveals that a clear 
majority of the formal evaluations (63.10%) did not respond to a legal requirement, 
but were conducted for other reasons, such as a desire to improve policies through 
learning (for a fuller discussion of evaluation purposes, see Figure 5.23 below). By 
the same token, this means that 36.90% of the formal evaluations did respond to a 
legal requirement to evaluate. Recall that by and large, this item was coded by 
detecting whether or not there was any indication of a legal requirement in the 
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evaluation (such as reference to an evaluation clause in a legal document). The 
distribution by the location of the evaluation funder is about proportional. 
 
Figure 5.9: Evaluation responding to a legal requirement 
 
But what is the temporal nature of evaluations that formal actors funded? Are 
the evaluations part of larger and continuous evaluation exercises or are they rather 
ad-hoc? Recall that in dynamic, polycentric environments, continuous evaluation is 
thought to be particularly important (see Chapters 2 and 8). Figure 5.10 shows that 
there is by and large a balance between formal ad-hoc evaluations and those that link 
with earlier or later evaluations, for example as part of an ongoing series. In other 
words, formal funders funded both a significant number of ad-hoc, but also 
continuous evaluations in this sample. The distribution by the location of the 
evaluation funder is broadly proportional. 
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Figure 5.10: Temporal nature of evaluations by funder location 
 
 
Given that the formal evaluation funder category is internally differentiated in 
terms of the organizations that fund evaluations (see above), Figure 5.11 considers 
the same data by the organisational category of the evaluation funders. It shows that 
continuous climate policy evaluation in this sample is in practice only funded by 
three types of funders: governments, governmental agencies or banks, and (to a 
considerably lesser extent) courts. Notably, parliaments, independent advice 
committees, research councils, and research institutes/universities are less involved 
in evaluating climate policy continuously over time.  
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Figure 5.11: Temporal nature of evaluations by funder category 
 
 
While of course all of the evaluations analysed here were, by definition, not self-
organized because formal (state) actors funded them (see Chapter 4 and above), this 
section has revealed that it is worth further unpacking the underlying characteristics 
of the formal category – including by the location of the evaluation funder – in order 
to work towards a deeper understanding of its internal structure. 
 Crucially, formal evaluations tend to be very much anchored in one location in 
terms of who funds them, who conducts them, and what they focus on in 
substantial terms. In other words, EU level funders tend to, by and large, fund 
evaluators at the EU level who focus on EU level policies. Overall, there is a 
clear tendency for formal actors at the EU level and in Germany to lead on 
financing climate policy evaluation compared to the UK.  
144 
 There is a strong focus on renewables and targets, but formal evaluations do not 
cover all climate sub-policies equally. By and large, the evaluations presented in 
this chapter follow the overall distribution of the complete database (Chapter 4).  
 Formal evaluation does not always depend on legal requirements. Rather, a 
majority of climate policy evaluations have been conducted for motivations other 
than mere legal requirements (see below).  
 Formal evaluation funders have funded both ad-hoc evaluations and continual 
exercises in about equal numbers. The latter are particularly important when 
seeking to understand and track climate policy developments over time. 
 
5.3 Context 
This section presents analyses of variables that mainly relate to contextual 
elements. Figure 5.12 lays out the results from eight separate context-related 
variables used in the coding scheme (see Chapter 4). The bar chart in the top left 
corner of Figure 5.12 (Chart A) focuses on the length of time considered in the 
evaluation, which may include aspects of policy history or longitudinal data 
contained in the evaluation (see Chapter 4). It reveals a relatively broad spectrum of 
attention to time in the formal evaluations. There are relatively few ‘snapshot 
evaluations’ (9.52%; for a definition, see Chapter 4), meaning that most evaluations 
consider five or more years in the analysis or policy history. In fact, the biggest 
number of evaluations (highest bar) considers a time span of more than 20 years. 
Following the arguments in Chapter 2, considering a long time span would, in 
principle, be a good starting point in order to unpick potential ways in which a 
climate policy interacts with its context. Chart A in Figure 5.12 further reveals a 
relatively uniform and proportionate distribution of time horizons considered in 
evaluations funded by actors at the EU level and in Germany. The UK appears to 
mainly fund either evaluations with a very short or a very long time horizon. 
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Figure 5.12: Contextual variables in formal evaluations 
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Figure 5.12 (continued) 
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Chart B in Figure 5.12 and all the remaining ones in the figure assess attention 
to the contextual factors on a scale of 0 to 4.30 More specifically, Chart B assesses 
the extent to which the evaluations considered policy goals (i.e. goals of the 
individual policy, but also more general targets to which the policy contributes, such 
as national greenhouse gas reductions). The bar chart shows that most formal 
evaluations (95.24%) made some reference to policy goals, but only 41.67% of the 
evaluations engaged with policy goals in any more depth and related the latter to the 
policy effects that the evaluation assessed. The number of evaluations that 
considered policy goals extensively (i.e. a score of 4 on the scale explained above) 
remains relatively small (five evaluations). The distribution of formal evaluation 
funders shows that EU level, as well as German and UK based actors funded 
evaluations in relatively equal proportions in all categories, with the exception that 
UK based funders did not support evaluations that scored very high on engaging with 
policy goals (see the shading in the last bar). 
Chart C in Figure 5.12 demonstrates that about half of the evaluations made no 
reference whatsoever to policy interactions with other sectors—this includes both 
interactions across climate policy sub-policies (such as renewables and emissions 
trading), and interactions with other policy sectors (such as health policy—see 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed review of the core contextual variables), so pointing to 
generally very limited attention to contextual effects in relation to this particular 
dimension. A prominent example is the interaction between the EU Emissions 
Trading System and the Kyoto flexibility Mechanisms. Some evaluations considered 
interactions with policies in other sectors, but the number of evaluations that looked 
at the policy impact of linkages and interactions in greater detail remain just a 
handful in this sample. The distribution of funding remained relatively even, 
although there appears to be a slight tendency for EU level funders to support more 
                                                 
30 Recall that this variable and all the remaining variables in Figure 5.12 were scored on a 0-4 scale, 
where 0 = no reference to dimension; 1 = dimension discussed, but no explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 2 = dimension discussed, but limited explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 3 = dimension discussed, and good explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 4 = dimension discussed and impact on policy outcomes 
evaluated extensively (for further details, see Chapter 4 and Appendix 3). 
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evaluations that look across different sectors. From a polycentric perspective, this 
points to a key, overarching role for the EU level that differs from policy evaluation 
in the nation states of Germany and the UK (for a fuller discussion, see Chapters 8 
and 9). 
Chart D in Figure 5.12 presents the number of evaluations with different levels 
of attention to unintended policy outcomes.31 The main message from this chart is 
that the vast majority of the formal evaluations make no or very few references to 
unintended policy outcomes. Formal evaluations that assess unintended policy 
outcomes in greater detail—that is, receiving a score of 3 or four on the scale 
explained above—remain far and few (10.71%). However, given that unintended 
effects may particularly become evident in other sectors or outside the focus area of 
the policy, this finding fits with the previous two bar charts, in that if there is little 
attention to effects in other sectors, the evaluations may then also be unlikely to 
detect significant unintended side effects occurring outside the focus area of the 
evaluation. With regards to the formal funders, it is noticeable that the few 
evaluations that do engage more deeply with unintended policy effects tend to be 
funded by actors at the EU level or in Germany. Notably, the UK did not produce a 
single formal evaluation that retuned ‘good’ (score 3) or ‘extensive’ (score 4) 
attention to unintended side effects (the two bars on the right). 
External events and circumstances may also affect a climate policy and its 
outcomes in unforeseen ways. Therefore, Chart E in Figure 5.12 presents the extent 
to which formal evaluations engage with the impact of external events and 
circumstances on climate policy outcomes. A good example of an external event 
considered in the evaluations is the global recession, which started with the financial 
crisis in 2008, and then gradually morphed into a full-blown economic and sovereign 
debt crisis in the EU. By and large, Chart E reveals that attention to external events 
and circumstances is rather limited, and more detailed analyses remain rare. Only 13 
evaluations engaged well (score = 3) or extensively (score = 4) with external events 
and circumstances and, notably and in line with our previous findings, none of these 
                                                 
31 For definitions and operationalizations, see Chapter 4. 
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evaluations were funded by actors from the UK, but from actors at the EU level and 
in Germany. 
Chart F presents data on the extent to which formal evaluations incorporated an 
assessment of the political environment in which any policy is placed (for the 
operationalization, see Chapter 4), including institutions and political shocks, such as 
elections or other significant events. A current example of such effects may be the 
election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America and his 
subsequent decision to withdraw the USA from the Paris Agreement, a decision that 
may affect the dynamics of international climate policy-making. In this sample, the 
vast majority (84.52%) of the formal evaluations did not consider how the political 
environment affected climate policy outcomes and, notably, there are no evaluations 
that analysed the policy effects in great depth (i.e. a score of 4 on the relevant scale). 
But evaluations may be subject to different political influences or pressures, notably 
because the political systems in these three governance centres differ considerably 
(with the EU being a supra-national organization, Germany a federal state, and the 
UK a unitary state). Omitting the political context thus potentially leaves significant 
gaps in an evaluation. Reviewing the individual bars in Chart F in Figure 5.12 
reveals that it is worth considering these data by governance centre: no formal actors 
in the UK have funded evaluations that analyse the impacts of the political 
environment on climate policy outcomes – the few studies that do so to some degree 
have exclusively been funded by actors from Germany and from the EU level, an 
overall pattern that fits the discussion of the charts in Figure 5.12. 
Chart G in Figure 5.12 presents the next contextual variable considered in the 
evaluations, which is (mainly physical) geography, such as, for example, the 
availability of tidal energy as a function of the length and nature of a coast line that a 
governance centre exhibits. Many climate policies, such as support for renewables, 
depend to a significant extent on the availability of certain geographical conditions – 
it is, for example, not possible to use geo-thermal energy in all places at a reasonable 
cost. Chart G reveals the level of attention to geography in formally-funded climate 
policy evaluations on the already familiar scale. Across the formally-funded 
evaluations, the characteristics of the physical geography appear to be only of limited 
interest. Well over half of the climate policy evaluations did not pay any attention at 
all to geographical aspects, or mentioned them but did not discuss the policy impact. 
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However, it is important to recognize that in some cases, geography may play a more 
significant role, such as in the case of opportunities for generating renewable energy 
than in others, such vehicle emissions standards. Figure 5.13 (below) therefore splits 
up the data by climate policy sub-type in order to test the notion that geography may 
matter more for some policies than for others. The findings from this figure are 
relatively straightforward – it represents the climate policy sub-types on the x-axis 
and the number of evaluations on the y-axis. The different shading on the bars 
encompasses the points on the 0-4 scale used to code attention to geography. As 
discussed above, the only policy area where evaluators discussed geographical 
aspects in any meaningful depth beyond quickly mentioning it in passing is 
renewables policy, but even there, this only applies to seven evaluations. 
 
Figure 5.13 Attention to geography in evaluations by climate policy sub-type 
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Returning to the discussion of Figure 5.12, the last contextual variable 
considered on the 0 to 4 scale (see above and Chapter 4) includes references to 
(climate) science and the scientific backdrop against which climate policies are made 
over time (Chart H). This includes, for example, references to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports or what kinds of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions are necessary in order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. 
Chart H shows that the vast majority of climate policy evaluations do not reference 
the findings of climate science at all (86.90%), and the very few that do tend to do so 
in a fairly cursory way. There are therefore no formal climate policy evaluations in 
this sample that engage with the scientific backdrop in any significant detail (i.e. 
scores of 3 or 4 on the scale described above). The distribution across the formal 
evaluation funders is relatively proportionate, but again is only of limited relevance, 
given the overall lack of engagement with this contextual factor. 
Figure 5.14 displays the data from the eight contextual variables discussed 
individually above on a spider diagram, where 0-4 represents the measurement scale, 
and the average value for evaluations from each governance centre is plotted on each 
of the eight rays of the diagram.32 Here, we can see how evaluations funded by actors 
at the EU level and in Germany appear to resemble each other, while evaluations 
funded by UK based actors scored lower on the political environment, external 
events and circumstances, as well as attention to other sectors. 
 
                                                 
32 Given that the time horizon was measured on a 6-point scale and all other variables on a 5-point 
scale (see above), I transformed the time-horizon variable into the same 5-point scale of the other 
variables.32   
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Figure 5.14: Average scores on contextual variables by governance centre 
 
In order to further explore and bring together the eight contextual dimensions, I 
calculated Pearson correlations among the contextual variables (see Appendix 4). By 
and large, the variables correlate weakly (i.e., in most cases below 0.3) and 
insignificantly, indicating that they measure different aspects of contextuality. 
Therefore, I summed the eight contextual variables in order to generate an overall 
‘context score’ or indicator for each evaluation (I transformed the time variable onto 
a 0-4 scale, see above). Figure 5.15 presents the data emerging from this process and 
reveals that no evaluation reached the theoretical minimum (0) or the theoretical 
maximum (8 x 4 = 32) on the contextual scales. With an overall mean of M = 8.70 
and a standard deviation of SD = 3.91, the distribution clusters on the lower end of 
the spectrum. The highest score (17) is just over 50% of the theoretical maximum of 
32. This means that no formal climate policy evaluation has a particularly large 
aggregate score on the contextual variables. The added normal distribution curve 
shows that the overall distribution tends towards a normal distribution, even though 
some variation remains. These variations also emerge from the different 
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contributions of evaluations supported by funders in the three governance centres 
discussed above. 
 
Figure 5.15: Index of contextual variables in formal evaluations 
 
 
Across all the variables, it becomes noticeable how UK funded evaluations 
cluster towards the lower end of the spectrum (i.e. they pay less attention to context 
across all the variables with M = 6.47, SD = 3.05), compared with the EU-level (M = 
9.07, SD = 3.43) and Germany (M = 9.21, SD = 4.39), which have both a broader 
range and contribute significantly to the higher-scoring end of the spectrum 
(especially Germany). Figure 5.16 presents these mean differences visually, showing 
the notable difference between the EU level/Germany and the UK, but also some 
overlap in the confidence intervals. A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to 
compare the three averages by the location of the evaluation funders proved 
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marginally significant with F(2, 81) = 2.852, p = .064. Chapters 8 and 9 will pick this 
back up. 
 
Figure 5.16: Average scores on contextual index by governance centre33 
 
 
 
As Chapter 2 has argued, in addition to the variables considered above, there are also 
other ways in which climate policy evaluations can, in one way or another, take 
contextual factors into account. One way is through methodological plurality. Using 
a greater range of methods is one potential way of discerning the possible 
multifarious effects of a climate policy, given that each method comes with unique 
strengths, but also potential blind spots (see Rog, 2012). Therefore, Figure 5.17 
presents the methodological approaches used in the evaluations. It shows that the 
                                                 
33 Note that multiple mentions were possible, so that the overall number exceeds the sample of 84 in 
this figure. 
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most popular evaluation method is a document analysis (for example a literature 
review), followed by modelling and questionnaires/interviews—thus in most cases, 
evaluations drew only on a fairly similar and limited set of methods. Other methods 
were used to a considerably lesser degree, but across the whole sample, there was a 
broad spectrum of methods that at least one evaluation used. Methods that 
incorporate views from stakeholders (such as direct stakeholder involvement or 
questionnaires and interviews) were only used moderately. 
 
Figure 5.17: Types of methods used in formal evaluations 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5.17 shows that there are some differences by the 
evaluation funder. While funders from Germany supported evaluations with all types 
of methods (although arguably to different degrees, see the height of the striped 
bars), EU level actors did not fund any evaluations that used cost-benefit analysis 
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(CBA) or social experiments. By the same token, UK based evaluation funders did 
not support any evaluations that used social experiments or stakeholder involvement. 
In addition to the type of the evaluation method, it is also relevant how many 
different methods were used within a single evaluation. As argued above, using more 
than one method may be an indicator of efforts to capture contextual effects and 
assess the potentially multiple effects from a single climate policy. Figure 5.18 
demonstrates how many evaluations (y-axis) used how many different methods (x-
axis). It shows that most formal evaluations use either one or two methods. 
Evaluations that use three or more methods remain rather rare. 
 
Figure 5.18: Formal evaluations by evaluation method 
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All evaluations contained in this sample used on average M = 1.83 methods 
(SD = .93). There are also differences by funder location. First, considering the 
different shading in Figure 5.18 reveals that UK based actors did not fund any 
evaluations that used more than two methods. Actors from Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, actors based at the EU level mainly funded the evaluations with three to five 
methods. There are no evaluations that use more than five evaluations. Statistically, 
this means that evaluations funded by Germany actors use on average the greatest 
number of methods (M = 2.03, SD = 1.06), followed evaluations funded by EU level 
actors (M = 1.74, SD = .90) and finally the UK (M = 1.57, SD = .51). However, a 
one-way ANOVA to compare these three means returned statistically insignificant 
results [F(2, 81) = 1.55, ns]. 
It is not only the type or the number of methods used, but also the extent to 
which methodological approaches have been tailored to the specific evaluation that 
matters for the extent to which contextual factors can be taken into account. For 
example, a survey or a model that has been specifically created or at least calibrated 
for an evaluation is likely to better fit with the policy and its context than an ‘off the 
shelf’ method that is simply applied without much attention to this kind of fit. 
Therefore, Figure 5.19 depicts to what extent methods used in the evaluations have 
been calibrated towards the context in question. The data reveal that nearly half of 
the formally-funded evaluations exhibited extensive tailoring or fine tuning, with a 
roughly equal number of evaluations whose methods showed no signs of tailoring. 
Looking at the location of the evaluation funder (shading of the bars) shows a 
relatively even distribution, although closer inspection shows that UK based 
evaluation funders financed a disproportionately large number of evaluations with 
extensive methodological fine-tuning, which are thus more context specific.  
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Figure 5.19: Methodological ‘tailoring’ in formal evaluations 
 
Another important contextual element concerns the evaluation criteria that a 
climate policy evaluation uses. Analogous to the methodological argument, a 
plurality of criteria could, again, point to greater attention to context (because 
evaluation with different criteria may pick up different kinds of policy effects). 
Figure 5.20 shows the type of evaluation criteria, and the number of evaluations that 
used them (multiple mentions were possible). Policy effectiveness (with a view to its 
goal attainment) is by far the most widely-used evaluation criterion, followed by 
efficiency, and cost effectiveness. Notably, accountability and legitimacy were 
hardly used at all. Looking at the evaluation funders reveals no clear trends across 
the data, although UK based funders appear to support evaluations with a particular 
focus on effectiveness and cost effectiveness, whereas particularly Germany based 
actors funded nearly all of the side effect evaluations. Altogether formally-funded 
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evaluations have used a very broad spectrum of criteria, but the majority concentrates 
on just a few of them. 
 
Figure 5.20: Types of criteria used in formal evaluations34 
 
 
Similar to the discussion on evaluation methods above, it is also relevant to 
consider the number of criteria used in the evaluations. Figure 5.21 shows that most 
formal evaluations used mainly one or two criteria, and very few used more. On 
average, formal evaluations contained M = 1.73 (SD = .87) criteria. Looking at the 
evaluation funder locations, evaluations funded by EU level actors used M = 1.79 
(SD = 1.07), with slightly more evaluation criteria in evaluations supported by 
Germany based funders (M = 1.72, SD = .74) than in evaluations supported by UK-
                                                 
34 Multiple mentions possible. 
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based funders (M = 1.57, SD = .65). However, a one-way ANOVA revealed that 
these differences were not statistically significant with [F(2, 81) = .32, ns]. It should 
be noted, however, that UK based actors funded only a single evaluation that 
contains more than two criteria. Thus, even though the spectrum of criteria used may 
be wide, in practice most formally-funded evaluations only focused on one or two 
criteria. 
 
Figure 5.21: Number of criteria used in formal evaluations 
 
 
 
Connected with criteria are the policy’s guiding goals, which may frame the 
evaluations. Figure 5.22 considers to what extent climate policy evaluations are 
‘reflexive,’ (see Huitema et al., 2011) or in other words, how many evaluations either 
take extant climate policy targets as a given (no reflexivity) and evaluate against 
them, or question policy targets critically and even offer alternatives. It reveals that, 
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by and large, formally-funded evaluations are not very reflexive. Almost all 
evaluations accepted given policy targets as a given and did not engage with them 
critically. This is important because as Chapter 2 argues, shifts in context could 
impact on the relevance of a target set when the policy was first implemented or 
decided upon. Only 9.52% of the evaluations – mainly funded by actors based in 
Germany and at the EU level - engaged critically with prevailing policy goals. 
 
Figure 5.22: Reflexivity in formal evaluations 
 
 There are, in sum, a number of different ways to empirically assess attention to 
contextual factors in evaluations.  
 The indicators assessed here do not all point in the same direction for formally-
funded climate policy evaluations.  
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 However, across the different – and in many ways unique – dimensions, it is 
clear that there is generally a limited treatment of contextual factors by formally-
funded evaluations.  
 This analysis also indicates differences across the governance centres of the 
evaluation funders: evaluations funded by actors based in Germany tend to 
account for context more than evaluations funded by EU-level actors, with 
evaluations funded by UK-based actors as the least context-sensitive. 
 Formal evaluations use, in general, few methods and criteria and are not very 
reflexive. 
 
5.4 Interaction 
This section considers the extent to which the climate policy evaluations reveal 
interactions between governance centres, which is one of the key postulates of 
polycentric governance (see Chapter 2). The first aspect in this section in Figure 5.23 
considers the stated or overt evaluation purpose (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Chapter 4). From a polycentric perspective, it matters whether an evaluation simply 
responds to a legal requirement or whether it was explicitly conducted in order to 
foster learning, perhaps even with a view to providing lessons for other governance 
centres. Figure 5.23 reveals that by far the most widely identified evaluation purpose 
was learning, followed by legal requirements and to a lesser extent accountability. 
Furthermore, there is a relatively even distribution of evaluations funded by actors 
from the EU level, from Germany and from the UK in each category. 
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Figure 5.23: Evaluation purpose35 
 
 
In addition to the (stated) impetus for the evaluation, with a view to interacting 
governance centres it also matter for which audience the evaluation was (explicitly) 
generated. Figure 5.24 presents the number of formal evaluations by target audience 
(multiple mentions were possible). It reveals that almost all (87.80%) formal 
evaluations were geared towards policy-makers, which would for example be 
ministry employees or other staff working on more detailed aspects of policy. Given 
that policy-makers were also among the biggest category of funders, they are 
evidently mainly funding evaluations for themselves. This is followed by politicians 
                                                 
35 Multiple responses possible. 
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(45.24%) and the general public (27.38). Evaluation funders from the EU level, from 
Germany and from the UK contributed by and large proportionately to each category. 
 
Figure 5.24: Target audience36 
 
Another way of considering interacting governance centres is to understand to 
what extent an evaluation draws on other evaluations – evaluations that focus on the 
same centre, but not necessarily the same policy – in order to understand the effects 
of climate policy. This is perhaps the most immediate and direct type of interaction 
that can be detected from analysing evaluations, where interaction between 
governance centres manifests directly through the evaluation. Figure 5.25 reveals 
that information for formal climate policy evaluations. The bar graph shows that 
                                                 
36 Multiple mentions possible. 
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61.90% of the evaluations made either no reference, or limited references, to other 
evaluations focusing on the same centre. However, 38.10% of the formal evaluations 
paid good or even extensive attention to other evaluations focusing on the same 
centre (manifest through citing findings or insights from other evaluations), thus 
tapping into a wider web of knowledge on the policy in question than that generated 
directly by the evaluation. The differently-shaded bars show that there was some 
variation depending on the location of the evaluation funders, indicating that UK 
based actors tended to fund more evaluations with no or limited attention to studies 
about the same governance centres than funders from Germany or the EU level. 
 
Figure 5.25: References to other evaluations focusing on the same centre 
 
Analogously, Figure 5.26 expresses the extent to which formal evaluations 
incorporated insights from or focused on other governance centres. An example may 
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be an evaluation of the EU Emissions Trading System, which makes references to 
the experience in the USA. Figure 5.26 shows that attention to other governance 
centres within formal evaluations is even more limited. Only 16.67% of the 
evaluations paid good or extensive attention to experiences in other governance 
centres – overall, this points to limited interaction between governance centres vis-à-
vis formal climate policy evaluations. Distinctions by evaluation funders were such 
that EU level funders showed a slightly higher propensity to fund evaluations that 
paid more attention to other governance centres compared to those funded by actors 
in Germany and, especially, funders from the UK. Looking across Figure 5.25 and 
Figure 5.26, and compared to the common practice of citing others’ work in 
academia, it is noticeable how self-referential and insular evaluations in this sample 
tend to be. 
 
Figure 5.26: References to evaluations focusing on other centres 
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Figure 5.27 then turns to the extent to which the formal evaluations in our 
sample draw on insights or data from informal evaluations, or to what extent 
interactions between these different types of evaluation there are. It demonstrates that 
a strong majority of 61.90% of formal evaluations (first bar) did not make any 
reference whatsoever to informal evaluations. 26.19% of the formal evaluations 
made some reference to informal evaluations (the second bar), but only 11.90% of 
formal evaluations extensively referenced or used data from informal evaluations. 
Looking at the distribution by evaluation funders (the shading of the bars) shows that 
only actors based in Germany or the UK funded evaluations that made extensive 
reference to informal evaluations. 
 
Figure 5.27: Use of insights from informal evaluations 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5.28 demonstrates data on the extent to which formal 
evaluations attempted to spot and address any gaps left by informal evaluations. It 
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shows that 72.62% of all formal evaluations made no explicit attempts to address 
gaps left by informal evaluations (first bar). Fully 17.86% of the formal evaluations 
spotted gaps in informal evaluations, but only 9.52% of the evaluations spotted gaps 
and addressed them. Considering the data by the location of the evaluation funders 
(the shading of the bars) demonstrates that while formal actors at the EU level were 
particularly strong in funding evaluations that spotted gaps, actors in Germany and in 
the UK were by and large the only ones that funded evaluations that spotted and 
addressed gaps. 
 
Figure 5.28: Formal evaluations filling gaps in informal evaluation 
 
 
 
Another way of enabling interaction between governance centres via 
evaluation is to produce quantitative comparability metrics. These may, for example, 
be the greenhouse gas emissions that a climate policy reduces or the costs that a 
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policy generates (see Chapter 4). Figure 5.29 depicts the number of quantitative 
comparability metrics contained in the formal climate policy evaluations whose 
analysis this chapter presents. It reveals that 64.29% of formally-funded climate 
policy evaluations contain four or more comparability metrics. In other words, there 
is a significant quantitative focus in formal evaluations. The distribution by 
evaluation funder is relatively proportionate (keeping in mind the overall distribution 
noted in the introductory section). 
 
Figure 5.29: Number of comparability metrics in formal evaluations 
 
Another way of stimulating interactions between governance centres and 
potentially learning or other forms of interactions is through the production of policy 
recommendations. Figure 5.30 summarizes the extent to which formal evaluations 
contain policy recommendations. Using the operational definition of an evaluation 
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discussed in Chapter 4, all evaluations had to include some recommendations or at 
least a policy-relevant conclusion. Figure 5.30 focuses on specifically stated 
recommendations in the evaluation. It shows that 46.43% of the formal climate 
policy evaluations contained no explicit policy recommendations, and only 23.81% 
of the evaluations contained extensive recommendations. Looking at these data by 
evaluation funder (the shading of the bars in Figure 5.30) shows that funders at the 
EU level, in Germany, and in the UK contributed about proportionately to each 
category, although UK based actors tended to fund a somewhat higher number of 
evaluations with extensive recommendations. 
 
Figure 5.30: Recommendations in formal evaluations 
 
In line with the argument that the context affects how a policy fares (see above 
and Chapter 2), it also matters that recommendations contain some level of 
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contextual information in order to gauge the extent to which lessons may (or may 
not) carry from one context to another. For example, if recommendations include 
information on the political system for which they may be suitable (or from which 
political system they are derived), this information may impact on the usability of 
these recommendations across different governance contexts. Figure 5.31 therefore 
summarizes data on the extent to which the recommendations in formally-funded 
climate policy evaluations contain contextual information. The considerable ‘not 
applicable’ category in the figure corresponds with evaluations that contained no 
recommendations (see Figure 5.30 above). For the evaluations that contained 
recommendations, it is noticeable that most of them contained some level of 
contextualization, but more in-depth, extensive contextualization remains an 
exception rather than a norm. Looking at the evaluation funders in Figure 5.31 shows 
that funders from Germany only funded evaluations with some contextualization. By 
contrast, the UK funded no evaluations that extensively contextualized their 
recommendations.  
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Figure 5.31: Contextualization of policy recommendations 
 
In busy and often time-pressured policy-making situations, shorter and well-
structured evaluations may be more impactful than lengthy ones with little indication 
of the most relevant findings and points (see Chapter 2 and especially Zwaan et al., 
2016). Therefore, executive summaries may be a key element in this process because 
they typically aim to summarize the most salient findings from an evaluation. Figure 
5.32 reveals the number of formal evaluations that contained executive summaries. It 
reveals that 79.76% of the evaluations contains executive summaries, but just under a 
quarter of the evaluations does not. Funders based at the EU level, in Germany, and 
in the UK generally supported a proportionate number of evaluations in each 
category.  
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Figure 5.32: Executive summaries in formal evaluations 
 
The next Figure 5.33 further unpacks the executive summaries by considering 
to what extent their structure highlights salient points. As explained above and in 
Chapter 2, a clear structure in executive summaries such as bullet points, a table or 
bolding may aid busy policy-makers to quickly discern relevant information. Figure 
5.33 shows that 64.29% of the executive summaries contain an internal structure in 
order to provide some hierarchy of information. In other words, the authors of most 
formal evaluations took some care to make their evaluations accessible to busy 
policy-makers and others with an interest in the findings—individuals or institutions 
who may potentially also be located in other governance centres. Evaluation funders 
at the EU level, in Germany and in the UK supported evaluations in each category to 
a proportionate extent. 
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Figure 5.33: Hierarchy of information in executive summaries 
 
Particularly in multi-lingual European environments, and if evaluative 
information is to travel well within and potentially beyond Europe’s borders, 
evaluative information in different languages influences to what extent 
recommendations and lessons can travel across linguistic borders. Figure 5.34 thus 
depicts the extent to which formal evaluations contained summaries or even whole 
versions in other languages (than the original language of the evaluation). As Figure 
5.34 reveals, providing summaries in other languages remains a relatively rare 
exception in the evaluations coded for this chapter (14.29%), again pointing to the 
fact that many formally-funded evaluations appear rather self-referential. Noticeably, 
evaluation funders in the UK did not fund any evaluations that provided any 
translations into other languages, an activity that was solely supported by funders 
based at the EU level and in Germany. 
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Figure 5.34: Linguistic access to evaluation by funder location 
 
Figure 5.35 presents the same data on linguistic availability by the 
organizational category of the evaluator. Here, it is readily visible that only research 
institutes and government bodies provided summaries in other languages. All other 
evaluators, such as commercial consultancies, parliamentary bodies, courts and 
scrutiny bodies or environmental organizations did not include translations with their 
evaluations.  
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Figure 5.35: Linguistic access by evaluator organizational category 
 
Finally, Figure 5.36 depicts the availability of the formal evaluations, including 
the effort made to publicize the evaluation and especially the findings (such as for 
example making the evaluation available on a website, or holding a press 
conference), which is another important way in which governance centres may 
interact vis-à-vis evaluation. The bar chart reveals that the authors of 79.76% of the 
formal evaluations made some effort to publicize their evaluations, but very active 
communication between governance centres (such as workshops or conferences to 
share findings) remains very rare (9.52%). Importantly, evaluation funders in the UK 
did not fund any evaluations that actively informed other governance centres. 
Combined with the linguistic aspects in Figure 5.34, this suggests that evaluations 
funded by actors in the UK appear more inward-looking than those funded by actors 
at the EU level or in Germany. 
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Figure 5.36: Evaluation availability 
 
 As with the foundational ideas of self-organization and context, this section on 
interaction demonstrates that there are multiple ways to understand and 
empirically operationalize interactions between governance centres.  
 Formal climate policy evaluations are at best to a limited extent placed to foster 
interactions between governance centres. Neither their characteristics, nor their 
evaluation approaches or the publicity done in order to draw attention to the 
evaluation findings point to an outstanding propensity to foster interactions.  
 But it is also important to recognize that a smaller number of evaluations score 
comparatively highly on several relevant dimensions. Overall and on multiple 
counts, evaluations funded by actors in the UK show a somewhat lower 
propensity to contain or support interactions between governance centres than 
evaluations funded by actors at the EU level or in Germany. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Across the three broad categories – namely self-organization, context, and 
interacting governance centres – the empirical evidence presented in this chapter has 
once again highlighted the internal variation along various dimensions of climate 
policy evaluations and their ability to facilitate polycentric governance. For example, 
while formal evaluations are clearly in a majority in the overall database (Chapter 4), 
they focus only on a small number of policy sectors (e.g., renewables) and omit 
others (e.g., transport). Turning to the foundational ideas of polycentric governance, 
formal evaluations are, by definition, not self-organizing in that the original 
(financial) stimulus to conduct them came from state-actors. However, the ‘formal’ 
category is by no means monolithic and presents internal variation that warrants 
close attention and discussion as this chapter has done. For example, the majority of 
the formal evaluations that this chapter has analysed were not stimulated by a legal 
requirement. Second, formal evaluations offered at best a cursory treatment of 
context—as measured on the various dimensions presented in the first part of this 
chapter, their ability to disentangle the influence of contextual factors on policy 
effects is limited. Finally, interactions between governance centres taking place 
through or enabled by evaluations remains limited among the formal evaluations. It 
was noticeable that in multiple ways, UK funded evaluations contained fewer 
interactions and were less-well placed to support interactions than evaluations 
financed by actors at the EU level or in Germany. 
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Chapter 6 Informal Evaluation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the results of coding the informal evaluations. The 
distinction between formal and informal evaluations is based on the evaluation 
funder (see Chapter 4). Recall that informal evaluations include those funded by 
‘industry’ (including all types of trade associations and lobby groups; ‘environmental 
organizations’ such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth; non-environmental public 
interest organizations such as consumer rights organizations; and foundations. Given 
that the overall database only contained 84 informal evaluations (see Chapter 4), this 
chapter analyses all of them. The presentation of the results follows the foundational 
ideas of polycentric governance set out in Chapter 2 namely self-organization of 
policy evaluation, context in evaluation, and interactions between governance 
centres. 
 
6.2 Self-organization 
Figure 6.1 presents the number of informal evaluations by funder location. It 
shows that EU level actors funded 40.48% of the informal evaluations, while actors 
from Germany funded 47.62%, and actors from the UK 11.90% of the informal 
evaluations. Thus, the contribution of informal evaluations by location of the funder 
– and thus the self-organizing capacity to evaluate in the polycentric climate 
governance ‘system’ in the EU (see Chapter 1) – is palpably uneven across the three 
governance centres.  
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Figure 6.1: Funders by location 
 
Figure 6.2 in turn demonstrates that informal evaluations first emerged in 2002, 
and that the number of evaluations funded by actors at EU level, in Germany and in 
the UK has varied over time. Evaluations funded by EU level actors and actors from 
Germany mainly drove the notable overall growth in yearly evaluations after 2007, 
while evaluations financially supported by UK based actors remained at a 
comparatively low level. While there is an overall growth trend in the number of 
evaluations over time, it is also clear that the number of informal evaluations tends to 
fluctuate over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
Figure 6.2: Informal evaluations by year and funder location 
 
However, the data allow further disaggregating the characteristics of the self-
organized evaluations. As Figure 6.3 details, the height of the bars in the chart 
indicate that environmental organizations funded the largest number of informal 
evaluations, followed by foundations and, in third place, industry. By contrast, 
(other) public interest organizations funded a negligible number of evaluations. 
Evaluation funders from different locations (indicated by the shading of the bars) 
funded evaluations in most categories, with the exception of public interest 
organizations, where only UK based funders were active. German environmental 
organizations such as Greenpeace Germany appeared particularly active in funding 
evaluations. 
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Figure 6.3: Informal evaluation funders by organizational category 
 
 
Turning to the evaluators, that is, the organizations that conducted the 
evaluations (note that self-funding is possible), Figure 6.4 demonstrates that the 
largest number of evaluators are based in Germany (41 evaluations), followed by 
evaluators at the EU level (23 evaluations) and the UK (17 evaluations). A notable 
difference with the overall database (see Chapter 4) is that the number of governance 
centres where the evaluators are located is smaller in that it only includes the EU 
level, Germany, the UK, as well as Canada and the Netherlands, with evaluators 
from the latter two governance centres producing only three evaluations in total. A 
look at the relationship between evaluators and evaluation funders (considering the 
shading of the individual bars) reveals that, by and large, informal evaluation funders 
tend to fund evaluators within their own governance centres. In other words, EU 
level funders mainly funded evaluators at the EU level (that is, evaluators from 
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multiple EU countries by the definition in Chapter 4), while German funders focused 
on evaluators from Germany and UK based funders on evaluators from the UK. 
However, funders at the EU level also funded twelve evaluations conducted by 
evaluators from other governance centres, namely the UK (7 evaluations), Germany 
(2 evaluations), the Netherlands (2 evaluations) and Canada (1 evaluation). See 
Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Informal evaluations by evaluator and funder location 
 
But what type of organizations did the informal funders choose in order to 
conduct their evaluations? Figure 6.5 shows that research institutes took a leading 
role in conducting informal evaluations (30 evaluations), and environmental 
organizations produced nearly the same amount (28 evaluations). Note that self-
funding is a possibility. Importantly, informal actors did not fund any governmental 
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actors, scrutiny bodies, or courts to conduct evaluations. In contrast to the overall 
database, commercial consultancies had a lower relative contribution to producing 
informal evaluations, summing up to 16 evaluations. Informal funders from Germany 
often funded research institutes to conduct evaluations, while funders at the EU level 
appeared to have a preference for funding environmental organizations to conduct 
evaluations.  
 
Figure 6.5: Evaluation funders by organizational type 
 
Furthermore, the locus of the policy under evaluation is a somewhat different 
way to look at these data (see Figure 6.6). Thus, evaluations of climate policy in 
Germany (national level – 41.67%) and those focusing on the EU (EU level - 
45.24%) comprise the lion’s share of the sub-set, with evaluations focusing on UK 
national policy taking a much smaller proportion (13.10%). Taken together, over 
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85% of all informal evaluations focused on Germany or the EU (see Figure 6.6). 
Furthermore, looking at the relationship between the location of the evaluation 
funders and the focus of the evaluation in Figure 6.3 shows that, again, informal 
funders mainly supported evaluations of policies in their own governance centre. 
However, in this case, Germany and UK based funders did support a handful of 
evaluations focusing on EU level climate policy and EU level funders supported nine 
evaluations focusing on Germany and one on the UK. Altogether, most evaluations 
are inward-looking, with EU level funders supporting a few evaluations that look 
beyond its own governance centre and into Germany and the UK. 
 
Figure 6.6: Informal evaluations by location of policy under evaluation 
 
Analogous to Chapters 4 and 5, Figure 6.7 draws together the information on 
the location of the evaluation funders, the evaluators, as well as the location of the 
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policy under evaluation into a single Sankey figure. The thickness of the connectors 
between funders, evaluators and the policy represents the number of evaluations with 
the respective characteristics (i.e. a thicker line means that there are more evaluations 
with these characteristics). A readily visible feature is that German funders mainly 
funded German evaluators in order to conduct evaluations of German climate policy, 
with similar patterns for the EU level and for the UK. However, we can also observe 
that EU level actors funded a sizeable number of UK based evaluators to evaluate 
EU level climate policy; similarly, German funders funded a number of German 
evaluators in order to assess EU level climate policy. 
 
Figure 6.7: Location of evaluation funders, evaluators and policy under evaluation 
Note: the thickness of the connectors represents the number of evaluations with the respective 
characteristics. 
An additional way to look at the informal evaluations is to consider the policy 
sub-type on which the evaluations focus. Figure 6.8 summarizes the relevant data. 
Similar to the overall database (see Chapter 4), by far the greatest number of 
informal evaluations focus on renewables policy, followed in considerably smaller 
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numbers by emissions trading and cross-sectoral policy (which includes evaluations 
that focus on more than one of the sub-sectors). Considering the location of the 
evaluation funders shows that Germany based evaluation funders mainly supported 
evaluations focusing on renewables, and EU level evaluation funders with a stronger 
focus on emissions trading, cross-sectoral policy, but also renewables. UK based 
evaluation funders were the only ones to support evaluations of more general energy 
policy, such as emissions from the entire power sector. 
 
Figure 6.8: Informal evaluations by climate policy sub-type 
 
 
However, there are also additional ways of further unpacking the concept of 
self-organization. Another variable to consider is the extent to which a legal 
requirement drives informal actors to evaluate. Unsurprisingly, but nevertheless 
importantly, none of the evaluations included in the informal cohort responded to a 
legal requirement.  
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Another way of looking at self-organization is to consider the extent to which 
the informal evaluations form parts of larger, continuous evaluation efforts or 
whether they are relatively ad-hoc. Figure 6.9 reveals that the vast majority of 
informal evaluations (72.62%) are ad-hoc. Only 27.38% comprise evaluation efforts 
that form part of larger cycles, evidenced by reference to prior or subsequent 
evaluation activities. Informal evaluation funders are thus generally either unwilling 
or unable to maintain ongoing evaluation exercises. Actors based in the UK funded 
no continuous evaluations, unlike funders at EU level and in Germany, which 
respectively funded 9 and 14 continuous evaluations. 
 
Figure 6.9: Temporal nature of evaluations by funder location 
 
Figure 6.10, in turn, disaggregates the continuous versus ad-hoc evaluation 
variable by funder category. It reveals that environmental organizations funded both 
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the largest number of ad-hoc and continuous evaluations. Industrial actors funded a 
very small number of continuous evaluations, but foundations funded a 
comparatively large amount of continuous evaluations (41.67% of the evaluations 
funded by foundations in total). 
 
Figure 6.10: Temporal nature of evaluations by funder category 
 
 
 In sum, this section reveals that, there are important patterns in who funds and 
who conducts informal evaluations, and what they evaluate, including over what 
time scale.  
 Given that the number of informal evaluations in the overall database only 
comprises 84 evaluations, it is clear that there are limits to self-organizing (i.e. 
non-state) climate policy evaluation in the EU across the three governance 
centres considered here. By the definition used in this thesis (see Chapter 4), the 
vast majority of evaluations were not self-organizing.  
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 Looking across the findings, the most striking point is that in many ways, there is 
a strong congruence between evaluation funders, evaluators and the focus of the 
evaluations, which tend to focus on the same governance centres (i.e. informal 
funders from Germany tend to fund German evaluators focusing on German 
climate policy and likewise for informal funders from the UK). EU level 
evaluation funders are somewhat different in that while they also focus mainly on 
their own governance centre, they also fund evaluators in other countries, and 
some of their evaluations focus on Germany and the UK. Especially in Germany, 
environmental organizations often take a lead in funding and conducting informal 
evaluations. 
 
6.3 Context 
This section addresses the contextual dimension of climate policy evaluation. 
Figure 6.11 summarizes the group of contextual variables that are included in a 
context index (see below). Chart A in Figure 6.11 addresses time horizons in 
evaluation, namely, as Chapter 4 explained, the number of years which an evaluation 
considers. For example, this could include how far the evaluation looks back in a 
historical review of the policy, or to what extent it presents data over a longer time 
span. Chart A reveals that informal evaluations most frequently consider time spans 
of over twenty years. The remainder of the evaluations scatter more or less equally 
among the other categories. Looking at the evaluation funders (the shading of the 
bars) shows that informal funders from all three governance centres (EU level, 
Germany and the UK) financially supported evaluations in each category, and 
Germany and the UK showed a slightly higher propensity to fund evaluations with a 
very long time span from 16 to 20 years and more.
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Figure 6.11: Contextual variables in informal evaluations 
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Figure 6.11 (continued) 
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The second contextual variable considered in Figure 6.11 is the extent to which 
the evaluations make reference to extant policy goals (e.g. the greenhouse gas 
reductions targets at the national or at the EU level).37 Chart B in Figure 6.11 
demonstrates that most informal evaluations discussed policy goals to some degree, 
but less than half of the evaluations (45.24%) considered policy goals well (score = 
3) or extensively (score = 4). Looking at the distribution of the evaluation funders 
(the shading of the bars) highlights that evaluations funded by actors based at the EU 
level and in the UK showed a somewhat higher propensity to engage more deeply 
with policy goals than evaluations funded by actors from Germany. 
The third contextual category relates to references to other policy sectors with a 
view to linkages with the policy at the centre of the evaluation. For example, this 
may relate to the extent to which a policy to support wind power may link with 
spatial planning and nature protection policies. Chart C in Figure 6.11 demonstrates 
that about a third of the informal evaluations made no reference whatsoever to 
linkages with other policies. The proportion of evaluations that discussed this 
dimension and then evaluated the impact of the interactions on policy outcomes 
remains small with just under five evaluations. Thus, in general, by the evidence 
from the evaluations, this contextual dimension received relatively little attention. 
The distribution of evaluations by funder is relatively even across the governance 
centres. However, notably, no evaluations funded by actors based in the UK received 
a (maximum) score of 4. 
Chart D in Figure 6.11 presents data on the extent to which the informal 
evaluations considered unintended policy outcomes, because these outcomes 
frequently emerge from interactions between a policy and its context (see Chapter 2). 
In other words, unintended and especially unforeseen effects may emerge precisely 
because contextual circumstances interact with the policy in unexpected ways. The 
                                                 
37 Recall that this variable and all the remaining variables in Figure 6.11 were scored on a 0-4 scale, 
where 0 = no reference to dimension; 1 = dimension discussed, but no explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 2 = dimension discussed, but limited explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 3 = dimension discussed, and good explanation of how this 
dimension impacts policy outcomes; 4 = dimension discussed and impact on policy outcomes 
evaluated extensively (for further details, see Chapter 4 and Appendix 3).  
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bar chart demonstrates that 27.38% of the informally-funded evaluations paid no 
attention whatsoever to unintended side effects. A few evaluations briefly addressed 
side effects, but only 34.52% of the evaluations paid good or extensive attention to 
side effects and elaborated on related policy impacts. The distribution of evaluations 
by location of the funder is relatively proportionate, even though it should be noted 
that UK based informal evaluation funders financially supported only two 
evaluations that engaged well or extensively with unintended policy outcomes. 
One of the contextual factors that may have considerable impact on policy 
outcomes concerns external events and circumstances —think, for example, of the 
global financial crisis that began in September 2008, marking the onset of the global 
recession, which has been cited as one of the reasons why the EU may easily reach 
its 2020 greenhouse gas reduction targets (Jacobs, 2012). Chart E in Figure 6.11 
reveals that, similar to the previous category, 54.52% of the informal evaluations did 
not address external events and circumstances at all. Evaluations in the two highest-
scoring categories (i.e. scores of 3 or 4) represent 28.57% of the overall evaluations 
funded by informal actors. Turning to the distribution of evaluation funders (the 
different shading of the bars) shows a relatively even distribution, but again, informal 
actors based in the UK did not fund any evaluations that received the highest score 
(4) on this criterion. 
Furthermore, Chart F in Figure 6.11 shows data on the extent to which 
evaluations focused on the broader political environment in which a climate policy is 
placed, including institutions, political actors, and events. In contrast to the earlier 
dimensions, the category with the greatest number of evaluations is that which 
mentions or briefly discusses the political environment, but does not deal with its 
policy impact. The number of evaluations that discuss the political environment in 
depth and evaluate its policy impact remains relatively low (25%). The distribution 
by location of the evaluation funders (shading of the bars) is relatively proportionate. 
The next contextual variable concerns (physical) geography, because not all 
policy approaches will necessarily work across all geographical contexts, especially 
in the case of climate policies that have a clear geographical dimension (such as the 
siting of wind turbines, agriculture, or biomass and forestry). Chart G in Figure 6.11 
details the extent to which evaluations took account of this dimension. In general, the 
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level of attention to geography across all evaluations is low, with 64.92% of the 
evaluations making no reference to this dimension. Only 11.90% of the evaluations 
focused on the policy-impact of the geographical context. The distribution by 
evaluation funders (bar shading) shows that evaluation funders based in Germany 
funded a disproportionately large number of evaluations that paid deeper attention to 
geography; UK based funders financially supported no evaluations that discuss the 
impact of geography on climate policies in depth (i.e. a score of 4).  
But geography may matter more with some policies than with others; for 
example, tidal energy depends on the availability of a coastline with certain 
characteristics, whereas emission limits on a traded product such as cars may be less 
dependent on geographical factors. Therefore, Figure 6.12 details attention to the 
assessment of geography in evaluations by policy type. In light of the overall 
distribution of these data, it is perhaps not surprising that renewables policy features 
at high levels in all categories on the familiar scale; however, it is also notable that 
when evaluations do focus on geography and its impact on policy outcomes, it tends 
to be in the area of renewable energy, with much lower attention to the role of 
geography in influencing climate policy outcomes in other policy areas. But even 
with renewables, only 18 evaluations evaluated the impact of geography in depth (i.e. 
they received a score of 4 on the relevant scale).  
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Figure 6.12: Attention to geography in evaluations by climate policy sub-type 
 
 
 
Turning back to the discussion of Figure 6.11, Chart H presents data on the 
extent to which climate policy evaluations dealt with a discussion of (climate) 
science. In the area of climate change policy, the science of climate change provides 
the indispensable backdrop against which climate policies are formulated. However, 
the vast majority of evaluations (82.14%) made no reference to climate science, so if 
at all, this dimension was considered rather implicitly. While five evaluations 
(5.95%) made general references to climate science, only six contained more detailed 
explorations. Noticeably, informal actors at the EU level funded all of the small 
number of evaluations (6 or 7.14%) that addressed climate science in greater detail. 
The latter included for example discussing findings from the IPCC Assessment 
Reports and the potential consequences of unabated climate change. 
In order to visualize the eight contextual variables discussed above together, 
Figure 6.13 presents their averages in a spider diagram. In line with the procedure 
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described in Chapter 5, the time variable was transformed onto a 0-4 point scale.38 
On the diagram, the vertical numbers represent the familiar scale (0-4, see above), 
and the individual contextual variables feature on each ray of the diagram. 
Considering the data by governance centre (the differently shaded circles in the 
middle of the diagram) demonstrates that evaluations funded by informal actors from 
the UK were particularly strong in contextualizing with a view to the political 
environment, as well as policy goals. Informal evaluations supported by actors at the 
EU level were stronger than the others in considering other sectors. 
 
Figure 6.13: Average scores on contextual variables by governance centre 
                                                 
38 I conducted the norming subtracting 1 from each time horizon score, and multiplying the result by 
4/5. 
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Following the exploration of these individual contextual variables, I calculated 
Pearson correlations in order to detect any possible relationships between the 
variables (see Table A4.2 in Annex 4). By and large, the correlations among the 
contextual variables from Figure 6.11 are weak and often statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, in order to construct an overall index of attention to context, I calculated 
the sum of the contextual variables per evaluation in order to reflect the fact that an 
evaluation may be strong on one dimension, but not necessarily on the others (I 
transformed the time variable onto a 0-4 scale, see above). The distribution’s average 
is M = 11.89, with a standard deviation of SD = 3.92. The minimum and maximum 
scores are 4 and 22, respectively. This range is compared against the theoretical 
minimum (0) and the theoretical maximum (32), showing that the distribution in 
covers a little more than half, but certainly not all, of the theoretical range. The 
number of evaluations with each index score were then plotted onto a histogram, 
which shows a near-normal distribution (see Figure 6.14).  
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Figure 6.14: Index of contextual variables in informal evaluations 
 
 
 
Evaluation funders from the three governance centres (the EU level, Germany 
and the UK) make somewhat different contributions to the overall distribution. 
Evaluations funded by actors in Germany cluster at the lower end of the spectrum 
with M = 11.06 (SD = 4.00), followed by the evaluations funded by actors at the EU 
level (M = 12.27, SD = 3.90) and more towards the higher end of the spectrum, from 
the UK (M = 13.90, SD = 2.89).39 Figure 6.15 presents these averages graphically, 
demonstrating some overlap in the confidence intervals. A one-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) in order to compare these differences statistically revealed a 
marginally significant result with F(2, 81) = 2.46, p = .092. In other words, the 
                                                 
39 Given that the index score includes some ordinal variables, the means and means testing are 
indicative only. 
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source of evaluation funding appears to hang together with extent to which the 
evaluation considers contextual elements; attention to context in policy evaluations 
evidently differs across different governance centres. 
 
Figure 6.15: Average scores on contextual index by governance centre 
 
 
 
As Chapters 2 and 5 have already argued, in addition to these directly 
measurable contextual variables, there are also other, more indirect characteristics of 
evaluations that pay attention to context. The first of these relates to evaluation 
methods, and especially their number, as a greater number of evaluation methods 
points to an effort to try to capture as many policy effects as possibly by means of 
triangulation. The idea of triangulation comes from the notion that each method has 
unique strengths and weaknesses – combining several methods can thus help to 
capture multiple policy effects, including those related to context. Figure 6.16 details 
that by far the most widely used evaluation method is a document analysis (used by 
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86.60% of the informal evaluations), followed by questionnaires/interviews (used in 
22.62% of the evaluations) and modelling (used in 22.62% of the evaluations). 
Informal evaluations used other methods, such as cost-benefit analysis, expert input, 
or stakeholder involvement, much less. Turning to the contribution of evaluations by 
funder location (shading of the bars in Figure 6.16) indicates a relatively 
proportionate distribution, although evaluation funders in the UK supported fewer 
evaluations that used modelling than those at the EU level or in Germany. 
 
Figure 6.16: Types of methods in informal evaluations40 
 
Figure 6.17 in turn presents the number of methods reported in the informal 
evaluations. Strikingly, the highest number of methods used in any informal 
                                                 
40 Multiple responses possible. 
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evaluation is three, while about half of the evaluations used only a single method. A 
little more than a third of the evaluations used two methods. Overall, the number of 
methods in informal evaluations remains at the lower end of the spectrum. Looking 
at the distribution by evaluation funder location shows a relatively even distribution; 
calculating averages confirms this notion, where evaluations funded by actors at the 
EU level used on average M = 1.32 methods (SD = .48), evaluations funded by 
Germany based actors returned on average M = 1.58 methods (SD = .59) and the UK 
M = 1.70 (SD = .68). 
 
Figure 6.17: Number of methods in informal evaluations41 
 
 
                                                 
41 Multiple responses possible. 
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Figure 6.18 presents these averages graphically, demonstrating the higher level 
of methods in informal evaluations funded by UK based actors, but also showing that 
the confidence interval is much larger, which indicates a greater spread in the 
number of methods used in these evaluations. An ANOVA to statistically compare 
these averages revealed marginally significant results with F(2, 81) = 2.68, p = .075. 
 
Figure 6.18: Average number of methods in informal evaluations by funder location 
 
 
 
In addition to the number of evaluation methods, another important way in 
which an evaluation may recognize context is through the extent to which the 
evaluator tailors their methods to the policy in question. An example may be 
calibrating a model or specifically designing or adjusting a questionnaire for the 
evaluation. The respective data reported in Figure 6.19 were extracted from the 
methodological description in each informal evaluation. The informal evaluations 
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separate into almost three equal groups on this criterion. In other words, a third of the 
evaluations exhibited no tailoring of the method at all (i.e. by and large they used ‘off 
the shelf methods’), while another third used some tailoring/calibrating, and the final 
third used extensive fine tuning, which may also include developing a new 
instrument, such as a questionnaire or a model, for the evaluation. The distribution 
by evaluation funders is again fairly even, although funders based in Germany 
funded a greater number of evaluation with extensive tailoring and funders at EU 
level financially supported comparatively fewer studies that did so. 
 
Figure 6.19: Methodological ‘tailoring’ in informal evaluations 
 
In addition to the methods that informal evaluations use, another indicator of 
attention to contextual effects comprises the evaluation criteria. Analogous to the 
argument on methods, a diversity of criteria suggests that the evaluators endeavour to 
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detect contextual effects through multiple perspectives expressed by a variety of 
criteria. Figure 6.20 describes the criteria that the informal evaluations used.42 A 
strong majority of the informal evaluations (59.52%) used the criterion of 
effectiveness, which relates to the extent to which a policy reaches its stated or 
implied aims. This is followed by cost efficiency, overall efficiency, and fairness. On 
the whole, informal evaluations subjected climate policy to a range of criteria. The 
distribution by evaluation funder was relatively proportionate, although it should be 
noted that actors in the UK did not fund any evaluations that challenged the 
legitimacy of the climate policy in question. 
 
                                                 
42 Multiple mentions possible. 
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Figure 6.20: Types of criteria used in informal evaluations43
 
How many criteria did the informal evaluations use overall? Figure 6.21 plots 
the number of evaluations against the number of criteria they used. The first two bars 
indicate that the greatest number of evaluations either assessed the climate policy 
against one or two criteria. A smaller number of informal evaluations used three or 
four criteria, while only five evaluations used five criteria. On average, informal 
evaluations used M = 1.98 criteria (SD = 1.09). The distribution by evaluation funder 
is by and large proportional, which also becomes clear by looking at how many 
criteria the informal evaluations from each governance centre used, with the EU level 
(M = 1.97, SD = 1.11), Germany (M = 1.85, SD = 1.03), and the UK (M = 2.50, SD = 
1.18) relatively close together. A one-way ANOVA to compare these averages 
yielded statistically insignificant results, F(2, 81) = 1.45, ns. 
                                                 
43 Multiple responses possible. 
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Figure 6.21: Number of criteria in informal evaluations44 
 
 
 
The final contextual category addressed here relates to reflexivity regarding the 
policy’s goals or targets, or, as explained above, to what extent informal evaluations 
critically engage with the extant policy targets. Figure 6.22 reveals that even among 
informally-funded evaluations, the vast majority (64.29%) evaluated policies against 
their stated aims; that is, a very low level of reflexivity. A much smaller number of 
evaluations (9.52%) critically questioned policy targets, and only 20.24% of the 
evaluations actually proposed alternative targets. The highest number of non-
reflexive evaluations were funded by actors in Germany, followed by actors at the 
EU level and then the UK. Funders at EU level fund the greatest number of the ‘most 
reflexive’ evaluations, followed by funders from Germany and finally from the UK. 
                                                 
44 Multiple responses possible. 
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Figure 6.22: Reflexivity in informal evaluations 
 
 
 
 As Chapter 2 discussed, the empirical evidence confirms that no single 
dimension addresses context in an unequivocal way. Considerable variation 
across multiple variables points to the multi-dimensionality of context in 
evaluation. It is thus not possible to average across all the different dimensions, 
but some general trends emerge.  
 Overall, there appears to be a medium level of attention to context among 
informal evaluations. Informal evaluation funders from the UK appear to have 
funded fewer evaluations with higher levels of attention to context than 
evaluation funders from the EU level or Germany, although there is variation 
across individual variables. 
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 The variability contained in these data also points to wide-ranging practices of 
evaluation, including to the fact that there are, indeed, a range of evaluations that 
score quite high in some of the relevant contextual dimensions. 
 One surprising finding is that informal evaluation are, on the whole, not very 
reflexive. However, informal evaluators used a wide range of criteria to evaluate 
climate policies. The following section addresses variables that describe the third 
foundational idea of polycentrism, namely interaction. 
 
6.4 Interaction 
The data presented in this section address the third foundational principle of 
polycentrism, namely interacting governance centres (see Chapter 2). The first 
variable addressing this question is the overall evaluation purpose. As Figure 6.23 
details, the content analysis reveals a range of reasons for conducting informal 
evaluations, with almost all evaluations (84.52%) citing learning as one of the core 
purposes of evaluation. Accountability was cited in only 27.38% of the evaluations 
analysed here. Fully 9.52% of the informal evaluations did not explicitly state their 
purpose—this could be an indication of other motivations to evaluate, including the 
political ones (see Chapter 2). As discussed in the previous section, no informal 
evaluation responded to a legal requirement to evaluate. The distribution by 
evaluation funder (shading of the bars in Figure 6.23) is about proportionate. 
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Figure 6.23: Evaluation purpose45 
 
Another view of addressing interacting governance centres is the stated or 
implied target audience of the evaluation, that is, for whom is the evaluation written? 
Figure 6.24 reveals that about half of the informal evaluations state that they are 
geared towards politicians and/or policy makers (recall that the latter are ministry 
officials or similar). A smaller number of evaluations is geared towards the general 
public, but it is also notable that for a sizeable number of evaluations, it was not 
possible to determine the target audience, because these evaluations contain no 
explicit statement on the target audience. UK based funders financially supported 
few evaluations for the general public, while Germany based evaluators supported a 
                                                 
45 Multiple mentions possible. 
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bigger number (15 out of 84 evaluations). At the same time, it was not possible to 
determine the target audience for 14 of the evaluations supported by German funders. 
 
Figure 6.24: Target audience46 
 
In order to probe interactions with other governance centres more directly, 
Figure 6.25 presents data on the extent to which the evaluations referred to other 
evaluations focusing on the same centre (if for example a study focusing on 
renewables policy in Germany also cites or engages with other studies focusing on 
renewables or other policies in Germany). Figure 6.25 shows that 53.57% of the 
evaluations pays either good or extensive attention to other studies focusing on the 
same centre. By the same token, 32.14% of the evaluations pays limited attention to 
                                                 
46 Multiple mentions possible. 
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other evaluations of the same centre and 14.29% pays no attention to other 
evaluations. Looking at the location of the evaluation funders (shading of the bars in 
Figure 6.25) reveals that all evaluations funded by informal actors in the UK make 
reference to evaluations of the same centre. Also, the majority (62.50%) of 
evaluations funded by actors from Germany pays either good or extensive attention 
to other evaluations of the same centre or policy. By contrast, actors at EU level 
funded only two evaluations that pay extensive attention to other evaluations of the 
same centre. 
 
Figure 6.25: References to other evaluations focusing on the same centre 
 
 
Another way of looking at interacting governance centres in the evaluations is 
to consider to what extent they discuss experiences from other governance centres. 
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This would be the case, for example, if an evaluation assessing German renewables 
policies also took into account experiences with similar policies in France. Figure 
6.26 shows that 47.62% of the informal evaluations make no reference to 
experiences from other centres, and the number of evaluations with either good or 
extensive attention comprised 27.30% of all informal evaluations. Turning to the 
distribution by location of the evaluation funders reveals by and large a proportionate 
distribution across funders. 
 
Figure 6.26: References to other evaluations focusing on other centres 
 
Furthermore, Figure 6.27 examines the extent to which informal evaluations 
draw on insights or data from formal evaluations. The results show that a strong 
majority of 60.71% of the informal evaluations make extensive use of insights or 
data from formal evaluations. A further 30.95% of the informal evaluations make 
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some use of insights or data from formal evaluations, and only 8.33% of the informal 
evaluations make no use of insights or data from formal evaluations at all. The 
distribution by evaluation funders (shading of the bars) is by and large proportional 
(considering the overall distribution in informal evaluation funders discussed above). 
 
Figure 6.27: Use of insights or data from formal evaluations 
 
 
In a related vein, Figure 6.28 summarizes data on the extent to which informal 
evaluations intend to spot and address any gaps left by formal evaluations. An 
overwhelming majority of informal evaluations (66.67%) make no effort whatsoever 
to identify gaps in formal evaluation; 11.90% of the informal evaluations spot some 
gaps in formal evaluation, but only 21.43% of informal evaluation spot and address 
any gaps left by formal evaluations. Considering the distribution by evaluation 
funder (the shading of the bars) shows that informal evaluations that spot and address 
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gaps left by formal evaluations were mainly funded by actors from Germany (14 
evaluations) and to a lesser degree by actors at the EU level (4 evaluations). EU level 
actors also funded a number of evaluations (8) that identify gaps, but do not address 
them. Informal actors in the EU funded almost no evaluations that spot, let alone 
address, gaps in formal evaluations. 
 
 
Figure 6.28: Informal evaluation filling gaps left by formal evaluation 
 
 
One way to link evaluation findings between different governance centres is 
through comparable quantitative metrics that allow comparison of findings such as 
greenhouse gas emissions or costs per climate policy. As Figure 6.29 details, most 
evaluations contain either one, two or more common metrics that could, at least in 
principle, enable comparison with other studies. The distribution by location of the 
evaluation funder (shaded bars) is by and large proportionate, although informal 
actors from Germany exhibit a somewhat greater propensity towards funding 
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evaluations with a higher number of comparability metrics than funders from the EU 
level or from the UK. 
 
Figure 6.29: Number of comparability metrics in informal evaluations 
 
 
Another way in which other governance centres may directly benefit from an 
evaluation is through identifying lessons or making recommendations (this also 
applies to learning effects within the same centre). Figure 6.30 details how most 
evaluations boast either some or extensive recommendations. Interestingly, informal 
evaluation funders based in the UK either fund evaluations that provide no 
recommendations, or extensive recommendations. The biggest number of evaluations 
funded by actors at the EU level (21 out of 84) exhibit extensive recommendations. 
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Figure 6.30: Recommendations in informal evaluations 
 
However, Chapter 2 noted that recommendations alone may not be enough to 
enable drawing lessons from one centre to another; detailed contextual information 
may indeed be necessary to gauge the transferability of lessons. Therefore, Figure 
6.31 details to what extent the informal evaluations make recommendations and 
contextualize them. The data show that 58.33% of the evaluations exhibit either 
some or extensive contextualization of the recommendations (which refers to making 
references to the various contextual dimensions reviewed above), but for the other 
half this is either not applicable (i.e. no recommendations) or the recommendations 
are not contextualized at all. Looking at the distribution by evaluation funder (the 
shading of the bars) reveals that UK based actors only fund evaluations that 
contextualize their recommendations; in the category ‘extensive contextualization’, 
the distribution among evaluation funders is about even. 
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Figure 6.31: Contextualization of policy recommendations 
 
Another important way of gauging the extent to which evaluations may 
actually be designed to carry lessons is their own structure. An important element is 
an executive summary, which allows a quick overview of the main findings (see 
Chapter 2). Figure 6.32 details that 77.38% of the informal evaluations include an 
executive summary. Looking at the distribution by evaluation funder reveals that UK 
based informal actors funded only one evaluation that does not include an executive 
summary, while both actors at the EU level and from Germany funded nine 
evaluations each that contain no executive summaries.  
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Figure 6.32: Executive summaries in informal evaluations 
 
An executive summary may still fail to engage busy policy-makers, unless the 
information contained therein is clearly structured. Figure 6.33 thus describes data on 
the extent to which the information in the executive summary exhibits some sort of 
structure, be it through bullet points, graphs, tables, bolding, or other means. A 
majority (53.57%) of the evaluations contain some sort of hierarchy of information in 
their executive summary, while for 23.81% the inverse is true. The distribution by 
evaluation funder is about proportionate, although UK based informal actors exhibit 
a somewhat lower tendency to fund evaluations that do not include a hierarchy of 
information in their executive summaries.  
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Figure 6.33: Hierarchy of information in executive summaries 
 
In order to enable exchange across different governance centres, particularly in 
the multi-cultural and multi-lingual environment of the EU, accessibility to 
evaluation findings in different languages is a key concern. Figure 6.34, however, 
reveals that the vast majority of informal evaluations (80.95%) contains no summary 
or even a translation into another language, which remains relatively rare and only 
appears in about a fifth of the informal evaluations. Looking at the evaluations that 
do contain a translation or summary in another language shows that informal funders 
based in Germany had funded most evaluations with this characteristic (12), 
followed to a considerably lesser extend by evaluation funders at the EU level (3 
evaluations) and an even lower number from the UK (one evaluation).  
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Figure 6.34: Linguistic access to evaluation by funder location 
 
Figure 6.35 presents the same data on linguistic access split up by the 
organizational category of the organization that conducted the evaluation (the 
evaluator). Here, we see that evaluations with a summary in another language were 
almost exclusively conducted by either research institutes or by environmental 
organizations.  
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Figure 6.35: Linguistic access to evaluation by evaluator organization type 
 
Finally, Figure 6.36 describes data on the availability of evaluation: almost all 
informally-funded evaluators endeavoured to publicize their evaluations, with more 
than half including some publicity.47 However, by the same token, only 15.48% of 
the informally-funded evaluation authors actively informed other governance centres 
of their evaluations. The distribution by the location of the evaluation funders is 
relatively even, although evaluations where other governance centres were actively 
informed were mainly funded by informal actors in Germany (8 evaluations), 
                                                 
47 Recall that this was coded on the following scale: 0 = published without any efforts to publicize; 1 = 
some effort to publicize (e.g., available on website); 2 = press release/policy brief; 3 = other 
governance centres actively informed about the evaluation outcomes (e.g., press conference, available 
in multiple outlets, picked up by the media). 
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followed by actors at the EU level (4 evaluations) and, finally, from the UK (only 
one evaluation). 
 
Figure 6.36: Evaluation availability 
 
 With a view to understanding the interaction between governance centres, 
informal evaluations from all three governance centres by and large covered 
some of the more common ways, such as providing executive summaries or 
making some references to insights from other evaluations of the same 
governance centres well.  
 However, turning to the deeper ways of more wide-ranging interactions, such as 
linking with insights from other governance centres, providing translations of 
findings, including quantitative comparability metrics or actively informing 
governance centres, the informal evaluations did less well. 
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 From a polycentric perspective, this indicates that informal, self-organizing 
actors contribute some important ways in which governance centres may interact, 
but do not cover all areas equally. The ability of informal evaluations to cover 
gaps left by formal evaluation is thus limited. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this chapter reveal that it is possible to disaggregate 
the ‘informal’ evaluation category in order to shed more light on the activities of 
non-state actors. The first thing to note is that in conjunction with the findings from 
the overall database presented in Chapter 4, self-organizing capacities in climate 
policy evaluations are limited in numbers. But where self-organization does happen, 
environmental groups take a leading role in both funding and ultimately conducting 
climate policy evaluations, while research institutes and private consultancies also 
contribute as evaluators. The finding that informal actors do not fund any formal 
ones to conduct evaluations is desirable from a democratic perspective - it would be 
highly problematic if for example a private company paid a court to conduct an 
evaluation. 
 Turning to the content analysis of the evaluations, it is clear that self-
governance, context, and interacting governance centres are multi-faceted concepts 
that cannot be measured with one or just very few variables. While some variables 
may be combined in indexes (such as the context index calculated above), others 
remain more stand-alone aspects. Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that 
informal evaluations engage with contextual factors to a moderate degree, and they 
provide moderate ways to stimulate interactions between governance centres. From a 
polycentric governance perspective (see Chapter 2), it is somewhat surprising that 
only few informal evaluations engage crucially with extant policy goals (i.e. 
exhibiting reflectivity), given that informal actors are often thought to be more 
independent and thus potentially more reflexive.  
Finally, this chapter presents each set of variables and analysis in separate 
sections. The following Chapter 7 will compare the findings from the formally and 
informally funded evaluations (i.e. the findings that Chapters 5 and 6 presented) in 
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greater depth, while Chapter 8 discusses potential overlaps between the different 
variables with a view to the three foundational ideas. 
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Chapter 7 Comparing Formal and 
Informal Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares formal and informal climate policy evaluations. It 
therefore compares the empirical findings presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in 
order to work towards a more systematic empirical understanding of climate policy 
evaluation. Recall that by definition (see Chapter 4), formal evaluation funders 
include courts and scrutiny bodies, parliaments, governmental organizations, banks, 
or agencies, independent advice committees, research councils, research institutes/ 
universities, and government (policy-makers). By the same token, informal 
evaluation funders include environmental organizations, foundations, industry, and 
public interest organizations. Given that Chapters 5 and 6 have already explored data 
on formal and informal evaluations individually (and in that context, looked at the 
evaluations funded by actors at EU level, in Germany and in the UK), the following 
sections compare formal and informal evaluations along the foundational ideas of 
polycentric governance, namely self-organization, context, and interaction (see 
Chapter 2). Some of the figures below significantly expand on those presented in 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.4). But while the earlier figures focus on the governance 
centre of the evaluation funders (i.e. EU level, Germany and the UK), the current 
section focuses on the difference between formal and informal evaluations, given the 
high relevance of these dimensions in the current thesis. The comparisons draw on a 
mixture of descriptive, graphic analysis, as well as some statistical comparison where 
possible and necessary. This chapter concludes with some broader insights emerging 
from the data with a view to the more detailed theoretical discussion of the findings 
in Chapter 8. 
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7.2 Self-organization 
In the overall evaluation database (N = 618), there are 458 formally-funded 
evaluations and 84 informally-funded climate policy evaluations.48 This means that 
there are more than five times more formal evaluations than there are informal 
evaluations. Formal actors have thus funded an overwhelming majority of the ex-post 
climate policy evaluations emerging from the EU level, from Germany, and from the 
UK. This points to limited self-organizing capacities in the realm of climate policy 
evaluation in the EU. Figure 7.1 highlights that this translates into 85% formal 
evaluations and 15% informal evaluations (evaluations whose funder could not be 
determined are excluded here). 
 
Figure 7.1: Formal and informal climate policy evaluations (N = 542)49 
 
                                                 
48 For the remainder of the evaluations, the funders could not be determined—see Chapter 4. 
49 Evaluations whose funder could not be determined are excluded here. 
85%
15%
Formal evaluations Informal evaluations
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But as Chapters 5 and 6 already noted, such aggregate numbers mask a great 
deal of underlying variability. Therefore, Figure 7.2 plots the number of formal and 
informal evaluations over time. The evaluations included in Figure 7.2 are all 
informal evaluations, as well as the random sample from the formal evaluations 
described in Chapter 5 (total N = 168). The first thing to note is that the numbers of 
formal and informal evaluations mirror each other, with formal evaluations 
constantly at a higher level. There is also strong growth in informal evaluations after 
2010. Furthermore, the number of formal evaluations has been somewhat steadier 
over time than the number of informal evaluations, whose numbers have proved 
more volatile (with the exception of the notable dip in 2009). 
 
Figure 7.2: Formal and informal evaluations over time (N = 168) 
 
 
Figure 7.3 represents the number of formal and informal evaluations by the 
location of the funder (i.e. the EU level, Germany, or the UK). In order to compare 
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the estimated total of evaluations funded in each governance centre (but recognizing 
that this thesis analysed a random sample from the formal evaluations—see Chapter 
4), the findings that follow incorporate a simple extrapolation by multiplying the 
sample values for formally-funded evaluations by 5.45 (or the total number of 
formally-funded evaluations, 458, divided by 84, which is the size of the sample). 
The same procedure has been applied to a range of data that the figures below 
present – footnotes clearly denote when this was done. Figure 7.3 reveals that the UK 
has – based on this estimation and proportionately – the highest ratio of formal to 
informal evaluations (formal/ informal = 7.6), followed by the EU level (5.4) and 
then Germany (4.9). 
 
Figure 7.3: Formal and informal evaluations by funder country (N = 542) 50 
 
 
                                                 
50 Extrapolation for formally-funded evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined 
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Figure 7.4 summarizes these data with a view to understanding the number of 
evaluations across the organizational type of the evaluation funders. It highlights the 
strong role of governments and governmental agencies in funding evaluations, while 
environmental groups funded the greatest number of evaluations in the informal 
group. 
 
Figure 7.4: Formal and informal evaluations by funder organizational category (N = 
542) 51 
 
 
                                                 
51 Extrapolation for formally-funded evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined 
are excluded. 
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Figure 7.5 demonstrates how the formal-informal comparison plays out across 
by the evaluator location. Given the high level of congruence between the evaluation 
funder and the location of the evaluator (see Chapters 5 and 6), it is not surprising 
that the proportions in Figure 7.5 are relatively similar to those in Figure 7.3 above 
with the exception of just a small number of evaluations conducted by evaluators 
beyond the EU level, Germany, and the UK. 
 
Figure 7.5: Formal and informal evaluation: evaluator location (N = 542) 52 
 
 
Figure 7.6 then presents the formal-informal comparison with a view to the 
evaluator types, that is, the organizations that ultimately conducted the evaluations 
(recall that self-funding is possible). The figure highlights that informal funders 
                                                 
52 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
excluded. 
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relied by and large on environmental groups, followed by research institutes and 
commercial consultancies. Formal funders mainly relied on research institutes, 
governments, and commercial consultancies. 
 
Figure 7.6: Formal and informal evaluations by evaluator organizational type (N = 
542) 53 
 
 
A very similar rationale applies to the location of the climate policy under 
evaluation in relation to the formal-informal comparison, which Figure 7.7 
                                                 
53 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
excluded. 
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demonstrates. Again, because evaluation funders tend to fund evaluations of climate 
policy in their own governance centres (see Chapters 5 and 6), the overall 
proportions in Figure 7.7 are similar to those in Figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.7: Formal and informal evaluation by location of the climate policy (N = 
542) 54 
 
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 already highlighted, formal evaluation covers a greater 
number of climate sub-policies than informal evaluation. Figure 7.8 summarizes the 
respective comparative data. Informal evaluations make a particularly strong 
contribution when it comes to renewables policy, to emissions trading, as well as to 
cross-sectoral climate policy. Formal evaluations focus on renewables, cross-sectoral 
policies, and energy efficiency. One readily visible feature is that, in general terms, 
the core foci of formal and informal evaluations (i.e. the climate policy sub-sectors 
with the highest numbers of evaluation) are relatively similar, but there are some 
                                                 
54 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
excluded. 
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policy areas where there are only formal evaluations (such as energy efficiency, 
taxation and bioenergy). 
 
Figure 7.8: Formal and informal evaluations by climate policy sub-type (N = 542) 55 
 
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 have argued, one way to stimulate policy evaluation is by 
setting legal evaluation requirements. Legally mandated evaluation may thus be 
considered least self-organized. Figure 7.9 compares the number of evaluations that 
have emerged in response to legal requirements to those that have not. It reminds us 
that there were no informal evaluations that responded to legal requirements (see 
Chapter 6). Figure 7.9 shows that when looking across the entire database, legal 
requirements were not the main driver of climate policy evaluation. Other reasons, 
                                                 
55 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
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such as learning or accountability (see below) account for the majority of 
evaluations. 
 
Figure 7.9: Evaluation responding to a legal requirement (N = 542)56 
 
 
Then there is the question of how the formal-informal comparison plays out across 
ad-hoc evaluations (i.e. evaluations conducted at one point in time) versus 
continuous evaluations (i.e. whether there were indications that the evaluations were 
part of larger on-going evaluation exercises). Again Figure 7.10 shows that most 
continuous evaluations are formal (90.46%), even though there are also some 
informal continuous evaluations (about one in ten).
                                                 
56 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
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Figure 7.10: Ad-hoc versus continuous evaluation (N = 542)57 
 
 In sum, looking across the formal-informal comparison reveals that self-
organization (the first foundational idea of polycentric governance, see Chapter 
2) in climate policy evaluation is rather limited (but the ratio between formal and 
informal evaluation varies somewhat by governance centre).  
 But there has also been growth in self-organized evaluations since 2010, showing 
that this type of evaluation is nonetheless on the rise.  
 Legal requirements do not stimulate any self-organized evaluations, but legal 
requirements were also not the sole or even the main motivator of formal 
evaluations.  
 Both formal and informal climate policy evaluation tends to happen within 
individual governance centres, such as at EU level, in Germany and in the UK. 
The analysis reveals a strong congruence between the location of evaluation 
funders, the location of the evaluators and the location of the climate policy 
under evaluation, such that EU level actors tend to mainly fund EU level 
                                                 
57 Extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could not be determined are 
excluded. 
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evaluators to evaluate EU level climate policy, and so on for Germany and for the 
UK. Notably, this dynamic is very similar for formal and informal evaluations 
(see also Chapters 5 and 6).  
 Looking beyond one’s own governance centre by the means of evaluation is thus 
an exception rather than a norm (more of which below).  
 Finally, the extrapolations calculated in this section revealed that formal actors 
funded similar numbers of ad-hoc and continuous evaluations, whereas informal 
evaluations tended to be more ad-hoc. 
 
7.3 Context 
The first block of contextual variables concerns those that together form the 
‘context index’ presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Recall that this index includes eight 
individual variables, namely the time horizon in an evaluation, as well as attention to 
policy goals, other sectors, unintended policy outcomes, external events, the political 
environment, geography, and climate science (see Chapters 5 and 6). Figure 7.11 
first compares the average composite scores on the context index from formal (N = 
84) and informal (N = 84) climate policy evaluations.  
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Figure 7.11: Context index for formal and informal evaluations (N = 168) 
 
 
Figure 7.11 shows that there is a difference between formal and informal 
evaluations on the contextual dimensions. Overall, there are more informal 
evaluations with a higher context-score (the bold line) than formal evaluations (the 
thin line). On average, the informal evaluations have a mean score of M = 11.89 (SD 
= 3.92) while the formal evaluations have a composite mean context score of M = 
8.70 (SD = 3.91).58 An independent samples t-test to compare the means reveals that 
this difference is also statistically significant with t(166) = -5.29, p < .001 (two-
                                                 
58 There is a lively debate on the extent to which researchers can (or should not) use parametric 
statistical tests with Likert-type ordinal scales. Following the testing and advice from De Winter and 
Dodou (2010), who show that in most cases, 5-point ordinal Likert scales approach interval scales in 
statistical testing, I have used parametric tests with regard to the context index, which contains a 
mixture of ordinal and interval data, but always highlight that given the ordinal scales, the means 
comparison is indicative only. 
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tailed, equal variances assumed). However, it should also be noted that there is still 
considerable overlap between the two distributions in Figure 7.11. Figure 7.12 
however demonstrates the means comparison graphically, showing that the 
confidence intervals do not overlap, which is an indicator of a high probability of 
group difference. 
 
Figure 7.12: Average context score for formal and informal evaluations (N = 168) 
 
 
 
Overall, these findings demonstrate that informal evaluations on average pay 
more attention to context according to the dimensions included in the index (see 
Chapters 5 and 6) than the formal evaluations. But which precise variables drive this 
difference, or in other words, on which individual variables are the differences 
between formal and informal evaluations the greatest? In order to test the difference 
among individual variables, I conducted a range of individual t-tests, comparing all 
the variables in a pairwise fashion. Table 7.1 presents the results from this statistical 
comparison. 
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The table reveals that key differences on three individual variables mainly 
drive the mean difference between formal and informal evaluations: attention to 
other sectors (M[formal] = 0.89, M[informal] = 1.65), unintended policy outcomes 
(M[formal] = 0.76, M[informal] = 1.76), and the political environment (M[formal] = 
0.75, M[informal] = 1.64). In each case, informal evaluations had statistically 
significant higher scores (p ≤ 0.01) than formal evaluations. The other variables did 
not return statistically significant differences by evaluation funder type. These 
findings confirm what polycentric governance scholars would argue (see Chapter 2): 
informal evaluations generally explore aspects that tend to be highly political and 
thus potentially uncomfortable for state-related actors to a greater extent than formal 
evaluations. These aspects include unintended policy outcomes (whose presence may 
suggest the inability of policy-makers to control outcomes), impacts on other sectors 
(again something that is difficult to predict and showcases limited control) and, 
finally, the political environment. 
242 
Table 7.1: Context in formal and informal evaluations (N = 168)59 
Variables M (formal) SD (formal) M (Informal) SD (informal) t df 
Time horizon 3.77 1.68 3.58 1.86 .70 166 
Policy goals 2.21 .96 2.37 1.14 -.95 166 
Other sectors .89 1.08 1.65 1.29 -4.15** 160.64† 
Unintended outcomes .76 1.15 1.76 1.43 -5.00** 158.64† 
External events 1.26 1.15 1.44 1.27 -.95 166 
Political environment .75 .86 1.64 1.26 -5.37** 146.93† 
Geography .44 .72 .70 1.14 -1.78 139.93† 
Science .15 .43 .25 .66 -1.12 142.191† 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 
† Equality of variances not assumed (significant Levene’s test). 
 
                                                 
59 For variables on an ordinal scale, the means should be considered indicatively only. 
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Analogous to Chapters 5 and 6, Figure 7.13 presents the individual contextual 
variables on a spider diagram, whose vertical axis features the familiar scale (0-4) 
and where each contextual variable is plotted on each of the rays of the diagram. 
Reverting back to the argument above, it is immediately visible in Figure 7.13 how 
informal evaluations contextualize more on some dimensions. However, it also 
shows common gaps (i.e. dimensions where neither formal nor informal evaluations 
contextualize much), such as science or geography. It should also be noted that 
neither formal nor informal evaluations extend, on average, to a 3 on the scale 
(which corresponds with good attention to the respective contextual variable). 
 
Figure 7.13: Contextual variables in formal and informal evaluations (N = 168) 
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As Chapters 5 and 6 have highlighted, the factors analysed above are not the 
only ones that matter when assessing attention to context in evaluation. An especially 
important additional perspective concerns the method(s) that an evaluation uses. 
First, there is the type of methods. Figure 7.14 demonstrates that while almost all 
formal and informal evaluations use document analysis as a method, there are 
significantly more formal evaluations that use expert input, questionnaires and CBA 
than informal evaluations. Thus, interestingly, formal evaluations also cover the 
more participatory evaluation methods (such as direct stakeholder input or 
questionnaires) rather well. 
 
Figure 7.14: Types of methods in formal and informal evaluations (N = 542)60 
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Then there is the number of evaluation methods used in evaluations. A higher 
number of methods could indicate greater efforts to disentangle various policy 
effects, as each method has unique strengths and weaknesses, which translate into 
analytical strength in some areas, but also potential blind spots in others (see Chapter 
2). Taking the data from Chapters 5 and 6 together (N = 168), there is a difference 
between formal and informal evaluations, such that on average, formal evaluations 
use a greater number of methods (M = 1.83, SD = 0.93) than informal evaluations (M 
= 1.49, SD = 0.57). A t-test to compare the two means shows that this difference is 
also statistically significant with t(138) = 2.90, p < 0.01 (two-tailed, equal variances 
not assumed due to a significant Levene’s test). Figure 7.15 shows the means 
comparison and again highlights that there is very little overlap in the error bars, 
which is another indicator that the difference is significant. 
 
Figure 7.15: Average number of methods used in formal and informal evaluations (N 
= 168) 
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In line with the discussion in Chapter 2, utilizing a greater number of methods 
could also point to greater resource availability among formal evaluation funders in 
order to use various methods. However, one should also note that the formal 
evaluations only use on average about ‘half’ a method more than the informal 
evaluations. Furthermore, the range of observed scores is higher for formal 
evaluations (maximum = 5 methods) as compared to the informal evaluations 
(maximum score = 3 methods). 
But in addition to the number of methods, Chapters 5 and 6 revealed that the 
calibration (or fine-tuning) of the methods matters because this affects an 
evaluation’s ability to cater to and perhaps better detect contextual policy effects. 
However, the level of methodological calibration between formal and informal 
evaluations is very similar. As Figure 7.16 demonstrates, although the overall 
difference in numbers of formal and informal evaluation is of course evident (see 
also above), the relative differences are small. Fully 35.71% of the formal 
evaluations exhibited no methodological fine-tuning (with 32.14% of the informal 
evaluations), while 25% of the formal evaluations contained some fine tuning 
(34.52% for informal evaluation), and 39.29% of the formal evaluations contained 
extensive fine tuning (with 33.33% for the informal evaluations). While there is thus 
some fluctuation, there is no clear trend in either direction. These findings thus 
suggest that as far as the calibration of evaluation methods is concerned, it does not 
appear to matter whether the funders are formal or informal – both are equally low 
(recall that a ‘1’ on the respective scale meant ‘some fine-tuning’ – see Appendix 3).  
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Figure 7.16: Methodological calibration in formal and informal evaluations (N = 
542)61 
 
Analogous to the discussion of methods in evaluation, Figure 7.17 presents the 
types of evaluation criteria, which formal and informal evaluations used in order to 
assess climate policies. It reveals that while there was a greater number of formal 
evaluations than informal evaluations in every category, informal evaluations 
demonstrated a disproportionately greater propensity to assess whether the climate 
policy was fair and legitimate. Informal evaluations thus focused especially on social 
criteria that were much less applied in the formal evaluations. However, virtually no 
evaluation focused on accountability, and the number of evaluations that evaluated 
the legitimacy of the climate policy in question was very low for both formal (an 
estimated 10 evaluations) and informal evaluations (9).  
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Figure 7.17: Types of criteria in formal and informal evaluations (N = 542)62 
 
 
A similar logic also applies to the number of criteria that the evaluations apply. 
A greater number of evaluation criteria points to efforts to capture more contextual 
effects (see Chapter 2). Here, formal evaluations use on average somewhat fewer 
criteria (M = 1.73, SD = .87) than informal evaluations (M = 1.98, SD = 1.09). A 
statistical comparison focusing on the sample of the formal evaluations and all 
informal evaluations returns a statistically insignificant difference between the means 
from formal and informal evaluations where t(166) = -1.65, ns (two-tailed, equal 
variances assumed). Note that in each case, the maximum number of criteria used in 
an evaluation was 5.  
As Chapters 5 and 6 have already explained, reflexivity – or the extent to 
which evaluations critically question extant policy goals and/or offer alternatives – is 
another important way to account for policy context in evaluations. Analysing 
reflexivity offers an insight into the extent to which extant policy targets (still) fit the 
context which prevailed at the time when the targets were adopted. If the context has 
changed, older targets may no longer be deemed relevant or appropriate at the time 
                                                 
62 Multiple mentions possible; extrapolation for formal evaluations; evaluations whose funders could 
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of evaluation. Figure 7.18 demonstrates that formal evaluation are, proportionately 
speaking, less reflexive than informal evaluations. While the vast majority of formal 
evaluations exhibited no reflexivity (fully 90.48% accepted extant policy goals as 
given), this is only true for 66.67% of the informal evaluations. Only 4.76% of the 
formal evaluations critically questioned the policy goals, but 9.52% of the informal 
evaluations did so. Importantly, while only 3.57% of the formal evaluations critically 
questioned policy goals and proposed alternatives, 20.24% of the informal 
evaluations engaged in this way. In sum, informal evaluations are considerably more 
reflexive than formal evaluations. This, again, confirms the expectation of 
polycentric governance and evaluation theory that informal evaluations may be more 
reflexive.  
 
Figure 7.18: Reflexivity in formal and informal evaluations (N = 542)63 
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 Looking across all the comparisons reveals that, on the whole, informal 
evaluations tend to pay more attention to contextual variables, and they are more 
reflexive than formal evaluations. Differences on references to the political 
environment, unintended side effects, as well as policy effects in other sectors 
drove the difference between formal and informal evaluations on the context 
index explained above and in the previous chapters.  
 There is no difference between formal and informal evaluations regarding 
methodological tailoring, but formal evaluations used a significantly greater 
number of methods than informal evaluations. This may point to greater levels of 
available resources and a willingness to use a greater number of methods among 
formal evaluation funders; by the same token, informal evaluations evidently 
explore other aspects, including more political ones, in greater depth (for a 
discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings, see Chapter 8). 
 
7.4 Interaction 
The third foundational idea in polycentric governance theory is the extent to 
which evaluations support interactions between different governance centres. Figure 
7.19 presents a comparison between the formal and informal climate policy 
evaluations with regard to the declared evaluation purpose (numbers for the formal 
evaluations have been extrapolated from the sample using the methodology 
explained in the above sections). Recall that the evaluation purpose may significantly 
influence evaluation use later on. While Figure 7.19 reflects the fact that the number 
of formal evaluations is significantly greater than the number of informal evaluations 
(see above), it is also notable how the proportions of the number of mentions of the 
different purposes appear to mirror each other across the two types. For both formal 
and informal evaluation, learning and improvement is the most frequently stated 
purpose, followed by accountability. Only formal actors funded climate policy 
evaluation in response to legal requirements. The generally strong focus on learning 
may be one indication that the evaluations analysed here endeavour to provide 
lessons and stimulate improvement – either for the policies they evaluate or even for 
other governance centres.  
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Figure 7.19: Evaluation purpose (original N = 542)64 
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 highlighted, in addition to the stated evaluation purpose, 
the extent to which an evaluation may support interactions between governance 
centres also depends on the target audience of the evaluation. Therefore, Figure 7.20 
compares the target audience for formal and informal evaluations; as before, the 
numbers of formal evaluations have been extrapolated. It reveals that the differences 
between the different types of audiences are much larger among formal evaluations 
than among the informal ones (i.e. comparing the height of the bars with the same 
hue). Whereas the informal evaluations stated that they are geared towards policy-
makers and politicians in equal numbers, the target audience of formal evaluations is 
much more directed towards policy-makers, followed by politicians, and then finally 
the general public.  
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Figure 7.20: Target evaluation audience (original N = 542)65 
 
 
But perhaps one of the most straightforward ways of expressing interactions 
directly is through the extent to which formal and informal evaluations draw on 
insights from other evaluations focusing on the same centre. Figure 7.21 presents the 
respective data, and shows that proportionately speaking, informal evaluations show 
a stronger tendency to draw on insights from evaluations of the same centres than 
form al evaluations. More specifically, 28.57% of the formal evaluations made no 
reference to insights from the same centre, with the analogous number of informal 
evaluations being 14.29%. While the numbers for limited reference to insights from 
the same centre are fairly similar (33.33% for formal and 32.14% for informal 
evaluations), 27.38% of the formal evaluations paid good attention to insights from 
the same centre (with 35.71% for informal evaluations). Most importantly, only 
10.71% of the formal evaluations paid extensive attention to insights from the same 
centre, with fully 17.86% of the informal evaluations doing so.  
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Figure 7.21: Level of attention to evaluations of the same centre (original N = 542)66 
 
 
However, this difference does not emerge as strongly from the data for an 
analogous, and yet substantially different, way of looking at interactions between 
governance centres; namely, the extent to which climate policy evaluations draw on 
insights from evaluations of other governance centres. Across the scale, the data are 
fairly similar: for no reference to insights from other governance centres (59.52% of 
the formal evaluations and 47.62% of the informal evaluations); for limited reference 
(22.62% of the formal evaluations and 25.00% of the informal evaluations); there is a 
difference for ‘good attention for insights from other governance centres’ with only 
8.33% of the formal evaluations exhibiting this characteristic, but 17.86% of the 
informal evaluations; and finally the same proportion of formal and informal 
evaluations paying extensive attention to insights from other governance centres 
(both 9.52%). Figure 7.22 represents the respective data. Overall, neither formal nor 
informal evaluations engaged with insights from other governance centres in depth. 
However, as the more detailed results in Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, there is a 
small number of outliers at the top of this spectrum that very much engaged with 
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insights from other governance centres, and informal evaluations have a slightly 
greater propensity in this regard. 
 
Figure 7.22: Level of attention to evaluations of other centres (original N = 542)67 
 
Quantitative comparability metrics are another important way in which 
evaluation may foster interactions between governance centres by allowing them to 
compare their experiences. Figure 7.23 reveals that across the whole database, there 
are many more formal evaluations that contain four or more quantitative 
comparability metrics than informal evaluations. Furthermore, the share of formal 
evaluations that use four or more metrics (64.29%) is much higher than the share of 
informal evaluations that use four or more quantitative metrics (13.10%). Formal 
evaluations evidently quantify their findings more.  
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Figure 7.23: Number of comparability metrics in formal and informal evaluation (N 
= 542)68 
 
A comparison of the means between the sample of formal evaluations (M = 
3.12, SD = 1.30) and the informal evaluations (M = 1.54, SD = 1.23)69 reveals that 
this this difference is also highly statistically significant with t(166) = 8.11, p < 0.01 
(two-tailed, equal variances assumed). Figure 7.24 presents this mean difference 
graphically. No overlap between the error bars indicates high probability of group 
difference. 
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Figure 7.24: Average number of comparability metrics (N = 168) 
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 have argued, policy recommendations are another way in 
which insights about climate policy effects may in principle travel from one 
governance centre to another. Figure 7.25 reveals a trend where the greatest number 
of formal evaluations does not contain recommendations (46.43%), and the higher 
the level of recommendations, the fewer formal evaluations there are. For informal 
evaluations, the inverse appears to be true. The biggest category here is extensive 
recommendations (47.62%), with fewer evaluations that contain only ‘some 
recommendations’ (29.76%) or even ‘no recommendations (22.62%). 
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Figure 7.25: Evaluation by level of recommendation (N = 542)70 
 
 
Following the theoretical arguments about the importance of context in 
polycentric governance (Chapter 2), Chapters 5 and 6 present data on the level of 
contextual information contained in recommendations in the evaluations. Figure 7.26 
compares the level of contextualization of the policy recommendations in formal and 
informal evaluations. It shows that only 5.95% of the formal evaluations 
contextualized their recommendations extensively (compared to 12.04% for the 
informal evaluations); 39.29% of the formal provided some contextualization of their 
recommendations (compared to 46.99% for informal evaluations) and, finally, 8.33% 
of the formal evaluations did not contextualize the recommendations at all (with 
20.48% of the informal evaluations not contextualizing their recommendations at 
all). Note also the considerable “not applicable” category, which means that the 
evaluation did not provide any recommendations in the first place. Taken together, 
neither formal nor informal evaluations contextualize their recommendations much, 
but informal evaluations show a slightly greater tendency to do so. 
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Figure 7.26: Contextualization in policy recommendations (N = 542)71 
 
Taking the results of Figure 7.25 and Figure 7.26 together reveals that while 
informal evaluations are inclined to present more policy recommendations, that 
difference hardly matters for the level of contextualization of the recommendation. 
However, it should be noted that the high number of evaluations without 
recommendations (i.e. ‘not applicable’) somewhat distorts these summary statistics 
because it leads to an over-estimation. 
An additional variable that may influence the extent to which insights can 
travel from one governance context to another vis-à-vis evaluation is whether 
evaluations contain executive summaries that highlight the main findings in an 
evaluation. For busy policy-makers in fast-moving environments, such summaries 
may help to quickly understand the main conclusions without having to delve into 
lengthy reports. Figure 7.27 shows that most formal and informal evaluations 
included executive summaries. In other words, the nature of the funder does not 
appear to influence whether or not the evaluation contains an executive summary. 
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Figure 7.27: Executive summaries in evaluations (N = 542)72 
 
As Chapters 5 and 6 have explained, an additional way to make evaluative 
information from the executive summaries even more accessible to policy-makers 
and others is to structure the executive summaries. This may be done by providing 
clear sections, bolding key passages or terms, or through figures and tables that 
summarize the most relevant information. Figure 7.28 thus compares the extent to 
which executive summaries are internally structured in formal and informal 
evaluations. It reveals that there is no large difference on this dimension; a Chi-
squared test to assess this difference statistically (based on the sample of formal 
evaluations and all informal evaluations; total N = 168) reveals no significant 
difference between the two groups with X2(2, N= 168) = 2.32, ns. Taken together, 
Figure 7.28 demonstrates that the source of evaluation funding does not appear to 
hang together with the extent to which the information in executive summaries is 
structured.  
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Figure 7.28: Hierarchy of information in executive summaries (N = 542)73 
 
Another important dimension of interacting governance centres is linguistic 
access, a feature that is particularly relevant in multi-lingual environments such as 
the EU (see Chapter 2). If evaluative insights are to travel from one governance 
centre to another, they may also have to overcome language barriers. Therefore, 
Figure 7.29 compares the extent to which formal and informal evaluations contain 
summaries – or even whole versions – of the evaluation in other languages. It reveals 
that the source of funding does not appear to influence whether or not evaluations 
contain summaries in other languages. The number of climate policy evaluations that 
are available in other languages is severely limited, irrespective of the evaluation 
funding source.  
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Figure 7.29: Linguistic access in climate policy evaluations (N = 542)74 
 
Aside from the rather outward-facing aspects discussed above, there are other 
aspects internal to the evaluation that indicate interactions across different 
governance centres. One important aspect is the extent to which informal evaluations 
aim to fill any gaps left by formal evaluations, and vice versa. For example, this 
could include an informal evaluation arguing that formal, state-funded data and/or 
analyses are limited, and that it therefore collects its own data and conducts its own 
analysis. Figure 7.30 thus compares the extent to which formal and informal 
evaluation discuss and action this type of interaction. It shows that, across the formal 
and informal evaluations, the difference is rather limited, even though there is – in 
light of the overall proportions – a somewhat greater share of informal evaluations 
(21.43% in comparison to only 9.52% of formal evaluations) that both identify and 
address gaps, than formal evaluations. Neither formal nor informal evaluations are 
thus particularly geared towards spotting the gaps left by others and addressing them. 
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Figure 7.30: Gap filling by formal and informal evaluations (N = 542)75 
 
A related aspect concerns the extent to which formal and informal evaluations 
draw on the findings of other evaluation types. For example, this includes whether 
informal evaluations draw on insights or even use data from formal evaluations. 
Figure 7.31 compares the extent to which this happens. It shows that there is indeed a 
significant difference between the groups; while the majority (61.90%) of formal 
evaluations makes no use of insights or data from informal evaluations, at the other 
end of the spectrum, the majority of informal evaluations (60.71%) uses insights or 
data from formal evaluations extensively compared to only 11.90% of the formal 
evaluations. Informal evaluations thus use more data and insights from formal 
evaluations than vice versa.  
  
                                                 
75Extrapolation for formal evaluations. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
No gaps identified Gaps identified Gaps identified &
addressed
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ev
al
u
at
io
n
s
Formal evaluations Informal evaluations
263 
Figure 7.31: Formal and informal evaluations referencing each other (N = 542)76 
 
 
Finally, as Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed, explicit efforts to publicize policy 
evaluations may have a bearing on the extent to which evaluative insights travel 
across governance centres. Figure 7.32 therefore presents the extent to which the 
authors of the evaluations made an effort to publicize their findings, for example by 
posting their evaluation on a website, issuing a press release, or informing other 
governance centres even more actively, such as through a conference or a workshop. 
Recall that this information was extracted both from the evaluation, but also from the 
source website or similar, where available (see Chapter 4).  
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Figure 7.32: Efforts to publicise formal and informal evaluations (N = 542)77 
 
The first things to note in Figure 7.32 is that as Chapter 5 has already 
discussed, there are no formal evaluations that were not publicized at all, and only 
one informal evaluation where this was the case (the size of the chart is too small to 
represent that one evaluation – see Chapter 6 for a finer resolution). Proportionately 
speaking, 67.86% of the formally funded evaluators made some efforts to publicize 
(e.g., putting the evaluation onto a website), with 52.38% for informal evaluators. 
Only about a fifth (22.62%) of the formal evaluations were linked to a press release 
or policy brief (with 30.95% for informal evaluations), and only 9.52% of the formal 
evaluations were used to actively inform other governance centres (the analogous 
number being 15.48% for informal evaluations). Overall, Figure 7.32 thus reveals a 
slightly higher relative propensity to publicize findings among informal evaluations 
than among formal ones.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
Comparing formal and informal evaluations reveals significant differences on 
some, but not all, of the dimensions of self-organization, context, and interacting 
governance centres. On the self-organization dimension, the first key point to make 
is that formal actors funded the vast majority of climate policy evaluations in the 
overall database (see also Chapter 4). In other words, the main impetus to fund 
evaluations comes from state actors or actors which draw significant funds from the 
state and are thus not self-organized according to polycentric governance theory. 
However, legal requirements are evidently not the main driver of the bulk of 
evaluations that formal actors funded – rather, the evaluations most commonly cited 
a desire to learn and improve climate policy. Furthermore, when focusing on the 
nature of the evaluation, it is also clear that formal actors are proportionately more 
inclined and/or able to financially support continuous evaluation exercises or cycles, 
whereas informal actors fund more ad-hoc evaluations. 
Second, on the contextual dimension, informal evaluations score on average 
higher than formal evaluations on the context index containing eight individual 
variables, which shows that informal evaluations contribute a somewhat greater 
amount of evaluative knowledge on contextual factors into the polycentric 
governance system. This general trend also extends to other variables, such as the 
number of criteria, where again informal evaluations used a greater number. The 
only exception to this trend concerns the number of evaluation methods, where 
formal evaluations use on average more methods than informal evaluations. 
Third, the category of interacting governance centres is probably least clear 
when comparing across formal and informal evaluations. By and large, climate 
policy evaluation in the EU focuses on single governance centres. For example, and 
linking with the section on self-organization, EU level funders mainly fund EU 
evaluators to evaluate EU level climate policy, with a very similar pattern emerging 
for evaluation funders in Germany and in the UK. Furthermore, while formal and 
informal evaluations are (proportionately) broadly similar with a view to the stated 
evaluation purpose, the target audience, the context contained in recommendations, 
the number and characteristics of executive summaries, linguistic access, filling gaps 
and publicity efforts, there are some notable differences: informal evaluations pay 
266 
more attention to other evaluations of the same centre (i.e. they tap into more sources 
of available evaluative knowledge); informal evaluations also contain more 
recommendations and use more data from formal sources than vice versa. By the 
same token, formal evaluations contain greater numbers of (quantitative) 
comparability metrics. Table 7.2 summarizes the key takeaway points. 
 
Table 7.2: Formal and informal evaluation: key similarities and differences 
 Formal evaluation Informal evaluation 
Self-organization  Vast majority (85%) of 
evaluation are not self-
organized 
 Legal requirements not 
the main driver 
 15% of evaluations self-
organized 
 Significant growth in 
numbers since 2010 
Context  Greater number of 
methods, quantification 
and continuous evaluation 
 Greater attention to 
various contextual 
variables 
 Use more social criteria 
such as fairness and 
legitimacy 
Interaction  Strong congruence between location of funders, 
evaluators, and the climate policy under evaluation 
 Learning as the headline evaluation purpose; followed by 
accountability 
 Limited attention to insights from other governance 
centres 
 More quantitative 
comparability metrics 
 Pays more attention to 
findings from evaluations 
of the same centre 
 More recommendations 
 
Taking together these results show that while the potential for and actual 
interactions between governance centres by the means of evaluation is relatively 
weak for both formal and informal evaluation, the two types of evaluation have 
different characteristics on various dimensions. In other words, formal and informal 
evaluation each exhibit some characteristics that the other does not possess to the 
same degree; this indicates that climate policy evaluation has generally become 
richer and broader given the involvement of different types of evaluation funders as 
defined in this thesis.  It also highlights that formal and informal evaluation are, at 
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least in some areas, potentially complementary. The following Chapter 8 provides a 
theoretical analyses of the findings from Chapters 5-7. 
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Chapter 8 Evaluation in Polycentric 
Governance: A Theoretical Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The core aim of this thesis is to understand the potential and actual role of 
policy evaluation in facilitating climate governance, by considering the former 
through the lens of polycentric governance theory (and vice versa). In so doing, it 
looks at policy evaluation in a new light: moving on from conceptualizing evaluation 
as the last stage in a nationally framed policy cycle, and starting from the premise 
that evaluation may weave much more profoundly into the fabric of governance. In 
many ways, the theoretical connection between polycentric governance literatures 
and wide-ranging policy evaluation literatures are debates on the role of different 
actors in climate policy evaluation (formal state-based actors and informal society-
based actors, i.e. the who? question in Chapter 2). This link emerges because of the 
keen interest from polycentric governance scholars in the origins, maintenance, and 
structure of governance arrangements (i.e. does a polycentric governance system 
emerge from the top down or from the bottom up?) and the equally keen interest by 
evaluation scholars, who have recognized that it appears to make a difference what 
types of actors conduct policy evaluation in terms of results and use (see Chapters 2 
and 3). This chapter uses the empirical findings from this thesis in order to discuss 
the core theoretical questions and debates related to polycentric governance and 
evaluation in detail. In other words, the chapter aims to relate the new empirical 
evidence in this thesis to the theoretical postulates of Chapter 2. As before, it 
considers the role of self-organization, context, and interaction in separate sections. 
After these three sections follows a fourth that looks across the three foundational 
ideas in order to analyse links and cross-overs. The final section concludes and 
bridges to the final chapter. 
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8.2 Self-organization 
The first, foundational idea of polycentric governance concerns the extent to 
which governance actors are willing and able to self-organize and take action beyond 
what states and state-linked actors do. Recall that in line with arguments from 
polycentric governance scholars, this thesis distinguished between self-organization 
and its opposite, namely state-based organization, on the basis of evaluation funding 
(see Chapters 4; 5-7). This thesis started from a theoretical expectation that those 
who pay for an evaluation also have significant control over what is being evaluated 
and, to a certain extent, how and to what end (see also Pleger & Sager, 2016).   
Empirically, self-organization may be considered in relation to funding and the 
contribution of individual governance centres. First, considering the entire database 
(see Chapters 4 and 7), the findings of this thesis demonstrate that the number of 
informal evaluations is comparatively small, as formal actors funded the vast 
majority of evaluations. In other words, this thesis demonstrates limits to self-
organization in climate policy evaluation. Second, formal and informal actors at the 
EU level and in Germany funded policy evaluation in about equal numbers, with 
considerably less evaluation activity in the UK (see Chapters 4 and 7). This suggests 
that not all governance centres prove equally active in terms of funding climate 
policy evaluation. However, the proportion of informal evaluations (compared to 
formal evaluations) remains relatively similar across the centres; that is, a smaller 
overall number of evaluations in the UK does not affect the proportion between 
formal and informal evaluations there. This discovery suggests that there may be 
similar, underlying drivers for both formal and informal evaluation across different 
governance centres in the EU. Coupled with the fact that informal evaluations tend to 
emerge later than formal evaluations, this finding indicates that informal evaluations 
are more reactive, and less spontaneous and independent, than polycentric 
governance theorists have traditionally expected. Especially Elinor Ostrom (2005, p. 
280) suggests that organizations may be able to combine their resources and conduct 
monitoring and evaluation, but this thesis only partially confirms this assumption 
(see Chapter 2). Not all governance centres and actors in the EU’s polycentric 
climate governance exhibit equal capacities, propensity, or willingness to self-
organize their policy evaluation. 
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The high geographical congruence between the evaluation funders, the 
evaluators and the location of the policy under evaluation furthermore reveals 
relatively separate spheres of climate policy evaluation in the EU, which coincide 
with the boundaries of the governance centres. In other words, evaluation tends to 
happen within individual governance centres and evaluations rarely look beyond 
their own governance centre for lessons from elsewhere. Significantly, this pattern 
holds across both formal and informal evaluation, producing considerable 
fragmentation in evaluative knowledge of climate policy effects (see below for a 
fuller discussion on related aspects of [the lack of] interaction). Self-organization in 
evaluation contributes somewhat to emphasizing certain climate policy sub-types in 
terms of the number of evaluations (notably emissions trading), but the overall 
sectoral focus of formal and informal evaluations remains similar. Both formal and 
informal evaluations mainly concentrate on renewables policy, cross-sectoral 
elements, emissions trading, transport and energy efficiency, while other climate 
policy sub-types such as biofuels, agriculture, or waste receive little attention. Self-
organized evaluation thus does not cover key substantial and geographical gaps left 
by formal evaluations (and vice versa). 
Polycentric governance systems are, by definition, assumed to be dynamic and 
ever-changing (Morrison, 2017). The experimentation at various governance levels 
that Chapter 2 discussed suggests high levels of dynamism and change in the search 
for adequate governance responses to climate change, and corresponding and equally 
dynamic evaluation efforts. This dynamism arguably calls for continuous evaluation 
that captures change over time and assess its effects (see Morrison, 2017). In this 
regard, self-organized evaluations make a weak contribution; informal actors funded 
proportionately fewer continuous evaluations than ad-hoc evaluations, while formal 
funders funded ad-hoc and continuous evaluations in nearly equal numbers (see 
Chapter 7). Thus, in addition to limits to self-organization in evaluation (see above), 
most informal evaluations do not exhibit and capture the dynamism that is assumed 
within polycentric theory. Some of the (rather optimistic) assumptions about self-
organization may thus have to be tempered in the area of climate policy evaluation.  
What do these findings mean for the aforementioned debate on the role of the 
state in polycentric governance? Recall that Chapter 4 explained that the formal 
(state) category contains evaluations funded by courts and scrutiny bodies, 
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parliaments, governmental organizations, banks, or agencies, independent advisory 
committees, research councils, and the (executive) government. This was done 
because, as Chapter 2 explained in greater detail, scholars working in the polycentric 
tradition tend to conceive of the state in a relatively broad way (see Mansbridge, 
2014). The evidence from actor types among evaluation funders suggests that states 
play a key, but not an exclusive or exhaustive, role in polycentric climate governance 
through evaluation in the EU because they fund the lion’s share of climate policy 
evaluation. 
In addition to directly funding evaluation, states also play a role in putting in 
place rules for evaluation. Legal requirements to evaluate (or evaluation clauses) 
may be one way for formal actors to provide aspects of overarching rules in 
polycentric systems to ensure a minimum level of information provision vis-à-vis 
evaluation. Chapter 2 discussed earlier evidence of growth in the number of 
evaluation clauses and corresponding evaluation activities in Europe, but highlighted 
the need to study these dynamics in the climate policy sector. The new data in 
Chapter 7 demonstrate that states play only a partial role in this regard. While 
(unsurprisingly) none of the informal evaluations were triggered by legal 
requirements, it is especially notable that most formal evaluations were also not 
stimulated by legal requirements either; other factors, notably a desire for learning, 
proved more influential in stimulating formal actors to fund evaluations (see Chapter 
7). In other words, in some respects, the role of the state is not as heavy-handed as it 
could be across parts of the formal evaluations because formal actors funded many 
evaluations outside some legal requirement to evaluate. This finding is somewhat at 
odds with the (more general) evaluation literature, where the presence of evaluation 
clauses has typically been understood as a sign of rising institutionalization of 
evaluation, and generally a growth area (Jacob et al., 2015; Mastenbroek et al., 
2016). This thesis shows that evaluation may not (yet) be as institutionalized in the 
climate sector as in other sectors (such as structural funding policy in the EU, see 
Chapters 2 and 3). 
Given that what counts as ‘self-organization’ depends so intimately on the 
definition of formal and informal evaluation, the point that both categories are much 
more internally differentiated than discussed in the relevant policy evaluation 
literatures is a novel finding, which has relevant theoretical implications for 
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polycentric governance. On the one hand, self-organized evaluations indeed 
contribute new insights on climate policy into the polycentric governance system; on 
the other hand, Chapter 6 has revealed that self-organization is limited to a relatively 
small number of organizational types, namely environmental organizations, industry, 
and foundations. The fact that public interest organizations, such as consumer 
protection groups or trade unions, funded virtually no climate policy evaluations 
indicates that the self-organization via evaluation observed here emerges from a 
small number of tightly circumscribed interest groups, such as the WWF or the 
federations of the renewable and solar energy industries in Germany. There are 
significant swathes of society or groups, such as human rights or public health 
organizations, that do not fund (and thus self-organize) climate policy evaluation at 
the EU level, in Germany, or in the UK. Those who do self-organize only engage in a 
limited set of evaluations (see Chapter 7). Particularly the more resource-intensive 
activities, such as using multiple evaluation methods or generating more elaborate 
quantifications of policy effects remain very rare in self-organized evaluations (see 
below). The same argument also holds for more continuous climate policy 
evaluations that are part of broader evaluation cycles which are rarely self-organized. 
This implies that, again, the pooling of resources among informal actors that Elinor 
Ostrom (2005, p. 280) proposed only happens to a limited extent, and mostly through 
certain organizations, such as the national or European-level offices of environmental 
organizations. These organisations produce mainly ad-hoc and thus less resource-
intensive evaluations. 
 
8.3 Context 
The second foundational idea in polycentric governance theory is that context 
matters immensely so that policy solutions are unlikely to work everywhere once 
they meet widely differing contexts—hence repeated reminders to avoid policy 
‘panaceas’ (E. Ostrom et al., 2007). The theoretical implication of this idea for policy 
evaluation is that any evaluation of policy effects should take contextual factors into 
account, lest it misses key mechanisms that lead to certain policy outcomes. Chapter 
2 explained that evaluation scholars have proposed to account for context in two 
ways, namely directly assessing contextual factors such as time, the political 
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environment, or external shocks, and/or considering context through the use of many 
different methodologies and criteria. Paying attention to context is especially relevant 
for interactions between governance centres (see Section 8.4 in this chapter), which 
depends on contextual information if lessons are to travel from one governance 
centre to another without reverting to policy panaceas in polycentric governance 
systems. 
Overall, the empirical findings from this thesis suggest that at best both formal 
and informal evaluations exhibit a cursory treatment of context. Both in terms of 
assessing contextual factors directly and looking at the number of methods or criteria 
that evaluations use, the average attention to context remains low across in climate 
policy evaluation. However, some important differences between formal and 
informal evaluations emerge in this thesis. Looking across the context index (see 
Chapters 5-7) reveals that informal evaluations pay, on average, more attention to 
contextual factors than formal evaluations. This suggests that informal evaluations 
not only exist (i.e. that informal actors have the capacity and willingness to evaluate, 
see Section 8.2 above), but that they are also qualitatively different on the contextual 
dimension. Informal evaluations contribute an additional contextual focus to the 
available evaluative knowledge on climate policy effects vis-à-vis policy evaluation; 
this knowledge is, on average, less available from formal evaluations. Thus, it is 
advantageous to have a significant presence of informal evaluations in a polycentric 
climate governance system, but their numbers are currently limited. 
Considering other ways of gauging attention to context in climate policy 
evaluations – such as the methodological approaches and assessing policy targets – 
shows that formal evaluations use a greater number of methods. Compounded with 
the fact that formal evaluations also contain a greater number of quantifications on 
‘comparability metrics’ (see Chapter 2), this indicates that formal actors may have 
higher levels of resources and/or willingness to fund evaluations that tend to be 
especially costly, such as using multiple methods or extensive quantification. This 
speaks directly to one of Elinor Ostrom’s core claims that non-state actors may also 
have the capacity to conduct their own evaluations (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 280). This 
part of the evidence suggest that it is indeed possible to empirically detect informal 
climate change policy evaluation at the EU level, in Germany and in the UK, but 
informal actors appear to have limits in the extent to which they are able and willing 
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to engage in more resource-intensive types of evaluation. Anything that requires 
significant resources – such as using a greater number of evaluation methods, or 
adding more quantifications to the evaluations – are areas where on average formal, 
state-based or linked actors such as the European Commission or national ministries 
appear to have a distinct advantage. This finding again suggests a substantial – 
though by no means exclusive or exhaustive – role for states or network-managing 
organizations like the European Commission in polycentric governance (see Chapter 
2). 
While informal actors may experience resource limitations, the formal actors 
appear to have political limitations that inhibit them to a certain extent from engaging 
in more context-sensitive climate policy evaluation. These limitations appear across 
several categories. As Chapter 7 explains, informal climate policy evaluations 
employ a greater number of criteria than formal ones, and are also significantly more 
reflexive, meaning that they exhibit a greater propensity towards critically 
questioning extant policy targets. In line with Per Mickwitz’s suggestions, informal 
evaluations are thus more likely to unearth a wider range of climate policy effects in 
context than formal evaluations (Mickwitz, 2003). Retrospectively questioning 
policy targets (i.e. reflexivity) may come with considerable political risks, given that 
doing so can highlight the shortcomings of earlier policy decisions at the expense of 
the powers that be. From a polycentric theoretical perspective, doing so is absolutely 
vital if insights are to travel from one context to another, and especially if 
governance centres aim to draw on evaluations in order to set new policy targets (and 
if one does not want to suffer from a success bias). In fact, Chapter 2 discusses how 
some authors assume that “reflexivity is a systemic feature” (Aligica, 2014, p. 66) in 
polycentric governance. The empirical evidence in this thesis shows that the majority 
of evaluations fall well short against this expectation and that on account of 
evaluation characteristics, polycentric climate governance in the EU may not be as 
reflexive as polycentric governance scholars like to assume. 
But this thesis also demonstrates that what counts as (relevant) context may at 
least in part depend on the characteristics of the (climate sub-) policy type. For 
example, a long-standing policy that has already been subject to multiple revisions 
may cry out for more historical, time-based contextualization. By contrast, a recently 
created and implemented policy on, say, the deployment of renewable energy 
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technology, may have less of a historical dimension, but rather link closely with 
more contemporary developments in political structures and institutions, as well as 
aspects of (physical) geography if the renewable resource is not available in the same 
way in all places. The type of policy instrument may also have a bearing on what 
contextual factors prove particularly relevant – for example, the strength of 
enforcement institutions may matter in the case of a policy that regulates carbon 
emissions, whereas in the case of a distributive policy such as subsidies for 
renewables deployment, the availability of investment capital may be a relevant 
factor in different actors’ ability to benefit from the subsidy (see Lowi, 1972 for a 
typology of basic policy types). This means that assessing context co-evolves with 
the characteristics of the policy in question. 
Given that there is practically an infinite number of ways in which one could 
assess context, contextual evaluation requires a (hopefully conscious) choice of 
factors that an evaluation assesses. But because any evaluation is necessarily value-
based (Vedung, 1997) and therefore a political activity (Weiss, 1993), contextual 
analysis (and the choice of potentially relevant contextual factors) may also reflect 
the interests of certain actors, and the policy values that they seek to pursue. For 
example, different actors may actively contest what factors, elements, or aspects are 
central to a policy and which ones are considered peripheral. This, in turn, means that 
the information that may travel between governance centres is, to a considerable 
extent, infused with the values that are inevitably part of any evaluation. Policy 
evaluation in a polycentric system is thus also an exercise in assessing what policy 
values particular governance centres consider paramount in their climate policy 
decisions – and these values may then be expressed in terms of policy targets and the 
assessment of contextual effects. This thinking links back to Frank Fischer’s (2006) 
idea of ‘societal vindication,’ or evaluating against the values that a society deems 
particularly relevant (see Chapter 2). Especially given political sensitivities in the EU 
Member States, network managers such as the European Commission may thus be 
better placed to conduct such evaluations. 
In summary, the empirical analysis has shown that both formal and informal 
evaluations make unique and relevant contributions to climate policy evaluation in 
the EU. The evaluations analysed here contain many of the elements that Rog (2012) 
identified in her framework for contextualising evaluations (see Chapter 2). 
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However, this thesis also shows that there are additional factors that may prove 
relevant – such as the tailoring of evaluation methods or reflexivity against original 
policy targets. In other words, both formal and informal evaluations make relevant 
contributions, which are to a certain extent complementary in facilitating polycentric 
climate governance. 
 
8.4 Interaction 
The third foundational idea in polycentric governance theory concerns the 
interaction between governance centres (see Chapter 2). The potential for interaction 
via evaluation is in many ways a first and significant (but not yet sufficient) step in 
facilitating polycentric climate governance. Polycentric governance scholars have 
long argued that in the absence of any interactions between governance centres, it 
would be futile to speak of a governance ‘system’ (see Chapter 2). Chapters 4-7 have 
assessed the potential for interaction vis-à-vis climate policy evaluation in two broad 
ways: first, they considered to what extent certain evaluation characteristics may 
provide a base for interaction; second, interactions have been assessed with a view to 
the extent that they manifest directly through evaluations, for example, the use of 
data across different evaluations or the extent to which evaluations themselves 
engage with the experiences from other governance centres. 
The fact that ‘learning and improvement’ is the most widely-cited reason for 
conducting evaluations – both in their formal and informal variants (see Chapter 7) – 
shows that most evaluators at least aim to stimulate learning and lesson drawing. 
Furthermore, the fact that most evaluations analysed here are geared towards policy-
makers and politicians as their core audience (see Chapter 7) indicates an interest in 
more detailed learning, rather than just symbolic action. However, the empirical 
findings suggest that interaction between governance centres by the means of and 
directly through evaluation remains limited and typically does not extend much 
beyond relatively standard ways, such as executive summaries. 
However, the analysis revealed important differences between formal and 
informal evaluations. Formal evaluations contained significantly more quantitative 
data and a greater number of comparability metrics (see Chapter 7). These 
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differences have important theoretical implications. Polycentric governance scholars 
have long debated the ability of self-organizing actors to muster the necessary and 
considerable resources to conduct scientific studies or, given the focus of this thesis, 
policy evaluations (Mansbridge, 2014; E. Ostrom, 2005). Recall that estimates from 
Germany have identified a cost of about one hundred thousand Euros per evaluation 
in the structural funds sector (Löwenbein, 2008). While the evidence in this thesis 
suggests that informal actors have indeed conducted evaluations in the climate 
sector, limits appear within these evaluations, as, for example, using various methods 
or quantifying policy effects more extensively are resource-intensive activities. In 
this respect, formal evaluations engage significantly more in these activities, perhaps 
because state-linked actors are typically backed by greater levels of resources. 
But keeping in mind that Elinor Ostrom counselled extensively against policy 
panaceas and monocentricity (E. Ostrom et al., 2007), it is also relevant to note that 
formal climate policy evaluations contextualize less than informal (see above). Thus, 
even though they contain a greater number of quantitative comparability metrics and 
thus a means to carry some more general lessons, lower levels of contextual 
information may hamper the ability of potential evaluation users to determine the 
extent to which the policy context in other governance centres may be similar (in a 
familial way) with their own, and thus gauge to what extent the lessons may apply 
(see Chapter 2). This is in line with the thinking of both polycentric and evaluation 
scholars that contextual factors often have a strong bearing on policy success 
(Chapter 2). 
These aspects apply specifically to policy recommendations, which are a fairly 
direct way of information exchange. Chapter 7 revealed that less than half of all 
evaluations in the database contained ‘extensive recommendations,’ which means 
that the actual contribution of both formal and informal evaluations to polycentric 
climate governance is limited with regard to providing recommendations. However, 
informal evaluations contained on average a greater number of recommendations, 
indicating that they contribute disproportionately more than formal evaluations. But 
neither formal nor informal evaluations evidently expended much effort to 
contextualize their recommendations – perhaps in order to underline their assumed 
generalizability. This means that potential evaluation users would have to go through 
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entire evaluations rather than just the recommendations in order to pick up on key 
contextual elements. 
However, other aspects of the evaluations tell a somewhat different story: most 
evaluations contain executive summaries that distilled key findings – a characteristic 
that evaluation scholars had already identified as a key prerequisite of usability 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2016), and many of the executive summaries also have an 
internal structure in order to highlight the most relevant points (such as bullet points 
or figures). By contrast, the evaluations’ ability to travel across language barriers in 
Europe is limited. Very few evaluations contain translations of their abstracts, let 
alone the whole evaluation (see Chapter 7), a phenomenon that stretches equally 
across formal and informal evaluations. The ability of climate policy evaluations to 
cross language barriers and thus governance centres therefore remains restricted and 
may indeed be one of the main obstacles to more interaction. This state of affairs 
excludes a range of actors from evaluation use and thus limits the accessibility of 
evaluative knowledge. This contrasts with Vincent Ostrom, who considered openness 
in polycentric governance especially paramount (see Chapter 2). However, given that 
many evaluations were written in English, it is of course also possible that policy 
elites across Europe and beyond will be able to engage with the evaluations even 
though they are not available in their native language (but his will unlikely hold for 
all members of the public). Finally, limited efforts to publicize evaluations to other 
governance centres is another indicator pointing in the same direction of limited 
interaction between governance centres through evaluation. 
On the second point, namely interactions through evaluation, the fact that 
formal evaluations appear to engage less with other evaluative insights from the 
same governance centre highlights that self-organization and interactions between 
governance centres are by no means independent: informal evaluations contribute 
disproportionately more to engaging with other governance centres through their 
own analysis. Thus, informal evaluations proved somewhat more outward looking 
than formal evaluations. But at the same time, both formal and informal evaluations 
are relatively weak in identifying and addressing the gaps left by the other, although 
there is a very clear difference between them in the sense that informal evaluations 
are much more likely to use data and insights from formal evaluation than vice versa. 
There are also clear limitations among both types of evaluation when it comes to 
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engaging with the experiences of other governance centres (see Chapter 7). In other 
words, the climate policy evaluations considered in this thesis appear limited because 
evaluation mainly happens within individual governance centres (in jurisdictional 
terms, as well as to a certain extent along the formal-informal distinction). From this 
point of view, one could only speak of a very limited role for climate policy 
evaluations in linking insights from different governance centres and therefore 
enabling the flow of knowledge and exchange through their own analysis.  
In summary, this analysis reconfirms that the concept of interaction between 
governance centres is by no means monolithic, as there are many potential ways in 
which climate policy evaluations may facilitate interaction (see Chapters 2 and 4). 
Both formal and informal evaluations make distinct and on the whole complementary 
contributions to interaction, but fall short of realizing their full theoretical potential. 
While formal evaluations appear to benefit from a higher level of resources that 
allow for greater methodological plurality and/or quantification, informal evaluations 
have strengths in other areas and can, for example, have a more integrative function 
because they engage more with other climate policy evaluations across governance 
centres.  
However, the collective action problem on knowledge production keeps 
surfacing in this thesis; particularly activities that would primarily benefit other 
governance centres, such as contextualizing findings, providing translations or 
publicizing findings, feature weakly across the evaluations that this thesis analyses. 
While, for example, providing evaluations in different languages comes at a cost for 
the evaluation producers, the users are typically elsewhere and may, to a certain 
extent, ‘free ride’ on the insights of others – a phenomenon that Elinor Ostrom had 
already identified as one of the potential shortcomings of polycentric climate 
governance (see E. Ostrom, 2010c). Even the fairly basic task of pooling all (or at 
least most of) the evaluative information and looking across it (in effect the task that 
this thesis begins by assembling a novel evaluation database) was previously 
neglected, meaning that there is a wealth of climate policy evaluations that had not 
been brought together systematically—although there are some limited databases 
(Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017), including those used as a data source for this thesis 
(see Chapter 4). To date, formal and informal evaluation only contribute partially to 
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addressing the collective action problem of creating and synthesizing the necessary 
evaluative knowledge on climate policy effects. 
 
8.5 Looking across the three foundational ideas 
The chapters of this thesis are structured around the three foundational ideas of 
polycentric governance – namely self-organization, context, and interaction. And yet, 
especially the sections above suggest that they are intimately linked in practice. This 
section aims to address these linkages more specifically, drawing on the evidence 
discussed above. 
First, there is the link between self-organization and context. The empirical 
evidence indicates that the self-organizing, informal evaluations tend to contextualize 
their findings more than formal evaluations. While an observation of a correlation 
cannot provide a fully satisfactory causal explanation of a possible connection, 
several additional aspects point towards a possible causal relationship. Chapter 7 has 
revealed that the difference in contextualization on the index score is mainly driven 
by greater attention to other sectors, unintended outcomes, and the political and 
institutional environment. These are, in many ways, areas of evaluation that could 
ultimately prove highly uncomfortable for formal actors, because they reveal 
unanticipated shortcomings of policy (i.e. potentially highlighting the limits of policy 
knowledge and thus decision-making), and because they address the nature of 
formal, state actors and governance structures themselves. Addressing these issues 
would require deep self-reflection and potential change, all of which are possibly 
risky activities that political actors may be keen to avoid. Further support for this 
argument emerges from the fact that informal evaluations also appear more likely to 
critically question extant policy goals; that is, they are, as Chapter 2 has highlighted, 
more reflexive. Because questioning earlier policy targets may upset existing 
political arrangements and actors, doing so may not feature strongly in formal 
evaluations.  
Second, there is a connection between self-organization and interaction 
between governance centres. In general, this link emerges in some areas, but is not 
quite as strong as in the other cases (see above and below). While informal 
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evaluations exhibit a somewhat greater propensity to integrate knowledge from 
numerous climate policy evaluations (see above), on many of the other variables, 
there are no significant differences between formal and informal evaluations. Aside 
from relatively standard activities, such as providing executive summaries in 
evaluations, both formal and informal evaluations evidently struggle or are unwilling 
to engage in the more resource-intensive activities to foster interactions in an active 
and direct way such as providing translations or engaging in active publicity of their 
results. From a theoretical standpoint, this links back to one of the most fundamental, 
underlying premises of polycentric governance, namely collective action dilemmas 
and the provision of public goods. Polycentric governance assumes interactions 
between governance centres, but the willingness and ability to foster these via 
evaluation of climate policy in the EU is evidently limited, both among state and 
societal actors. Given that much of the requisite information already exists in the 
form of evaluations at the EU level, in Germany and in the UK, the need for 
information clearing houses, such as databases, becomes ever more evident (see 
Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). Relatedly, the former President of the American 
Evaluation Association Debra Rog wrote back in 2012 that 
We are increasingly cognizant that the work we do in any single 
evaluation should have cumulative force. Single studies are rarely 
definitive, but often fit within a broader literature (Rog, 2012, p. 37). 
But it is of course an open question who ‘should’ or ‘could’ conduct these 
activities – an issue that links back with the idea of a potential network manager 
(Jordan & Schout, 2006; Jordan et al., 2018). One international actor that has already 
taken significant steps towards such network management is the Global Environment 
Facility by funding the Climate-Eval (now Environment-Eval) network.78 But as 
Schoenefeld and Jordan (2017) highlight, this network is only a single attempt to 
bring together knowledge from different evaluations. Compiling evaluations in a 
database is probably a necessary first step, but does not, in itself, let the information 
flow (the evaluations need to be used and potentially analysed for this to happen). 
                                                 
78 https://www.climate-eval.org/ 
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It is also relevant to ask at what scale it makes most sense to do so – should 
European-level or national actors (such as the European Commission, the European 
Environment Agency or the German Federal Government) bring together 
information in a database and thus act as network managers, or is this best done at 
the global level (see Mickwitz, 2006, p. 71)? The findings from the previous chapter 
suggest some ‘nesting’ of climate policy evaluation, in that it detected evaluation 
activities at both the EU level, as well as the national (Germany and the UK) level. In 
sum, interaction is fundamental for polycentric governance, but self-organization – 
as operationalized in this thesis – is making at best a very limited contribution to 
fostering it. 
Third, there is the link between context and interacting governance centres. As 
Chapter 2 has explained, this link affects the ability of lessons to travel from one 
governance centre to another in meaningful ways. Recall that Rog (2012, p. 37) 
highlighted that “[a]ttention to the contextual elements […] may help to make the 
[evaluation] findings more generalizable.” Attempts to apply far-reaching policy 
prescriptions without attention to context could amount to the ‘panacea thinking’ 
against which Elinor Ostrom and colleagues (2007) counselled extensively. The 
evidence in Chapter 7 suggests that while the general level of contextualization tends 
to be low in all evaluations, this is especially true when highlighting contextual 
aspects in policy recommendations, which is one of the more salient places where 
actors from other governance centres may look for lessons and inspiration. Overall, 
low levels of contextualization in many areas show that from a polycentric 
perspective, there are significant ways in which climate policy evaluation practice – 
and especially its outputs – could be improved. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Two key conclusions have emerged. There is indeed an emerging theoretical 
rationale for a role for ex-post policy evaluation in facilitating polycentric 
governance systems, especially in the case of climate governance. Evaluation may 
contribute to the flow of information between governance centres if its characteristics 
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support this function. This flow of information is, in turn, a key way in which 
polycentricity in climate governance may turn into polycentrism (see Chapter 1).  
Second, the empirical explorations that followed have shown that some, but not 
all, of the expectations derived from polycentric governance theory have materialized 
in climate policy evaluation output produced in the EU. While some of the 
evaluations were self-organized and others were not, a range of factors appear to 
support a linking function of evaluation across governance centres, but there are also 
key gaps on other dimensions. Policy evaluation would certainly be poorer without 
the self-organized evaluations, but the inverse also applies: formal (i.e. non-self-
organized) policy evaluations play an important role in generating and potentially 
diffusing knowledge in a polycentric climate governance system. Especially the 
question of collective action dilemmas – arguably the core point of departure of the 
polycentric approach (E. Ostrom, 1990) – has emerged as an important issue with 
regard to knowledge production and provision via evaluation. In other words, while 
self-organization may assist in resolving some of the collective action dilemma in the 
area of evaluation, it is certainly no panacea, and states will likely continue to play a 
key role in stimulating and providing evaluative insights. However, those writing on 
polycentric governance are less clear on the balance of effort between state and non-
state actors. While Elinor Ostrom has typically advocated a mix between the two, 
others have interpreted her work as an anti-state message, and thus spurred 
considerable debate (see Mansbridge, 2014). Evaluation may enable the systemic 
functions of polycentric governance by allowing lesson-drawing across centres 
without doing so in a way that ignores context, politics, values, and a range of factors 
that may help or hinder such a role. The state is likely to play a significant role in this 
process. 
This thesis uses three prominent governance centres, namely the EU level, 
Germany and the UK, as its empirical focus. The results show that evaluation output 
differs across each centre, both in numbers and in nature. In addition, there are 
notable differences between formal (i.e. state-funded) and informal (i.e. society-
funded) evaluation within each centre. This variation is expected – polycentric 
governance theory assumes different (evaluation) practices, and indeed heterogeneity 
and experimentation in different governance centres. These differences may 
ultimately even become an opportunity for learning about different ways of 
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organizing and practicing policy evaluation (see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017 for a 
related argument). The next and final chapter discusses the implications of this thesis 
from a broader perspective and starts to look ahead, both conceptually and in terms 
of policy recommendations and future work. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and New 
Directions 
9.1 Introduction 
After the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen summit to extend the Kyoto-based 
mechanisms to address climate change, many scholars suggested alternatives in the 
polycentric governance tradition (E. Ostrom, 2010c; see also Cole, 2015). But it soon 
became clear that what Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and others were proposing was 
neither theoretically fully specified, nor sufficiently empirically validated (Jordan et 
al., 2015). In and of itself, this situation already constituted a significant research 
gap, but the fact that the 2015 Paris Agreement ushered in an even more polycentric 
way of governing climate change at the international level (Oberthür, 2016) has 
further exacerbated the need for more theoretical and empirical exploration. In 
response, the core aim of this thesis is to understand what can be learnt about the 
potential and the actual role of one factor, namely policy evaluation, in facilitating 
polycentric governance. This aim led to two core objectives: 
Objective 1: To identify the key foundational ideas of polycentric governance 
theory and relate these to relevant debates on policy evaluation in order to understand 
the potential role of evaluation in facilitating climate governance.   
Objective 2: To test these theoretical expectations in the case of the European 
Union in order to understand the actual role of evaluation in climate governance. 
This chapter returns to the original research aim and to the objectives, 
discusses the findings with a view to debates in polycentric governance and policy 
evaluation literatures and then relates these insights to the broader research context. 
The chapter closes with policy recommendations and reflections on promising 
avenues for future research. 
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9.2 Reflections on the original aim and objectives 
9.2.1 The research aim 
The overall aim of this thesis is to understand precisely which factors enable 
polycentric governance systems to function, with a particular focus on the potential 
and actual role of policy evaluation. Scholars have often assumed that knowledge 
emerges and flows in polycentric governance systems, but the role of evaluation as 
an important source of knowledge in governance had not yet been fully explored. 
What have we learned from this project? This thesis is the first, to the 
knowledge of the author, to identify a substantial theoretical role for policy 
evaluation in facilitating polycentric climate governance. In developing these 
insights, this thesis significantly clarifies, specifies, and adjusts polycentric 
governance theory in order to study policy evaluation and generate a basis for 
empirical testing. Doing so demonstrates that in theory, evaluation amounts to more 
than a simple checking device at the end of a stylized policy cycle. In order to test 
the theoretical expectations from polycentric governance theory, this thesis presents 
empirical evidence from a novel database of 618 climate policy evaluations from 
three governance centres in the EU, namely the EU level, Germany and the UK. The 
following sections return to the two specific objectives of this thesis, namely 
theoretical development and empirical testing, in greater detail. 
 
9.2.2 Objective 1: Theory development: polycentrism and evaluation 
In the original reading of the theory, this thesis uncovers that polycentric 
governance builds on three core foundational ideas with crucial relevance for policy 
evaluation: (1) that actors have the willingness and ability to self-govern, (2) that 
context matters in governance, and (3) that governance centres, while formally 
independent, interact in order to harness the benefits of polycentric governance. This 
thesis specifies the three foundational ideas for the first time in order to connect with 
and structure existing debates in policy evaluation literatures (which had also begun 
to discuss the role of different evaluation actors, how context matters in evaluation, 
as well as to a lesser extent, thoughts on interaction and lesson-drawing as a function 
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of evaluation and thus hold important insights for polycentric governance and vice 
versa). This thesis is the first to develop a theoretical rationale for how the 
polycentric governance perspective helpfully illuminates the relationships among 
various debates in policy evaluation literatures (e.g., how self-organization and 
attention to context hang together), and what gaps still exist in theoretical and 
empirical explorations. 
What core theoretical lessons does this thesis derive about how evaluation 
facilitates governance from a polycentric perspective? First, rather than assuming 
that policy evaluation would be the exclusive domain of formal state actors, the 
polycentric perspective stresses the possibility that many different actors may fund 
and/or conduct evaluation, some linked to the state and some not. In other words, 
self-organized policy evaluation is an important theoretical focus, and thus 
something to explore in detail. Evaluation literatures had also already engaged with 
the idea of different actors in evaluation, particularly with a view to the level of 
independence of different evaluation actors. A distinction between formal, state 
actors and informal, societal actors had already entered policy evaluation literatures 
as early as the 1970s, and had been sporadically discussed in the intervening decades 
(see Chapter 2). This thesis re-kindles and systematizes that discussion given its 
importance from the polycentric perspective. Crucially, it highlights that the formal-
informal distinction turns out to be much more complex than first meets the eye 
because evaluation includes funders and evaluators, which can, but do not 
necessarily have to be, the same organization or individual. In order to capture the 
original impetus for evaluation, this thesis distinguishes between formal and informal 
evaluation on the basis of funding (rather than the nature of the evaluator, or whether 
or not an evaluation responds to a legal requirement). This highlights a complex 
layering of interests within evaluation endeavours, and the need to further explore the 
impetus for evaluation and its effects. 
The second foundational idea of the polycentric perspective emphasizes the 
importance of context in public policy (and thus in evaluation), but it also recognizes 
the existence of contextually-embedded lessons that may emerge from evaluation. 
This thesis reveals that both polycentric governance and policy evaluation literatures 
had already dealt with the vexed theoretical issue of context in governance, but in 
somewhat different ways. While the importance of context in determining policy 
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outcomes is in many ways one of the starting premises of polycentric governance 
(after all, if context did not matter, monocentric solutions would suffice), policy 
evaluation scholars had long debated whether public policies generate effects 
irrespective of their context on one extreme end of the spectrum, or whether policy-
making is so deeply context-dependent that the only way to understand it is from a 
historical perspective (see Chapter 2). Across the two literatures, those working on 
the issue of context turned out to be rather united in their view that ‘policy panaceas’ 
are unlikely to work regardless of the context (see E. Ostrom et al., 2007). 
Theoretical discussions (see Chapter 2) have revealed that context is often 
idiosyncratic, making it difficult to define relevant contextual aspects a priori. But 
even though context is thus highly multi-dimensional, evaluation literatures had 
nevertheless identified various aspects that prove relevant for climate change. 
Therefore, this thesis unpacks a number of potentially relevant contextual factors for 
climate change such as the nature of political institutions, external shocks or 
geography, but combines these factors with attention to indicators or metrics that 
may carry more general, albeit context-embedded, lessons. 
Third, the precise mechanisms for how governance centres interact and what 
role evaluation may play in that process had not been fully theoretically specified. 
But both the polycentric and the evaluation literatures have something to offer: while 
polycentric governance calls for interacting governance centres (but falls short on 
fully specifying the exact means to do so), policy evaluation provides a potential 
means but the respective literatures mainly focus on evaluating individual policies 
and by and large neglect larger governance issues. For evaluation, polycentric 
governance opens up the possibility that evaluation results may not only matter for 
individual policies, but that such insights could be relevant elsewhere. Such ideas 
have recently been floated in the evaluation community (Uitto, 2016). In linking 
polycentric governance and policy evaluation, the idea of lesson-drawing via 
evaluation becomes a distinct theoretical possibility from the polycentric perspective 
(see Chapter 2). This thesis specifies how evaluations (and the lessons therein) would 
have to look in order to facilitate interactions via lesson drawing. Important factors 
include contextual information, and lessons as well as potentially quantitative metrics 
that can carry more general insights, in addition items such as executive summaries 
and translations. 
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9.2.3 Objective 2: Testing the role of evaluation in climate governance 
This thesis contains a new database of climate policy evaluations at the EU 
level, in Germany and in the UK (both national level). A systematic collection 
returned 618 climate policy evaluations (from 1997–2014), more than twice what 
Huitema et al. (2011) had found between the 1990s and 2007. After a ten year hiatus 
and with fast-moving debates on the role of policy evaluation in climate governance 
(Aldy, 2014; Aldy & Pizer, 2014; Aldy & Pizer, 2015; Aldy, Pizer, & Akimoto, 
2017; Feldman & Wilt, 1996; Fransen & Cronin, 2013; Hildén et al., 2014; Hildén, 
2014; Mela & Hildén, 2012; Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017; Schoenefeld et al., 2018) 
the database is a crucial first step in anchoring these debates in more empirical 
evidence and also reflecting the fact that some of the most significant climate 
policies in the EU were put in place between 2007 and 2009 with the adoption of the 
2020 Climate and Energy Package (Jordan et al., 2010). It should also be noted, 
however, that the EU is in many ways a unique case in the sense that it exhibits both 
ambitious climate change policy, as well as evaluation capacities. However, by 
choosing Germany and the UK (national level) as the two country cases, this thesis 
cannot account for greater variation within the EU (e.g., differing evaluation 
capacities and climate policy ambition within other states, such as the new member 
states), or indeed differences within Germany and the UK at the regional or local 
level (see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017; Schoenefeld et al., 2018). These are potential 
areas for future research (see below). 
Looking across the entire database reveals that formal, state based actors 
funded the overwhelming majority of climate policy evaluations in the EU (458 in 
total). Informal (i.e. society-based) actors only financially supported a much smaller 
number of 84 evaluations (see Chapter 7).79 There is thus only limited self-
organization in climate policy evaluation. This finding only partially confirms the 
expectation from polycentric governance theory that actors are able and willing to 
self-organize their evaluation. Therefore, spontaneity in governance via evaluation is 
limited. But in line with the theoretical expectations from polycentric governance 
                                                 
79 For the remainder of the evaluations, the funder could not be determined – see Chapter 4. 
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(see Chapter 2), the 84 self-organized evaluations allow meaningful empirical 
analyses using the newly developed coding scheme (below).  
It should however also be noted that in addition to distinguishing formal and 
informal evaluations by the nature of the funder (for the full justification, see 
Chapters 1 and 2), this could have alternatively also been done by looking at the 
organizational nature of the evaluator. While this thesis assumed that funding an 
evaluation allows significant control over the evaluation outcome, it is also in 
principle possible that evaluators insert their own perspectives and evaluation 
priorities, especially if they can muster creative ways to deviate from the demands of 
their principals/funders (see Pleger & Sager, 2016). Considering the data in this 
thesis from the latter perspective would have generated vastly different results – for 
example if ‘Research institutes’, ‘Commercial consultancies’, ‘Industry Groups’, 
‘Civil Society Organizations’, and ‘Environmental Organizations’ were classed as 
‘informal evaluators’ (see also Huitema et al., 2011), then 82.8% of the evaluations 
counted in Figure 4.5 (i.e., the entire database) would have been considered 
‘informal.’ In this case, Elinor Ostrom’s arguments about the self-organizing 
capacity in evaluations would have received far greater support than is currently the 
case in this thesis. Conducting the subsequent analyses of this thesis with this 
alternative distinction between formal/informal and potentially comparing the results 
to the analyses flowing from the approach in this thesis could also generate new 
results regarding the principal-agent questions in evaluation. 
A second, significant finding reveals a close entanglement between the 
locations of the evaluation funders, the evaluators, and the climate policy under 
evaluation. Evaluation tends to happen within individual governance centres, both in 
terms of the actors that fund and ultimately conduct the evaluation, as well as in 
terms of the data that they use and where they look (or not) for additional insights on 
the policy under evaluation. Looking beyond one’s own governance centre by the 
means of evaluation is the exception rather than the norm.  
Analysing formal and informal evaluations with the coding scheme (see 
Chapter 4) reveals some similarities, but also differences between formal and 
informal actors, thus pointing to (some) heterogeneity in evaluation, as polycentric 
governance scholars would expect. Formal and informal evaluations are similar in 
terms of their focus on climate policy sub-sectors (such as renewables policy or 
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emissions trading, while neglecting for example agricultural policy) but they differ 
on other dimensions such as evaluation criteria, purposes, and methods—even within 
the single field of climate policy. Recall, however, that the evaluation of adaptation 
efforts was not included in this study – doing so may have further increased the 
diversity of evaluation, given ongoing debates about evaluating adaptation (see e.g. 
Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). Furthermore, the exclusion of evaluations that were not 
sufficiently systematic, or evaluations that are not publicly available (see Chapter 4), 
could also lead to underestimations of evaluation diversity in this thesis. But turning 
back to the data analysed here, evaluations by informal actors tend to contextualize 
(somewhat) more, but those by formal actors engage in more resource-intensive 
evaluation activities, such as using many different evaluation methods or quantifying 
their findings. Limited contextualization of policy recommendations in both informal 
and especially formal evaluations indicates that there is still a good deal of ‘panacea 
thinking’ (E. Ostrom et al., 2007) in the climate policy evaluation community, 
reducing the contribution of evaluation in realizing the theoretical benefits of 
polycentric climate governance because actors in other governance centres may 
struggle to assess to which extent the recommendations apply to their own context. 
The latter point relates to interaction between governance centres, where the 
empirical evidence suggests that the bulk of climate policy evaluations remain rather 
‘insular’ because they tend to focus on their respective governance centres, and do 
not directly engage with evaluations of other governance centres. While most formal 
and informal evaluations engage in relatively standard activities such as providing 
executive summaries or some level of recommendations (which provides some basis 
for interaction), there is much less evidence of activities such as carefully 
contextualizing policy recommendations or providing translations of the summaries 
or entire evaluations into other languages. Informal evaluations exhibit a greater 
propensity to draw on and thus engage with the findings from other evaluations. True 
to the theoretical claim that more assessment of potential contextual factors is 
advantageous in a polycentric setting, the existence of both formal and informal 
evaluation facilitates polycentric climate governance. However, climate policy 
evaluations in the EU are only partially equipped to enable the flow of knowledge 
between governance centres via evaluation, even though informal evaluations make a 
slightly stronger contribution in this regard. 
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9.2.4 Summary 
This thesis demonstrates that there is much to be gained from looking at 
evaluation’s role in climate governance from the polycentric perspective, both 
theoretically and empirically. Conceptually, the polycentric perspective proves useful 
in perceiving and disentangling various perspectives on policy evaluation that have 
so far only received limited attention. It is certainly true that polycentric governance 
remains “a veritable work in progress” (Aligica & Sabetti, 2014a, p. 5), but this 
thesis uses an approach that not only furthers existing theorizing, but also opens up 
many additional venues for further work. In introducing the polycentric governance 
approach, Chapter 2 highlighted how the Ostroms and their collaborators stressed 
“heterogeneity, diversity, context, and situational logic as critical elements in the 
analysis of institutions, governance, and collective action” (Aligica, 2014, p. 5). The 
work discussed above has – to the extent possible – attempted to work in this 
tradition, and it demonstrates the diversity and other relevant aspects with regards to 
climate policy evaluation at the EU level, in Germany and in the UK and its role in 
facilitating climate governance. The empirical findings suggest that the current 
characteristics of climate policy evaluation equip it only partially to fulfil this role.  
 
9.3 Contributions to knowledge 
The theoretical and empirical sections of this thesis develop new theoretical 
insights on the role of evaluation in facilitating polycentric climate governance and 
test them in a particular case, namely climate policy in the EU. Some, but not all of 
the theoretical expectations could be empirically validated, as for example self-
organization in evaluation remains limited. This section explores some of the broader 
contributions of these insights to the various original strands of literature first 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
9.3.1 Contributions to the policy evaluation literatures 
In the past, policy evaluation literatures have either discussed and developed 
evaluation methods and content (e.g., Mickwitz, 2003; Patton, 2008; Pawson & 
295 
Tilley, 1997), or have they focused on the institutions (e.g., the European 
Commission) and the actors who advocate, conduct, and use evaluation (see 
Mickwitz, 2013; Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). The polycentric governance 
perspective helps to recombine various existing strands of the policy evaluation 
literature into a more comprehensive theory-driven framework. This approach 
contributes a fresh perspective to the evaluation literatures because it accounts for 
why numerous evaluation characteristics are relevant not only in and of themselves 
(or for more circumscribed theoretical aspects in debates on evaluation), but rather 
for the functioning of polycentric governance as a greater whole. Polycentric 
governance theory is thus a useful tool for re-ordering and systematizing numerous 
debates in evaluation literatures and their corresponding empirical explorations. 
This thesis is the first to research the need to distinguish between formal and 
informal evaluation on the basis of evaluation financing (rather than the nature of the 
actors that ultimately conduct the evaluation). In so doing, it demonstrates that there 
are important and underappreciated connections between the actors that fund and/or 
conduct evaluations and the evaluation methods and content. For instance, formally-
funded evaluations quantify more and use a greater number of methods, while 
informally-funded evaluations tend to use more criteria and produce, on average, 
more recommendations. These links have consequences for the role of evaluation in 
polycentric governance systems given that not all actors appear to produce 
evaluations with the same characteristics.  
These insights chime with an emerging debate that evaluation often involves 
multiple actors and thus principal-agent relationships; after some early empirical 
explorations (see Hayward et al., 2013), these relationships have only recently 
attracted more explicit theorizing (see Pleger & Sager, 2016). These dynamics also 
appear in the climate change sector. There are no unitary actors with unitary 
motivations behind most climate policy evaluations; at the very least, there are 
potentially complex principal-agent relationships underlying the production of 
climate policy evaluations. What constitutes ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ evaluation is 
furthermore closely bound up with a definition of the state and what constitutes 
‘state’ and ‘non-state.’ For example, many civil society organizations receive public 
funds, or connect with state institutions in one way or another (see Greenwood, 
2011). This thesis makes concrete, empirical suggestions on how to better distinguish 
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between formal and informal evaluation. This distinction is important because both 
types of evaluation are qualitatively different on dimensions that matter for the 
facilitation of polycentric governance. However, alternative ways of distinguishing 
between formal and informal evaluation (such as focusing on the nature of the 
evaluators) could unearth additional insights, for example to what extent evaluators 
may be able to strengthen or counteract the influence of their funders (e.g., are 
mainly society-based evaluators still relatively independent when using government 
funds for an evaluation?). Furthermore, it may have been somewhat more 
straightforward to identify the organizational category of the evaluating organization 
(as the evaluator is normally mentioned in an evaluation), as opposed to the funder 
(note that doing so may have reduced the substantial number of evaluations – 74 in 
total, or 11.97% of the database). Thus, more data would have been available for 
analysis. 
One important area of difference between formal and informal evaluation is 
context. Three contextual variables, namely attention to other sectors, unintended 
side effects, and the political environment mainly drive the difference between 
formal and informal evaluations in considering the context of the policies they study. 
Informal evaluations contextualize more in areas that are especially political, and 
where governmental actors may not wish to shine a strong spotlight. These areas are 
especially political because unintended side effects may reveal the inability of public 
actors to anticipate or control a range of policy effects; they may also not appreciate 
learning about such effects in other sectors, or being exposed to argumentation on the 
political environment, which they inhabit and know well. Policy evaluation in 
climate governance thus differs from the earlier discussions on monitoring in 
common pool resource systems advanced by the Ostroms. Elinor Ostrom typically 
wrote of the local context, such as the nature of the resource being managed (it 
makes a difference whether one is managing a population of lobsters or a pasture), 
the specific techniques used for monitoring as a function of the resource and so forth, 
but she put less emphasis on political elements. This thesis shows that the latter 
become an important ingredient of lesson-drawing in polycentric governance, but 
formal actors are not very well inclined to provide them in relation to climate policy. 
In sum, this thesis proposes to conceptualize and study evaluation as an 
integral part of governance processes – a practice of enlightenment on policy effects 
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that is, by its very definition and ultimate purpose, a value-driven and therefore 
political endeavour. While evaluation is about judgement, polycentric governance is 
about structure and ordering of governance, as well as the related processes of 
experimentation, competition, and innovation. This thesis demonstrates how the 
‘valuing’ in evaluation becomes relevant for polycentric governance. Evaluation can 
answer questions like ‘Why did they do what they did in their governance centre? 
What values was a climate policy based upon, what visions of politics and its 
institutions and to what extent do these experiences bear relevance and lessons for 
other governance centres?’ Understanding evaluation in this way moves significantly 
beyond considering ‘one evaluation at a time,’ and investigates the cumulative effect 
of numerous evaluations (see Rist & Stame, 2011). This is a much-needed 
perspective in times of rising evaluation output, but little theorization and empirical 
exploration of its broader governance role. 
 
9.3.2 Contributions to polycentric governance theory 
Numerous scholars had made the point that polycentric governance theory—
and especially climate change governance theory—would benefit from much more 
theoretical explication and empirical application. While Aligica and Sabetti (2014a, 
p. 5) wrote that “the Ostroms left behind a veritable work in progress”, Elinor 
Ostrom (2014b, p. 84) herself stressed that “a complete inventory […] [of climate 
governance efforts] would be a good subject for a future research project.” 
Furthermore, Jordan et al. (2015) emphasized that the emergence of increasingly 
polycentric governance arrangements in the area of climate change governance cries 
out for empirical exploration, because many of its underlying assumptions had only 
scarcely, if at all, been tested. 
This thesis contributes knowledge on a growing, but so far largely neglected 
activity with high relevance to polycentric governance: policy evaluation. In so 
doing, this thesis disentangles and refines three foundational ideas of polycentric 
governance. These refinements demonstrate that, first, ‘self-governance’ takes on a 
new and different meaning in international climate governance arrangements where 
states, interest groups, industry associations, and other types of organizations 
dominate. The constitution of the ‘self’ becomes more difficult to apply. In other 
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words, who is the ‘self’ that is monitoring or evaluating? Is it enough to have non-
governmental or civil society organizations conduct policy evaluation? In the 
German context, evaluators had already been debating this very question 
(Struhkamp, 2007). Because policy evaluation is typically conducted by 
organizations or institutions that involve many individuals and that have existing 
(political) interests and relationships with other institutions, the idea of self-
organization can only be applied in a very general sense to evaluation. Whereas in 
the case of common pool resource governance systems the interests of the 
individuals monitoring fisheries or water management are relatively clearly defined 
and generally in line with the interests of the overall system (i.e. they aim to ensure 
that the appropriation of common resources remains within self-determined limits), 
in the case of climate policy evaluation, such an alignment of interests cannot readily 
be assumed. The involvement of different institutions and/or individuals in 
evaluation cannot guarantee a unitary interest among all those involved in financing, 
conducting, and/or using the evaluations (see Pleger & Sager, 2016). These 
principal-agent dynamics are therefore a key area for future work in the context of 
polycentric governance (see below).  
The distinction between formal and informal actors based on evaluation 
funding (see Chapter 4), allows exploring the role of the state in climate policy 
evaluation and, by extension, in polycentric climate governance. Overall, the 
overwhelming majority of formal evaluations (compared to informal evaluations - 
see Chapter 7) reveals de-facto a strong role for the state in climate policy evaluation 
in the EU. States finance and/or conduct most of the climate policy evaluation in the 
EU. But this is by no means an exclusive role, as informal (i.e. non-state) actors are 
also involved. Their involvement emerges not only in terms of the number of 
evaluations that they produce, but also in how they evaluate. Especially the more 
‘political’ elements that are often neglected in formal evaluations are more central in 
informal evaluations (see above).  
Both scholars arguing for a role of the state in monitoring and evaluation 
activities (see Mansbridge, 2014) and those with a more sceptical orientation (E. 
Ostrom, 2005) have thus identified relevant actors in polycentric climate governance 
whose activities turn out, in the end, to be rather complementary than antagonistic in 
the case of climate policy in the EU (see Chapter 8). From a polycentric perspective, 
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greater pluralism in climate policy evaluation in terms of criteria, methods, and 
actors resulting from the involvement of both state and non-state actors ultimately 
means broader (but as this thesis demonstrates not necessarily comprehensive) 
evaluative coverage of the many potential effects of climate policies, and this is 
where non-state actors contribute significantly to the variety of evaluation. 
Furthermore, Chapter 2 reveals that the means of interaction between 
governance centres had remained, by and large, under-specified in existing 
polycentric governance literatures. Scholars in the polycentric tradition often 
highlight the (normative) need for such interactions, or implicitly assume their 
existence, but had not yet done sufficient work to test their existence and nature 
empirically. Vincent Ostrom writes about individuals that may serve as bridges 
between governance centres and Elinor Ostrom floats the idea of newsletters (E. 
Ostrom, 2005, p. 280) to carry experiences from one centre to another. But these 
discussions remained too general and too unspecific to derive clear findings. This 
thesis shows that policy evaluation has considerable theoretical potential to 
contribute to such interactions, but that in light of the empirical evidence, this 
potential has at best only been partially developed in the EU.  
The idea of interaction between governance centres probably comes closest to 
the Ostroms’ thinking in its application of polycentric governance theory to climate 
change in this thesis. Yet, it has also not been easy or straightforward to adjust the 
concept. First, there is the vexed question of who or what qualifies as a ‘governance 
centre’ (see Chapter 2). This thesis has pragmatically defined three governance 
centres as the EU level, Germany (national level) and the UK (national level), 
especially because the national level is where the bulk of the literatures on policy 
evaluation concentrates, although there is some ‘nesting’ of evaluation activities (see 
Chapter 3). The thesis demonstrates that key concepts from polycentric governance 
theory can be usefully adapted to this operationalization, but this is by no means the 
only level where insights on the role of policy evaluation apply. What defines an 
interaction and where that interaction happens is, again, an area of definitional and 
empirical exploration, and what has been done in this thesis is one, but certainly not 
the only way to do so. Explorations across other types of governance centres and 
across other levels (such as the regional/local and the international level), or the links 
between different ‘domains’ of polycentric governance such as the ‘transnational’ 
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and the ‘nation state’ domains as a function of policy evaluation could be further 
explored (Jordan et al., 2018). 
There are also important questions on the idea of a higher-level jurisdiction 
(see Chapter 2). This thesis shows that states play an important role in funding 
evaluations, and therefore providing a source of information (Mansbridge, 2014), but 
this is by no means an exclusive or exhaustive role. Actors at the EU level were by 
and large the only ones to venture beyond their own governance centre in terms of 
funding evaluators in other governance centres. Therefore, the EU level appears to 
fulfil some of the functions of a higher-level jurisdiction in climate policy because it 
looks across several governance centres, but it also leaves important gaps. Crucially, 
neither formal nor informal actors played strong roles in systematically bringing 
evaluative knowledge together in the form of databases or other knowledge-sharing 
platforms (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). In other words, a significant task ascribed 
to higher-level jurisdictions by the theory – namely bringing evaluative insights from 
different governance centres together in useful ways – remains, by and large, 
unfulfilled in the EU, and therefore detracts from realising the putative benefits of 
polycentric governance. This significant shortcoming is notable for the EU, which 
has long sought to portray itself as a climate change governance leader (T. Rayner & 
Jordan, 2013; Wurzel & Connelly, 2011). 
The fact that this thesis has pointed to shortcomings of polycentric governance 
(and its relationship to evaluation) demonstrates a need to both improve evaluation 
(see below in the section on policy recommendations), but also and crucially to 
continue developing the emerging theory of polycentric governance. While this 
thesis has attempted to address one influential line of criticism, namely the lack of 
empirical explorations of real-world examples of polycentric governance (see for 
example Jordan et al., 2015; Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt, & Forster, 2018; Morrison, 
2017), additional lines of criticism of polycentric governance include its insufficient 
theorization (e.g. Carlisle & Gruby, 2017), meaning that many of the propositions or 
attributes of polycentric governance had not been fully developed, thus making it 
difficult to assess the performance of polycentric governance systems. Here, again, 
this thesis has made a key contribution by considering the role of policy evaluation 
as an important factor. Last, scholars have admonished the lack of attention to power 
dynamics in literatures on polycentric governance (e.g. Morrison et al., 2017; 
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Singleton, 2017). The argument goes that much of existing debates on (polycentric) 
governance often assume relatively equally powerful actors, which is often not the 
case (see Partzsch, 2017). There is ample room to explore these dynamics further in 
the future, especially with a view to the relationship of policy evaluation and 
power/control, which is increasingly drawing interest (see Duffy, 2017). 
 
9.4 Policy recommendations 
This thesis documents a wealth of climate policy evaluations between 1997 and 
2014. But it also identifies a lack of sustained effort by actors to systematically bring 
that knowledge together in the form of databases or other knowledge sharing 
platforms. Therefore, the first recommendation is to create and maintain a publicly 
accessible climate policy evaluation database, which incorporates both formal and 
informal evaluations from the EU and if possible beyond. Network-managing actors 
such as the European Commission or the European Environment Agency may be 
candidates for this crucial task, but other informal (i.e. non-state) actors may also in 
principle step up. A (still limited) but good example of how this may look is the 
‘Forschungsradar’ database with evaluations on the German Energiewende.80 Based 
on the empirical insights from this thesis, doing so would be a starting point for 
formal and/or informal actors to conduct meta analyses in order to draw important 
insights from the well over 600 evaluations identified since the early 1990s, plus any 
additional ones published since 2014. A similar question applies to the international 
level – who can oversee and systematize the evaluations emerging from the Paris 
Agreement review and transparency processes? Would the UNFCCC play an 
important role as a network manager, or would non-state actors step up their efforts? 
The categories developed in the novel coding scheme in this thesis could serve as a 
way to assess the quality of the evaluations in the database, for example on the extent 
to which they contextualize their findings or provide translations into other 
languages. 
                                                 
80 http://www.forschungsradar.de 
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For formal and informal actors in particular governance centres, this thesis 
recommends to use evaluation more actively in order to look beyond one’s own 
immediate horizon. But doing so should incorporate paying attention to the context 
from which insights from other governance centres emerged and assess to what 
extent contextual similarities allow for lesson-drawing (or not). This is to avoid 
applying generic policy lessons without much knowledge of how these lessons came 
about in the first place. Thus, rather than working from the notion of ‘one policy, one 
evaluation,’ actors in any one governance centre would start from the notion of ‘one 
policy, many evaluations,’ and thereby acknowledge the growing plurality of 
evaluations and their corresponding insights. Analogously, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that rather than working from the assumption of ‘one evaluation, one 
(intended) user,’ the polycentric perspective would suggest ‘one evaluation, many 
users.’ But a crucial question is of course who would step up to overcome the 
collective action problem that invariably emerges when there are many different 
potential users who do not directly contribute to the evaluation? 
The third recommendation is that while policy evaluation may facilitate 
polycentric climate governance, in the context of the EU, evaluation is certainly no 
panacea to address climate change and should thus not be viewed or understood as 
such. From the (arguably normative) perspective of polycentric climate governance 
in the EU, climate policy evaluation exhibits some, but not necessarily all the 
characteristics that would allow it to contribute strongly to the emergence of a 
polycentric governance system. For example, current climate policy evaluation in the 
EU by and large neglects certain sub-sectors (such as waste or agriculture), and many 
evaluations do not contextualize enough in order to enable lesson drawing in the way 
that this thesis proposes. While it has become fashionable to look to the EU and its 
constituent parts to derive policy lessons for other systems (Benson & Lorenzoni, 
2014; Wyns, 2015), this thesis tells a more cautionary tale of the functioning of 
polycentric climate governance in the EU than others have done before (Cole, 2015; 
E. Ostrom, 2010c; see T. Rayner & Jordan, 2013) because some of its elements – 
notably evaluation – do not fully meet the expectations advanced by polycentric 
governance theory. 
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9.5 New research priorities 
This thesis has laid a new foundation for future research to further the 
relationship between polycentric governance and policy evaluation. Based on the 
theoretical discussions and the empirical evidence, this thesis proposes five priority 
areas for further work: assessing causality; exploring evaluation use in polycentric 
systems; exploring additional aspects relevant for polycentric governance; linkages 
with other actors and practices; and studying other policy areas beyond climate 
change. This section discusses each area in turn. 
The first area for future research involves exploring how and why the 
evaluation patterns and characteristics emerge in the first place. For example, what 
factors stimulate or inhibit self-organization in evaluation? Is the smaller number of 
informal evaluations due to a lower willingness to evaluate by informal actors, a lack 
of adequate resources, or perhaps even a lack of sufficient openness of the 
polycentric system? This thesis has assumed funding as an important impetus for 
evaluation, but how does its influence fare in comparison to other factors? Are there 
too few openings for informal actors to become involved in climate governance in 
the EU vis-à-vis evaluation? Recall that Vincent Ostrom had stressed that polycentric 
governance systems need to be sufficiently open to new actors in order to function 
(V. Ostrom, 1999a; V. Ostrom, 1999b). Similarly, why do we observe the strong 
congruence between the locations of the evaluation funders, the evaluators, as well as 
the focus of the climate policy under evaluation? Furthermore, researchers should 
explore what drives the correlations between self-organization and context, meaning 
that informal evaluations contextualize their findings more than formal evaluations 
on various dimensions? Galaz et al. (2012) argue that information sharing within 
polycentric governance system may eventually lead to stronger forms of 
collaboration, such as joint projects. But can such developments be empirically 
detected as a function of evaluation? This thesis has laid the groundwork to explore 
such causal mechanisms in climate governance in the EU and potentially elsewhere. 
Detailed process tracing and qualitative interview work with evaluation funders, 
evaluators and (potential) users could shed further light on these important questions 
and could complement the initial and thus partial perspective of this thesis (see 
Chapter 4). 
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Working towards more causal explanations could also involve considering 
alternatives to the differentiation between formal and informal evaluation based on 
evaluation funding. Alternatives include considering the nature of the actor that 
conducts the evaluation (for a more detailed discussion of this aspect, see Chapter 8), 
looking at the presence of legal requirements (see for example Wirths, Rosser, 
Horber-Papazian, & Mader, 2017), or measuring self-organization on a scale rather 
than with binary codes. For example, one could assess the degree to which an actor 
depends on public money, or has independence from policy-makers. Doing so would 
be enormously challenging given that these data would have to be generated through 
surveys or interviews—a notoriously difficult exercise, as Löwenbein (2008) 
experienced when he received a survey response rate of just 5% among professional 
evaluators in Germany—but an endeavour that could ultimately explain the finding 
that the formal-informal distinction also appears to blur in practice. For example, 
many Brussels-based interest groups receive significant funding from the EU 
institutions (see Greenwood, 2011). The empirical difficulty to categorize 
evaluations as either ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ necessitates exploring alternative 
categorizations and their consequences for evaluation production and use. Especially 
the principal-agent relationships, which have remained outside the scope of this 
thesis (see Pleger & Sager, 2016), are ripe for further assessment, including how they 
relate to polycentric governance arrangements. Exploring such causal mechanisms 
would work towards a deeper understanding of the origins of polycentric climate 
governance, and it could also enable prediction of future governance outcomes under 
certain conditions. 
The second priority for future research involves exploring actual uses of 
evaluation knowledge in polycentric governance systems. It is a challenging, but 
nevertheless highly pertinent task to study whether the insights and recommendations 
from the evaluations actually translate into policy use and thus change  (e.g. Johnson 
et al., 2009; van Voorst & Zwaan, 2018), while keeping in mind the full range of 
scholarship on knowledge utilization (see for example Rich, 1991; Rich, 1997). 
While the current thesis has probed interactions between governance centres directly 
through evaluation, as well as the potential for interaction as a function of evaluation 
characteristics, the next logical step involves investigating whether certain evaluation 
characteristics – such as for example the presence of executive summaries, 
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translations, or recommendations – actually translate into greater use (or its 
improvement). More interpretivist research approaches may also consider how 
different actors construct the concept of ‘evaluation use,’ and how these 
constructions impact on the evaluation process more generally. This could also link 
with an assessment of the various discourses that connect with evaluation (see Duffy, 
2017). Research on evaluation use could thus significantly extend our understanding 
of interactions in polycentric governance systems and therefore ultimately allow 
much more definitive assessments of their effectiveness. 
The third priority area involves exploring additional aspects that have gained 
increasing prominence in more recent debates on polycentric governance. Since the 
work on this thesis began in late 2013, Jordan et al. (2018) have for example 
identified five core theoretical ‘propositions’ related to polycentric governance 
theory, namely ‘local action’, ‘mutual adjustment’, ‘experimentation’, ‘trust’, and 
‘overarching rules.’ While this thesis has explored some of these propositions with 
particular relevance to policy evaluation in detail, others have a theoretically much 
wider scope, but would equally benefit from much closer investigation with a view to 
evaluation. These include notably the roles of experimentation, trust and overarching 
rules. To date, little has, for example, been said about the link between governance 
experimentation and evaluation (see Bernstein & Hoffmann, 2018), and there is a 
dearth of work on potential links between evaluation and trust, as well as how the 
concepts of policy evaluation and overarching rules may hang together. Likewise, 
evaluation may have to play an important role in generating trust, which Dorsch and 
Flachsland (2017) highlight as one of the key ingredients of governance systems. 
And policy evaluation may help build trust – recall Chelimsky (2006, p. 54), who 
writes that in democracies “[i]t is distrust, once again, that generates the deepest 
constituency for evaluation.” Furthermore, Chapter 2 briefly discussed questions on 
the accountability and legitimacy of polycentric governance arrangements. There is 
now an emerging debate on these concepts with a view to polycentric governance 
(Bäckstrand et al., 2018), and it would be useful to explicitly connect the thinking on 
evaluation in polycentric governance with these debates in order to widen the 
thinking on roles for evaluation in polycentric governance. For example, the fact that 
there is a significant number of informal evaluations indicates that policy evaluation 
could support horizontal accountability mechanisms in polycentric arrangements and 
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thus point to the emergence of new accountability chains that may better fit the 
nature of polycentric systems (see Chapter 2).  In other words, further explorations of 
the effects of evaluation in polycentric governance systems would be helpful – 
including potentially the relationship between evaluation and control and/or 
transformation (see Duffy, 2017) in polycentric settings. 
The fourth priority includes studying various forms of linkages between 
different evaluation actors in polycentric governance, where the debate is advancing 
quickly, but where evaluation has been little discussed (see Pattberg, Chan, 
Sanderink, & Widerberg, 2018). For instance, while there has certainly been 
increasing ‘supply’ and professionalization of evaluation activities around Europe 
(Brandt, 2009; Summa & Toulemonde, 2002), particularly through the establishment 
of the European Evaluation Society81 and many national evaluation organizations 
(see also Duscha et al., 2009; Pollitt, 1998), we know too little about the extent to 
which these activities in organized evaluation societies correspond with policy 
evaluation practices in the European Commission, in other European institutions, in 
the Member States, as well as with the multiple informal actors that this thesis has 
identified – and thus potentially misses important interactions within the evaluation 
community. For example, evidence from Germany suggests that the evaluators that 
the state uses to conduct evaluations do not necessarily interact with evaluation 
societies (Duscha et al., 2009). The nature of these interactions remains to be 
explored in the case of climate change with the aim of working towards a fuller 
understanding of policy evaluation in Europe. 
Linkages also matter with a view to other—and related—forms of policy 
assessment. For example, in the area of climate change governance, there is a huge 
gap in exploring how (ex-ante) impact assessments (see Radaelli, 2010; Turnpenny 
et al., 2016) connect with (ex-post) policy evaluations, including in the context of 
polycentric governance. For example, as Fritsch and colleagues (2013, p. 450) 
propose, a key way to assess the quality of ex-ante assessments would be to compare 
their estimates of policy effects with the findings of ex-post evaluations. The current 
                                                 
81 http://www.europeanevaluation.org/ 
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database of ex-post policy evaluations is a vital building block and indeed pre-
condition for this type of research in the climate policy domain. 
The final type of future work involves extending the theoretical and empirical 
insights from this thesis to other policy areas in order to assess whether the 
characteristics of evaluation in the climate sector – such as limited contextualization 
and potential for interaction, but also differences between formal and informal 
evaluations – hold in other cases. An area for potential comparative work may be 
ocean governance, which is a global issue where scholars have already explored 
aspects of polycentric governance (e.g., Galaz et al., 2012; Morrison, 2017). 
Comparison may help to identify whether evaluation amounts to a necessary 
condition for polycentric governance. 
In closing, this thesis has thus not only covered important theoretical and 
empirical ground with a view to evaluation in polycentric (climate) governance, but 
it has also opened up numerous avenues for future research. In doing so, it 
contributes to a collective endeavour to address climate change and therefore work 
towards the successful implementation of polycentric climate governance through the 
Paris Agreement and potentially well beyond. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure A1.1: Use of the terms ‘polycentricity’, ‘polycentrism’ and ‘polycentricism’ in Google Books, 1940-200882 
 
Source: This graph was generated using the Google Books NGram technology. For further information, see http://books.google.com/ngrams and (Michel et al., 2011); y-axis 
represents % of all n-grams (in this case, one-word unigrams, or search terms).
                                                 
82 Data were available from 1800 – 2008 at the time of writing; given virtually no use of the search terms before 1940, I chose to display 1940-2008. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A2.1: Climate policy evaluation database: list of sources 
Organization type Germany United Kingdom EU level 
Government  Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety 
 Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy 
 Federal Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 
 Inter-ministerial working group 
on CO2 reduction 
 Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) 
 DEFRA 
 HMRC 
 Department for Transport 
 European Commission 
o DG Clima 
o DG Regio 
o DG Energy 
o DG Trade 
o DG Move 
o DG Agriculture 
o DG Environment 
o DG Health & Food 
Safety 
o DG Mare 
o DG Growth (Internal 
Market) 
o Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) 
 European Council 
Parliaments & 
Parliamentary 
Bodies 
 German Bundestag 
 German Bundesrat 
 House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee 
 House of Commons EFRA committee 
 European Parliament 
o Committee on the 
Environment, Public 
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 German Bundestag – 
Environment Committee 
 German Bundestag – Economy 
and Energy Committee 
 German Bundestag – Food and 
Agriculture Committee 
 German Bundestag – Transport 
& Digital Infrastructure 
Committee 
 House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee 
 House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 
 House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Committee 
 House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 
 House of Commons Transport 
Committee 
 House of Lords EU Select Committee 
and Energy and Environment Sub-
Committee 
Health and Food 
Safety 
o Committee on 
Industry, Research and 
Energy 
o Temporary Committee 
on Climate Change 
o Committee on 
Transport and Tourism 
o Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 European Parliament Research 
Service 
Government 
agency/bank 
 Sachverständigenrat für 
Umweltfragen (German 
Advisory Council on the 
Environment) 
 National Climate Protection 
Initiative 
 German Environmental 
Protection Agency (UBA) 
 German Energy Agency 
 German Advisory Council on 
Economy and Energy 
 German Advisory Council on 
Global Change 
 UK Environment Agency 
 Low Carbon Innovation Coordination 
Group 
 UK Sustainable Development 
Commission 
 Carbon Trust 
 Ofgem 
 Energy Savings Trust 
 UK Climate Change Committee 
 Renewable Fuels Agency 
 Green Investment Bank 
 European Environment 
Agency 
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 German Advisory Council for 
Agriculture, Food and Consumer 
Protection 
 KFW Bank 
Courts & Scrutiny 
Bodies 
 Bundesrechnungshof  UK National Audit Office 
 UK Audit Commission 
 European Court of Auditors 
Private 
consultancy 
 Ecofys 
 Arepo Consult 
 Prognos AG 
 GfK 
 Ipsos Mori 
 Eunomia 
 Frontier Economics 
 Ecofys 
 Golder Associates 
 Cambridge Econometrics 
 Future Energy Solutions 
 Enviros Consulting 
 Oxera Consulting 
 McKinsey 
 IPA Advisory Limited 
 NERA Economic Consulting 
 Ricardo Consulting 
 Ricardo Energy & Environment 
 LEK Consulting 
 Eoin Lees Energy 
 ADAS Consulting 
 Phylipsen Climate Change Consulting 
 ICF International 
 Ecofys 
Non-governmental 
organization 
 Germanwatch 
 Öko Institute 
 UK Green Alliance 
 Carbon Connect 
 Open Europe 
 Greenpeace (EU) 
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 ADAC Germany 
 Greenpeace (Germany) 
 WWF Germany 
 BUND (Friends of the Earth 
Germany) 
 Centre for Sustainable Energy 
 Sandbag 
 WWF UK 
 Greenpeace UK 
 Friends of the Earth UK 
 E3G 
 Policy Exchange 
 What about those affiliated to political 
parties, eg SERA? 
 Transport & Environment 
 European Environmental 
Bureau 
 Friends of the Earth Europe 
 Climate Action Network 
Europe 
 WWF European Policy Office 
 CEE Bankwatch Network 
Private Sector 
Interest Group 
 The Federation of German 
Industry (BDI) 
 Bundesverband Erneuerbare 
Energien e.V. 
 The Confederation of British Industry 
 Engineering Employers Federation 
 Energy UK 
 Business Europe 
 European Wind Energy 
Association 
 ePURE (European Renewable 
Ethanol) 
 AEBIOM (European Biomass 
Association) 
 EUREC (The Association of 
European Renewable Energy 
Centres) 
 ACEA (European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association) 
 Verband der 
Automobilindustrie (German 
Automobile Manufacturers 
Association) 
Research 
institute/university 
 Ecologic Institute 
 Fraunhofer Institute 
 Institute of European Environmental 
Policy 
 UK Energy Research Centre 
 Institute of European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP) 
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 German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW) 
 Bremen Energy Institute 
 Centre for Solar Energy and 
Hydrogen Research 
 Rhine-Westphalian Institute for 
Economic Research (RWI) 
 Forschungszentrum Jülich 
 Institute for Resource Efficiency 
and Energy Strategies (IREES) 
 Institute for Ecological 
Economic Research (IÖW) 
 Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy 
 Grantham Institute 
 Tyndall Centre 
 UK Climate Impacts Programme 
(UKCIP) 
 NatCen 
 Policy Studies Institute 
 UCL Energy Institute 
 Environmental Change Institute 
 UCL Environment Institute 
 Centre for Sustainable Energy 
 Institute for Public Policy Research 
 
 Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) 
 Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) 
Existing database  ADAM Project database 
 Monitoring Mechanism report to 
European Environment Agency 
 Energiewende Studies Database 
(Forschungsradar) 
 ADAM Project database 
 Monitoring Mechanism report to 
European Environment Agency 
 UK National Archives 
 Warren (2014) on demand-side response 
studies 
 
 ADAM Project database 
 Commission Smart 
Regulation/Evaluation 
Database 
 Mastenbroek et al. (2015) 
database (publication in JEPP) 
 Commission Multi-Annual 
Overview of Evaluations & 
Impact Assessments (2002-
2009) 
 Eureval Database 
 EU Climate Policy Biography 
(EUI) 
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Other  Heinrich Böll Foundation 
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
 Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung 
 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
 Friedrich Naumann Stiftung 
 Anglo-German Foundation  EUFORES (The European 
Forum for Renewable Energy 
Sources) 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1: The Coding Scheme 
 
Sub-dimensions - Potential 
operationalization  
Coding: i.e. how will each sub-dimension be done in 
practice? 
Score Examples/page numbers for evidence. 
Time (historical developments) 
 
Length of time (retrospective) considered in the 
evaluation: 1 = (snapshot evaluation); 2 = >0 – 5 years; 
3 = 6-10 years; 4 = 11-15 years; 5 = 16 – 20 years; 6 =  
>20 years 
 
  
Policy goals (intended outcomes) 
 
Scale (separate evaluation for each dimension) – 5 point 
Likert with the following anchors: 
0 = No reference to dimension (e.g. history, policy 
goals, etc.) 
1 = Dimension discussed, but not explanation of how 
this dimension impacts policy outcomes (e.g., as part of 
general intro/overview) 
2 = Dimension discussed, but limited explanation of 
how this dimension impacts policy outcomes (e.g., as 
part of general overview/intro) 
3 = Dimension discussed, and good explanation of how 
this dimension impacts policy outcomes (e.g., as part of 
general overview/intro) 
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4 = Dimension discussed + impact on policy outcomes 
evaluated 
Policies in other sectors 
(interactions?) 
See above.   
Unintended policy outcome(s) See above.   
External events/circumstances See above.   
Political environment/structures See above.   
Geography See above.   
Scientific findings (e.g., climate 
science) 
See above.   
Evaluation methods used (list all) 
(Categorical) 
Document analysis (lit review, case study) 
Modelling 
CBA 
Questionnaire/interviews 
Social experiment 
Stakeholder review/input 
Expert review/input 
Other/not specified. 
  
Number of methods used Record number.   
Evaluation criteria used: 
(Categorical) 
Effectiveness & goal attainment 
Coordination w/ other policies 
Fairness (incl. windfall profits, equity) 
Cost effectiveness 
Efficiency (incl. competitiveness, price impact) 
Legitimacy 
Accountability 
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Transparency 
Other/not specified 
 
Number of evaluation criteria. Record number.   
Side effects Yes/no   
Evaluation method: To what extent 
is the evaluation ‘tailored’ to the 
particular context in which the 
policy is placed? Routine instrument 
or fine-tuned? 
 
Likert Scale 
0 = No fine tuning (off-the-shelf method/model) 
1 = Some fine tuning (e.g., general approach used, but 
some minor adjustments; e.g., some model calibration 
or choice of methods) 
2 = Extensive fine-funding (more complex methods 
chosen/developed with a strong view to contextual 
effects/specific question) 
  
Reflexivity: existing policy targets 
considered as ‘given’ or critically 
evaluated? 
 
 
Likert scale 
1 = Policy goals accepted as given criteria for 
evaluation 
2 = Policy goals critically questioned 
3 = Policy goals critically questioned + alternative 
goals proposed 
  
Stated or implied purpose of the 
evaluation 
(Categorical) 
1 = To satisfy a (legal) reporting requirement 
2 = Accountability 
3 = Improving policy/learning 
4 = None/not clear 
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Stated or implied target audience of 
the evaluation 
(Categorical; multiple mentions 
possible) 
1 = Politicians (more general discussion) 
2 = Policy-makers (bureaucrats) – fairly technical 
discussion 
3 = The wider public 
4 = Not clear 
  
Is the evaluation a legal 
requirement? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
  
Evaluation a continuous or one-off 
activity? 
0 = No evidence of prior/subsequent evaluation 
activities 
1 = Evidence of prior/subsequent evaluation activities 
 
  
For informal evaluation: Does 
informal evaluation attempt to 
identify and fill gaps left by 
‘formal’ evaluation activities? 
Likert scale 
0 = No gaps in ‘formal’ evaluation identified  
1 = Gaps identified 
2 = Gaps identified and addressed  
  
Reference to evaluation studies 
conducted in other centres (but 
focusing on the same centre) 
 
 
Likert scale 
0 = No reference 
1 = Limited, shallow reference (e.g., briefly mentioned) 
2 = Good attention to studies from other goverance 
centres 
3 = Extensive attention to other studies (description of 
the study/findings AND connection with analysis of the 
‘own’ governance centre) 
  
Reference to evaluation studies 
focusing on or general experiences 
in other centres. 
 
Likert scale 
0 = No reference 
1 = Limited, shallow reference (e.g., briefly mentioned) 
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2 = Good attention to studies focusing on other 
governance centres 
3 = Extensive attention to other governance centres 
(description of the study/findings AND connection with 
analysis of the ‘own’ governance centre) 
To what extent do ‘formal’ 
evaluations draw on information 
from ‘informal’ evaluation and vice 
versa? 
Likert scale 
0 = no use of informal/formal data 
1 = some use of formal/informal data (e.g., background) 
2 = extensive use of formal/informal data (e.g., data 
used in core analyses) 
  
Is there some common metric (e.g., 
quantification?) that can be used to 
compare across governance centres? 
Likert scale 
0 = no common metric used 
1 = 1 common metric used 
2 = 2 common metrics used 
3 = 3 common metrics used 
4 = 4+ common metrics used 
  
Are there key 
lessons/Recommendations for 
others or the policy itself? 
Likert scale 
0 = No recommendations 
1 = Some recommendations 
2 = Extensive recommendations 
  
If there are recommendations, it is 
clear whether/how the context 
matters? 
Likert scale 
0 = No contextualization of recommendations 
1 = Some contextualizations of recommendations 
2 = Extensive contextualizations of recommendations 
  
Ease of use 0 = No executive summary 
1 = Executive summary included 
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If executive summary: 
(Categorical) 
0 = no hierarchy of information (e.g., single block of 
text) 
1 = hierarchy of information included (sub-headings, 
bolding, figures, etc.) 
  
Linguistic access 0 = No summary in other language 
1 = Summary in other language included 
  
Availability of the evaluation Likert scale 
0 = Published without any efforts to publicize 
1 = Some effort to publicize (e.g., available on website) 
2 = Press release/policy brief 
3 = Other governance centres actively informed about 
evaluation outcomes (e.g., press conference, available 
in multiple outlets, picked up by the media)? 
  
Evaluand – substance or process? 
(Categorical) 
1 = policy substance 
2 = policy process 
3 = substance + process 
  
Evaluation budget Record budget figure if available.   
General comments  
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Appendix 4 
Figure A4.1: Pearson correlations among the contextual variables (formal evaluations) 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Time horizon 
2. Policy goals 
3. Other sectors 
4. Unintended policy outcomes 
5. External events and circumstances 
6. Political environment 
7. Geography 
8. Science 
1        
0,023 1       
0.213 .256* 1      
0.053 -0.074 0.057 1     
.255* 0.189 .237* 0.048 1    
.301** 0.168 0.179 0.110 0.200 1   
0.173 0.001 0.156 .231* 0.034 .316** 1  
.269* -0.023 0.037 -0.022 0.113 .238* 0.208 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure A4.2: Pearson correlations among the contextual variables (informal evaluations) 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Time horizon 1        
2. Policy goals 0.091 1       
3. Other sectors -0.051 -0.019 1      
4. Unintended policy outcomes -0.002 -,331** -0.006 1     
5. External events and circumstances .282** -0.072 0.166 0.038 1    
6. Political environment 0.152 ,270* ,219* -,323** -0,051 1   
7. Geography 0,106 0,058 -0,054 0,052 0,108 0,160 1  
8. Science 0,185 0,101 0,174 0,064 0,011 -0,066 -0,109 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
